1. A and B agreed and decided to rise publicly and take a r m s against the government w i t h t h e help of their followers. E v e n if they did not carry out their plan to overthrow the government, A and B are liable for conspiracy to commit rebellion under Art. 136 of t h e Revised Penal Code.
But if A and B and their followers did rise publicly and take a r m s a g a i n s t t h e g o v e r n m e n t to overthrow it, thereby committing rebellion, their conspiracy is not a felony. They are liable for rebellion and their conspiracy is only a m a n n e r of incurring criminal liability for rebellion.
2. A, B, a n d C, after h a v i n g c o n c e i v e d a c r i m i n a l p l a n , got together, agreed and decided to kill D. If A, B and C failed to carry out t h e plan for s o m e r e a s o n or another, t h e y are not liable for h a v i n g conspired a g a i n s t D, because t h e crime t h e y conspired to commit, w h i c h is murder, is not treason, rebellion or sedition.
B u t if they carried out t h e plan and personally took part in its execution which resulted in t h e killing of D, they are all liable for murder, even if A merely acted as guard outside the house where D w a s killed and B merely held t h e arms of D w h e n C stabbed h i m to death. Their conspiracy is only a m a n n e r of incurring criminal liability for murder. It is not an offense, not only because a crime w a s committed after t h e conspiracy, but also because conspiracy to commit murder is not punished in t h e Revised Penal Code.
Indications of conspiracy.
When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to t h e attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy. (People vs. No. L-35700, Oct. 53 SCRA 246, 254)
Thus, an accused h a s been held as a co-conspirator as t h e cir- cumstances of h i s participation indubitably showed unity of purpose and unity in t h e execution of t h e unlawful acts, gleaned from that fact t h a t he k n e w of t h e plot to a s s a s s i n a t e t h e victim as he too had been ordered to scout for a m a n w h o could do t h e job; he also knew exactly the place where t h e killing w a s to take place and also the date and approximate t i m e of t h e assault. (People vs. Cantuba, G.R. No. 7 9 8 1 1 , March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 289, 298)
For a collective responsibility among t h e accused to be estab- lished, it is sufficient t h a t at t h e time of t h e aggression, all of them acted in concert, each doing h i s part to fulfill their common design to kill their victim, and although only one of t h e m m a y have actually stabbed t h e victim, t h e act of t h a t one is deemed to be the act of all. (People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 9 0 6 4 1 , Feb. SCRA 794, 798)
The acts of the defendants must show a common design.
It is fundamental for conspiracy to exist that there must be unity of purpose and unity in t h e execution of t h e unlawful objective. Here, appellants did not act with a unity of purpose. Even assuming that appellants have joined together in the killing, such circumstances alone do not satisfy the requirement of a conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy. It m u s t be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. Obedience to a command does not necessarily show concert of design, for at any rate it is the acts of the conspirators that show their common design.
Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this
fact alone does not prove conspiracy. (People vs. No. Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172, 186-188)
People vs.
(167 439)
Facts: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year-old retardate, and the
accused Pugay were friends. On the evening of May 19, 1982, while a town fiesta was being held in the public the group of accused Pugay and Samson saw the deceased walking nearby, and started mak- ing fun of him. Not content with what they were doing, accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of a wheel and poured its contents on the body of Miranda. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
Held: Where there is nothing in the records showing that there
was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose between the two accused immediately before the commission of the crime, where there was no animosity between the deceased and the accused and it is clear that the accused merely wanted to make fun of the deceased, the respective criminal responsibility of the accused arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him.
Period of time to afford opportunity for meditation and reflection, not required in conspiracy.
Unlike in evident premeditation, where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and for the perpetrator to deliberate on t h e consequences of his intended deed (U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 330), conspiracy arises on the very i n s t a n t the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once this a s s e n t is established, each and everyone of the conspirators is made criminally liable for t h e crime, committed by anyone of t h e m . (People vs. Monroy, et 104 Phil. 759)