Jai. Sut. I. ii-1).
The whole of the Veda is thus shown to prescribe duty.
49. Arambhavadin.—Yes, it is true. But on the strength of
what has been set out (as the object of inquiry, viz., Dharma or duty, the terms used subsequently like " tasya \ amnayasya, ' tadbhutanam ', etc., though general in character should be understood as referring only) to a portion of the Veda, i.e., to codana (or mandatory section) and not to the whole of it. (Further Sahara's statement)—" The knowledge of karma (Niyoga,
etc.) is the obvious fruit (prayojana) of the Veda " is not for pointing out that the entire Veda inculcates karma. How ? (it may
be asked); on completing the Vedadhyayana (i.e., memorising the Naiyayikas, etc., (say that) W^l^ the Vedas (are of man's creation), sn%WflC the reason for this view is that there is mention of names like Kafhaka and Kalapaka pointing to authors.
64 3f*Bt3T^ sj^ffoi W<lr-To assert that because Jaimini has used the word Veda in I. viii. 27, codana in I. 2 must mean Veda is to belittle Jaimini's intelligence. If he meant that the whole of the Veda was action-related, mm, the right place to use the word Veda would be I. 2 which is the Laksana sutra and he would not postpone its employment to the VIII adhikarana.
XVII.49] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATFD BY JAIMINI 173
text of one's branch of the Veda) one comes across the authoritative statement enjoining the ceremonial bath (which should
therefore follow immediately) so that one entertains the impression that the Veda (apart from its committal to memory) carries no
sense; then (to eradicate such an impression the Bhasyakara, viz., Sahara says)—" We will transgress this mandate. If we do not transgress it we would be rendering the Veda meaningless when (actually) it is frought with meaning.65 The knowledge of
karma is indeed its obvious fruit,68 so that it is clear that what is pointed out is that the Veda does really possess a meaning and
not that there exists no other meaning {i.e., other than karma).
That statement (i.e., dfstohi. etc.) is made to dispel the notion that the Veda is unrelated to artha (sense) and not to disprove that anything apart from karma (viz., Brahman) is to be found in the Veda.
The word karma denotes Dharma only (like agnihotra)
because it is something to be achieved by effort and because the person who undertakes to acquire the knowledge of Dharma seeks
to know if the Veda is significative, i.e., whether there is any meaning yielded by the Veda or not and whether it is possible to understand that significance as being (identical with) Dharma.67 Hence
(to conclude) the Bhasyakara (Sahara) should not be deemed as holding the opinion that the knowledge of karma alone is the fruit of the Veda.
66 Vide the present writer's English translation of Sastradipika, G.O.S., Vol. LXXXIX, pp. 1-15 for a discussion of this topic; also S.B., pp. 5 and 6.
M £& fe <\mh **fi*3t«rcfTr-The Veda in general, with no portion
excepted possesses meaning. It is to indicate this fact that the above statement is made by Sahara and not that any portion of the
Veda is void of meaning, when it denotes something other than karma.
e7 q&r^q *?$ H«r, *T$8n5faf*?T:—Since the word karma means object of knowledge in general—sftRSWFT it denotes both Brahman
and Dharma. There is therefore no need for a separate treatise dealing with the nature of Brahman. This is purvapaksa and the
answer is given in the text beginning with ^afor^sr, etc. The siddhantin says that from the context ^It % etc., karma should naturally mean
Dharma only but that meaning is discarded because of the need to remove the doubt whether the Veda is significant or not. Hence the word karma is taken in the sense of artha.
174 PAtCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVII. 50
50. [Page 50] Again (let us take the Sutra)—" Since the
object of the Veda is to enjoin karya, what does not enjoin karya is purposeless"—Jai. I-ii. 1. There, if the word * anarthakya '
is taken to mean non-denotative {i.e., conveying no meaning), that interpretation is wrong, because the meaning is made clear;
we have the Bhasya text—" Thus in this manner only they
—
arthavadas (the laudatory or condemnatory texts) restate existing things " (S.B. P. 105). If on the other hand the word means
* serving no purpose ' (it is unwelcome) since the mandate enjoining the recital of one's own branch of the Veda (viz.,
' svadhyayodhyetavyah ') does not so much as admit the getting up of even a single letter that is purposeless.68 We will grant that arthavada statements like ' He cried, etc' (are purposeless) since in themselves they do not serve a desired human end
(purusartha). 69 And it is inappropriate to postulate a separate
karya (vidhi) because it (the arthavada—so rodit, etc.) is in syntactical unity (with the negative vidhi—* barhisi rajatam na deyam ').
It is not possible either, to supply (a mandate, since it is absurd to enjoin rodana—howling).
51. The (Upanisadic) statements on the contrary (unlike
the arthavada), are productive of that knowledge which enables one to realise the atman that is rid of every trace of affliction, and fraught as they are with such irreproachable beneficence their value is beyond compare. Hence {i.e., since the Vedanta passages possess an independent value) it was shown (in the ritualistic section) that arthavadas being in themselves incompetent to serve a human end become purposeful as aids to it (pufusartha-yaga
which is the means to Svarga) by extolling it (i.e., the injunction) 68 The arambhavadin says that the word anWR in Jai., I. ii. 1.
cannot be taken to mean 'void of sense' for all the Mlmamsakas are agreed that the Veda in its entirety is significant. Now that the anarambhavadin might urge that if it should mean 'purposeless'
—
fassrzfriTST it would be unacceptable to the arambhavadin also—so
far, the resum£ of the view held by one who advocates the noncommencement of the Uttara-Mlmamsa Sastra.
89 The word 3Rfon could be interpreted in two ways: (i) having no meaning whatever. This is unacceptable both to the opponent and the Siddhantin; (ii) serving no purpose. The Siddhantin admits
purposelessness only with reference to such statements, i.e., arthavadas, as are non-significant without their association with mandatory statements—
vidhivakyas—*/. Jai. Sut., I. ii. 1.
XVIII. 52] VEDANTA—NOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 175
in one way or other (in a secondary sense), and (their utility as auxiliaries to some kriya was stated) not on the supposition that none of these (texts including both arthavadas and Vedantic texts) served any useful purpose unless related to some kriya. And
therefore, only sentences of that description (like so rodit, etc.) were there (under Jai. Sut. I. ii. 1) adduced in illustration (and no Vedantic passage was instanced as auxiliary to karya like
Jyotistoma).
XVIII. 52. Some (Prabhakaras) however account differently for commencing the Sastra {viz., codanalaksano artho
Dharmah). It is indeed not thus (i.e., as stated by the Bhatta School) that the Sastra (Purva Mimamsa) sets about, viz., whether Dharma is what the Veda imports or what the Buddha declares
to be such. How else then ? One who has learnt to recite the Veda will gather (in a general way) some sense (from what he has mastered) and it is there only that views, one discrepant with
the other, exist, (leading to the doubt) whether this one is its sense or that. And it is to resolve those doubts that the Sastra is
commenced.70
53. Even there, i.e., even in the view of the Prabhakaras,
it is not to be understood that inquiry into the Veda in its entirety has been undertaken. How is that (to be known) ? If it were so,
(i.e., when the inquiry related to the meaning of the entire Veda) the sutra should have been framed thus: athato Vedarthajijnasa, since the inquiry is not about Dharma but about Vedartha
(and Vedartha is the object of inquiry).
Prabhakara.—It is true; but then (it must be admitted that authors of sacred writings compose their works to inculcate 70 The Bhatta School justifies the commencement of the Mimamsa
Sastra on the ground that doubt arises as to whether agnistoma, etc., are Dharma or caityavandana; to resolve such a doubt and to prove that agnistoma, etc., are alone Dharma that the Mimamsa Sastra has to be begun. The Prabhakaras on the other hand aver that doubts as to the special significance of the Vedic passages arise and to resolve these doubts the Sastra has to be begun and not for refuting the opinions held by the heretical schools regarding the nature of Dharma. The first Sutra in consequence would mean—It is incumbent on one to inquire into the meaning of the Veda and not—It is incumbent on one to inquire into the meaning of Dharma as the Bhaftas
maintain.
176 PA^CAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVIII. 54
that which is of value (Purusartha). Hence the inclusion of the word 'Dharma' for . impressing purusartha.71
Siddhantin.—lf that be so, let the inquiry be confined to
Dharma only, because it is fraught with a human value and admits of doubt (as to its nature). 72
54. And further the next Sutra also is in consonance (with the first). It is to dispel contrary notions held regarding the nature of Dharma (that the second Sutra)—" That which is supported by Vedic testimony and beneficent in its results, is Dharma "
is intended. Otherwise, i.e., if Vedartha itself is understood as giving rise to contrary notions, then to dispel them the Sutra should have been (framed as) * codana laksano Vedarthah
'
(Vedartha and not Dharma is what the Veda defines), for if
* Dharma ' is taken (as the right word) then it will not be possible to dispel contrary notions regarding Vedartha. How ? (Why not
regard Dharma as used in the sense of Vedartha and the second
sutra as intended for the purpose of refuting any wrong interpretation of Vedartha ?) In so far as the thing that is revealed by
the mandatory statement is Dharma (this is what the Sutra means);
if thus its {i.e., of the thing denoted—artha) nature as Dharma (Dharmatva) is brought to mind, then it cannot be concluded that that alone (viz., Dharma like Jyotistoma, etc.) is Vedartha (i.e., what the entire Veda enjoins) and none other. 73 If however 71 The justification, says Prabhakara, for the use of the word
'Dharma' instead of 'Vedartha' is that Vedartha as a whole is purusartha;
Dharma means purusartha or 'istasadhana'.
72 The word 'Dharma' cannot mean Vedartha in general on the
basis of rutfhi, i.e., common usage, since it may also mean caityavadana.
Ordinarily by Dharma we understand Sreyassadhana, i.e., means to the attainment of bliss. Since Vedartha also is the means of attaining bliss the word 'Dharma' may import Vedartha. But this is not right.
Dharma however relates only to agnihotra, etc., and they alone are the means to bliss. Brahman is not sadhana to bliss but bliss itself.
Hence it is evident that Jaimini has not proposed the inquiry into the whole of Vedartha, but has left Brahmajijnasa unexpounded, which
therefore demands a fresh treatise.
73 It has been pointed out that the word 'Dharma' does not mean Vedartha by common usage—rucjlhi. It cannot also be supposed that figuratively it can be so taken. If the word 'Dharma' should mean Vedartha by (i) Jahallaksana—where the primary sense of the word is altogether discarded, then Vedartha instead of being Dharma would XVIIL 55] VEDANTA^KOT ANTICIPATED BY JAIMINI 177
(the second sutra is interpreted) as laying down that Dharma is the name for what the codana denotes pointing thus to the relation of the name and the named, such a course would clash with
the beginning of the Sastra (Dharmavicara), would lead nowhere, and would be quite arbitrary.
55. [Page 51] But still if it be maintained that the word 1 Dharma ' somehow means Vedartha only, then it would amount to saying that Vedartha is what the codana defines and not what arthavada denotes; and this would lead to the conclusion that like the second adhyaya and the sequel of Jaimini sutras this inquiry (i.e., of the first adhyaya) is in relation to the meaning (artha) of the Veda whose validity has been previously established. 74
* Tatra,' i.e., if the validity has been established in the first sutra itself: * anantaram ', i.e., again, the attempt to prove the validity (as Jaimini does in sutra V—* anupalabdhe arthe tat pramanam
Badarayanasya, etc.) would be out of place ; as also useless would be (the statement of Sabarasvamin)—' Vrttam pramanalaksanam '
—(Brhati—Anandasrama Edn.. p. 370). (In the first adhyaya Jaimini has established only that the Veda is a valid means of knowledge and if what the Veda imports—arthavatva—has also been established by him, Sahara should have said. " Vrttam pramanalaksanam, Vrttanca Vedasya arthavatvaniscayah ").
(Again if the Vedartha has been determined in the second sutra as the one denoted by codana) doubt as to whether mantras and arthavadas signify karya (or not) would not arise; (but then)
that doubt is dispelled only in the sequel (i.e., in the arthavadadhikarana—
Jai. I. ii. 1 ,
* amnayasya ', etc.).
Hence on the ground already stated it must be concluded
that that part of the Veda only which is associated with karya be Adharma; (ii) Ajahallaksana—where the primary sense does not wholly disappear, then as the Pancapadika says (3?NW^n55sroT, etc.) we would not be justified in concluding that what is not enjoined by codana or mandate, is not Vedartha.
5IWlwroitf$*f *«<£.—The doubt arises only after the pramanya of the Veda is understood. Hence the inquiry into the pramanya of the
Veda beginning with the third sutra and ending with the first adhyaya would be supererogatory.
12
178 PAnCAPADIKA OF PADMAPADA [XVIIL 55
was undertaken for inquiry, and inquired into, but not that part of the Veda whose object it is to inquire into the existing entity.
That being so, this (first sutra of Uttara MImamsa, v/z., athato
Brahmajijnasa—* then therefore the inquiry into Brahman ', is
(it is evident) begun with the object of investigating that part of the Veda which deals with the nature of Reality.
Here ends the Second Vanraka of the Ponrapddikd VARtfAKA III
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE AGENT
I. 1. Inquiry into the meanings of words constituting the Jijnasa Sutra—Athato Brahmajijnasa.
[Page 52] " There (i.e., in the first sutra) the word 'atria'
—
then, is to be understood in the sense of immediate succession1 and not in the sense of adhikara (which means commencing a
fresh topic for exposition), the reason being that the desire to understand Brahman is not (a fit subject for commencement) "
and so on is the Bhasya. The objection is raised that such comment (Samkara Bhasya) will be appropriate if the wopd 'jijnasa'
is construed according to its component parts (avayavartha).
For there is no prominence assigned in the Sutra either to Brahman or to Brahmajnana whose exposition may fitly be commenced
1 Samkara comments on the word 4 atha' found in the first sutra
—
3?Tl<fr SSlfasiKU in the following words: <T5Tt*rei*5 an^a^i: m fafmm 3Rf«R»T$rqr<k—Now the first Varnaka dealt with the topic
under inquiry, viz., identity of the individual with Brahman and also the benefit resulting from the knowledge of the identity, viz., the removal of the ills of life; the second, with the topic whether the contents of the Uttara Mimamsa are, or are not subsumed under the Purva Mimamsa. The present section discusses the question whether there is any indication in the first Sutra as to the person competent to pursue the inquiry—adhikarin. The word 'atha' means 'immediate conclusion'—anantarya, implying that Brahman-inquiry is preceded by something. The question is what is that something? It is the
preliminary discipline—moral and spiritual. The antecedent requirements for Brahmajijnasa are known as Sadhana-catusfaya or the four
essential means, viz., discrimination between what is eternal and what is ephemeral—f^nsr^EgfsRSF:, aversion from the enjoyment of
objects here and hereafter—SSTg^'E^mWTT:, acquisition of
mental peace, self-restraint, etc.—5W*Tlf^ra*raq<*., and longing for liberation—*jg§$<^. The word *atha' cannot mean 'commencement'
as some suppose since 'desire—jijnasa—jnatumiccha—desire to know' is not a thing to be commenced. The point to be noticed is that we must be able to ascertain from the Sutra who the person is that is fit for the study of the Ststra and this is evident from the word 'atha*.
180 pancapAdikA of PADMA1?ADA [J. 2
and of desire which is prominent, such commencement is not possible. 2
2. But this word 'jijnasa' is used by many learned men as a term denoting inquiry—vicara—otherwise known as mimamsa
(investigation or examination); e.g., "This therefore they inquire into (jijnasamte), viz., whether the meditation pertaining to Vedic chanting which is subsidiary to the ritual has to be done by the sacrificer or by the officiating priest."—(V.S., III. iv-44). " But this has to be inquired into (jijfiasyam), viz., whether these two (tapya—what is fit to be burnt, viz., body and tapaka—that which burns, viz., samsara) are but features of the single atman or belong to a distinct species (i.e., something distinct from atman— vide V.S., II. ii-10).
3. The commentator of Dharma Mimamsa also (Sahara)
has taken the word (jijnasa) in the aggregate (and not in its component
elements)— " Let one desire to investigate (jijnasitum)
Dharma " ; for the aggregate denotes inquiry, otherwise he would have said, " Let one desire to understand (jnaturn) Dharma."
Hence it is that the caturth! samasa (the compound of the fourth case-ending) has been selected (by Sahara having) admitted that the meaning is of the aggregate and so dissolving the compound (Dharmajijnasa) as Dharmaya-jijnasa (the inquiry is for Dharma).
And the extracts that follow are in conformity thereof:— " So
the Vedic statements are inquired into (vicaryante) by these (Sutras of Jaimini) " ; " The Vedic statements are to be inquired into
(vicarayitavyani) ", and " how are the Vedic statements to be inquired into (vicarayet)? " And again, " the inquiry regarding kratvartha and purusartha ", " kratvartha and purusartha are both inquired into jijnasyete ".
4. Here also the Bhasyakara (Samkara) says :—" therefore has Brahman to be inquired into " ; and again " the inquiry 2 In Brahmajijnasa—Brahmajnanecchfi—it is iccha or desire that is the leading element and not Brahman or Brahmajnana; for 'iccha
kartavya ' is meaningless. Hence ' atha ' cannot mean ' Commencement '.
It is to be noted that the inappropriateness of taking 'atha' in the sense of commencement of a new topic will be apparent only when jijnfisS
is interpreted derivatively—jfiatum iccha and not as a whole which then would mean merely vicara or inquiry. The objection raised is,
"Why should not the word jijnasS be construed collectively
—
^W\§
instead of construing it by dismembering it into its component parts?"