Investigaciones Relevantes Existentes

In Chapter 1, 'visibility' was conceived in terms of a triad consisting of information, perception and interpretation. Information consists of the raw data that human beings know or think they know; perception refers to the manner in which that data is or has been observed; and interpretation refers to the way in which that data is processed in order to generate meaning.

However, with this and an idea of the varying extents to which the traditional principles of maritime strategy accounted for visibility in mind, visibility itself can be more clearly defined. When considering the concept, it is useful to think in terms of a 'coin' analogy. The visibility 'coin' has two distinct sides: the technical and the cognitive. The technical side concerns the information aspect of the triad; the cognitive often concerns the perception-interpretation elements.

What makes visibility distinct from the traditional principles is this union of the technical and the cognitive. The traditional principles of sea (later battlespace) control and sea/area denial account, to a certain extent, for technical matters such as information and information dominance. They do not account as much, however, for the cognitive side of the coin. Fleet-in-being and forward positioning both account for the cognitive to varying extents, often being used as approaches towards naval 394 _{Mizokami, K., ‘Two Koreas, Three Navies’, US Naval Institute News, last modified 8 May 2014,} https://news.usni.org/2014/05/08/two-koreas-three-navies; Gause, K. E., North Korea’s Provocation and Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime, Occasional Paper (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2015), p. 48.

diplomacy. They do not account as greatly, however, for technical matters. Visibility is thus distinct because it acknowledges the link between the technical and cognitive sides of the coin, as suggested by the triad outlined in Chapter 1.

Thus, in practice, the strategic principle of visibility control and/or denial takes such operational forms as information dominance; knowledge superiority; deterrence; and naval reassurance. Furthermore, it acts as a conceptual strategic umbrella for those operations where the technical and cognitive sides of visibility are seen in unity. Control/denial of visibility has both a physical and a non-physical dimension to it. Physical assets, such as ships and information networks, are directed towards its attainment. Ultimately, however, its effects are felt in the non-physical, cognitive domain - through the attainment of information dominance and the reinforcement of perceptions of trust, strength, reassurance, partnership or deterrence. The Horn of Africa case examined in Chapter 3 illustrates this; part of the challenge for naval counter-piracy missions is to coordinate and position their forces where threats are likely to arise. The use of physical information hardware to maintain an information network where pirate attacks and merchant transits are logged enables the 'tailored' use of physical naval forces where they are required/most likely to be required, ensuring their effectiveness against the pirate threat. In turn this acts as a powerful cognitive deterrent (see Subsection 3.3.3), as well as helping to facilitate local sea control and forward positioning.

However, the teachings of Corbett must be borne in mind here. Sea control (and its predecessor, command of the sea) serves as a key analogy when understanding the fluid nature of visibility. As Corbett's writings made clear, command of the sea is never absolute. No navy can ever truly be said to be in 'full' control of the world's waterways. Instead, 'control' exists to varying degrees in different locations at different points in time. Furthermore, command of the sea does not simply pass from one actor to another should the former lose it. Instead, it can be the case that the sea is 'un-commanded'.

The sea control analogy is a reminder that visibility control is equally as fluid. In today's globalised, interconnected world, in which exists a multitude of human actors with access to the means of disseminating data, narratives and interpretations, it is unlikely that a single naval actor could truly ever be in 'full' control of visibility. In a similar vein to Corbett's notion of command of the sea, control of visibility is highly contested and only exists to varying degrees according to needs and circumstances.

Nor does control of visibility automatically pass from one actor to another when the former loses that control. At the Horn of Africa, international naval missions may have had a great degree of success in controlling visibility and deterring pirate attacks, but this does not mean their control of visibility is absolute. Pirate attacks do still occasionally happen in spite of multinational naval information networking, as occurred in October 2016, when a pirate attack occurred on the chemical tanker CPO

Korea 330 nautical miles offshore395_{. This points to a limitation on the extent of}

visibility control in this case.

So, to summarise what has been said so far, to 'control' visibility is to be able to influence it in a positive manner conducive to one's interest(s) – whether this be at the national level, as in the case of territorial waters defence, or at the international level (as in the case of multinational security operations. To 'deny' visibility is to be able to influence it in a negative manner also favourable to one's national and/or security interests.

By way of a word of warning, like any maritime strategic principle control/denial of visibility should never be considered as an end in itself. It is a means to an end, in the same vein as sea/battlespace control/denial, power projection, fleet- in-being and forward positioning. Controlling or denying visibility does not in itself bring about a decisive end to a conflict, international dispute or diplomatic exercise. However, what it can do is to aid an actor in advancing towards their desired end goal(s). Exerting a degree of control of visibility can bring strategic options to the metaphorical table; denying visibility helps to limit a rival or adversary's own strategic options.

The need for this principle is greater than ever before given the advancements in information and communication technologies witnessed in the contemporary world, where data and interpretations can be spread and perceived with rapidity. In such a world, controlling visibility can have a significant impact on an actor’s behaviour. The Chinese case illustrates this; according to Cheng, the PRC has recognised that contemporary information technologies have “altered the relationship between people and conflict” in a manner that allows visibility control to have an impact on the 395 _{EU NAVFOR Somalia, 'European Union's Counter-Piracy Operation Atalanta Extended by Two} Years to Help Ensure Pirate Attacks on Seafarers off Coast of Somalia Remain Suppressed', last modified 28 November 2016, http://eunavfor.eu/european-unions-counter-piracy-operation-atalanta- extended-by-two-years-to-help-ensure-pirate-attacks-on-seafarers-off-coast-of-somalia-remain-

behaviour of potential adversaries, such as the US396_{. Due to advancements in}

information, communication and media technologies, the PRC has a set of instruments at its disposal with which it can influence the situational picture in certain ways. This can include fomenting doubts in neutral/adversary authorities and populations about their own actions; reinforcing and/or undermining certain domestic/foreign attitudes towards confrontation and conflict; and/or deterring foes by sapping their political will to choose confrontational options. All of these impacts can be used as means towards a strategic end – in this case, the defence of the PRC’s homeland and the long-term discouragement of foreign military aggression as a response to the PRC’s own actions. What the Chinese case shows is that visibility control has a strategic utility made all the more relevant by contemporary technologies and the ramifications they have for strategy.