INVESTIGACIONES RELATIVAS AL DESARROLLO DEL:

of Korea research economists, had been busy on a plan before the coup.

The Planning and Programming System (PPS)

The Korean military regime recognized the importance of the bureaucracy

53.

the civil service was an attempt by the government to improve the

administration's capacity to implement development policies.

The Prime Minister, in an address at the opening ceremonies for

the PPS training course introduced by the National Defence College,

observed:

...the current government wants to secure the uniformity of government policies and rationalize the planning, budgeting and management practices in order to increase dramatically the administrative capacity of the

government...the policies of the SCNR can be accomplished only when the strong administrative capacity goes

together with them.92

On 12 July 1961 the Prime Minister directed the Minister for

Cabinet Administration to prepare a plan for the introduction to the

civil service of PPS. PPS, more generally known elsewhere as PPBS

i.e. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, had been in vogue

for some years in American business circles. The system was introduced

into the U.S. Department of Defence when McNamara was Secretary, and

acquired sufficient status for President Johnson in 1965 to direct

that all Federal agencies adopt PPBS. The Korean military leaders were

impressed by their observation of the system as used by the U.S.

military forces, and believed it was to their country's advantage also

to employ PPBS.

PPBS was based on the idea that planning, programming and budgeting

were interrelated aspects of a single process; i.e. the efficient

administrator planned a program of activities within his budgeted

funds, each activity being set at a level and on a timescale suited to

the overall program and budget. Sharkansky states 'PPB represents an

effort at budgetary reform whose practitioners hope to substitute national

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.

The direction to introduce PPS into the Korean Civil Service was formalized as Prime Minister's Directive No. 1, issued at the end of

July. Concurrently the National Defence College was required to prepare

a suitable training course, and the first course commenced at the end

of July 1961. The Prime Minister himself delivered a lecture as part of this

training program. Meanwhile the Bureau of Administrative Management

within the Ministry of Cabinet Administration had prepared a plan for

the introduction of PPS throughout the civil service, together with a

draft revision of the government organization law, made necessary by the changes associated with PPS, and on 5 August presented both to the Prime

94

Minister, who agreed with them. Training of civil servants in PPB

continued at the National Defence College, all above the level of section

chief being required to attend the course. The Prime Minister noted

that PPS had been introduced to the Army in response to wartime needs;

he argued that an even greater need for the planning discipline existed

in the area of civil administration. On 11 August 1961 the Cabinet

approved the draft Bill, which was promulgated on the 25th of that month. Thus less than forty days elapsed from the direction to prepare a study

and the promulgation of appropriate legislation. Fewer than 10 officers

were involved in the preparation, and related areas such as administrative

research in the Ministry of Cabinet Administration were unaware of the 95

PPS study. Later in 1961, in line with the organizational changes

a Brigadier-General was appointed as Planning and Control Officer directly assigned to the Prime Minister, with rank between vice-minister and

minister. He was supported by a staff of 32 men. In each ministry a

planning and coordination officer was appointed together with a staff

of from 10 to 20 in each case. These planning and coordinating officers

5 5

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but were to be under the functional control of the Planning and Control Officer. With this organizational set-up, and with planning and

coordinating staff trained at the National Defence College course, PPS

was introduced into the Republic's civil service in time for the first Five Year Development Plan.

PPS did not achieve the success mooted. Within ministries the planning

and programming sections have no control over the performance of line

branches. Budgetary control has been denied the Planning and Control

Office. Work standards are developed without input from the planning and

programming system.

Reasons for the comparative failure of the introduction of PPS to the administration must include the fact that it was seen by the

bureaucrats as an internal reform aimed at improving their efficiency i.e.,

implying a current lack of efficiency. It was pushed through in haste,

and did not have the national appeal of reforms such as the economic

development plan. Very importantly, Park Chung Hee did not lend his

direct support to the task, choosing instead the Prime Minister to act as

overseer. The strategy employed was comprehensive in that PPS was to

be introduced simultaneously throughout the government administration in

the event this was achieved in a formal sense, but the benefit expected,

coordinated planning, failed to materialize. It is interesting to note

that the introduction of PPBS into U.S. administration later was also

to run into troubles. In 1968, Daniel J. Alesch cited a critical

shortage of people familiar with the system and the reluctance of those

in power to adopt a new system, as principal causes of p r o b l e m s . ^

Later again in 1977, Allen Schick was to write of PPBS in the context of

public administration that it died of multiple causes. He went on to

identify these as: hasty introduction, staff unprepared, insensitivity of

5 6.

SUMMARY

In each of the above countries, Pakistan, Indonesia and Korea,

reform of the administration was initiated by military governments which

had recently taken power. Economic chaos and administrative incompetence

or corruption prevailed in all three countries so that measures to reform

both the economy and public administration were taken quickly. The

approach to administrative reform was comprehensive in each case and

was pursued with vigour by the military leaders, especially in Korea.

A measure of success was achieved in all three countries; although, the

attempt to introduce PPS into the Korean administrative system failed

to meet its goals. It is noteworthy that the administrative bases

inherited by these military governments were flimsy, and any success

achieved by reform measures was therefore enhanced by comparison with

the base.

It is not clear what strategy Sukarno intended to apply in his

approach to the reform of the Indonesia bureaucracy in 1958. The title

of the reform agency ‘Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus' could

have implied the use of comprehensive strategy in that the whole public

service was to be reformed although overall reform could have been

approached in an incremental fashion. In the event the Committee was

disbanded and re-formed with sufficient frequency to preclude the

implementation of any strategy. The Ampera Cabinet under Soeharto

initiated comprehensive reform between 1966 and 1968. Seven separate

reform committees were established each dealing with a different aspect

of government; under Sukarno the public service had been allowed to run

down to the extent where it became necessary for the reformers virtually

5 7

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reviewed their reform measures, which could be expected to result in

incremental adjustment where beneficial. The Development Cabinet which

replaced the Ampera Cabinet in June 1968 continued the comprehensive

reform started by their predecessors.

In the case of Pakistan the reforms proposed in 1961 by the Ahmed

report were comprehensive in that they sought the complete reorganization

of 'the basic machinery for economic and social planning and implementa-

4-- . 9 8

tion....

The Ahmed Committee proposed to broaden the decision-making base

to middle range officers, and by elevating the states of technical officers

to parity with the previously elite generalists. Although the government

set about implementing the committee's recommendations, the extent of

the resulting improvement has been questioned.

The administrative reform of the Park Chung Hee regime initiated

in 1961 in Korea employed a comprehensive strategy. The size of the

bureaucracy was reduced at one stroke by sacking 26% of personnel from

each government agency. Similarly the attempt to introduce PPS was

applied throughout the public service. This ruthless approach to

administrative reform was accompanied and complemented by rapid, planned

economic development and was rewarded by a considerable measure of

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