Iris central alargado

Empirical facts about our social context are relevant to considerations of social justice because they play a central function both in determining the veracity of the claims that are made and in delineating the extent to which the implementation of a policy could be considered achievable. Yet, almost without exception political philosophers

“have failed to consider the bearing that empirical findings might have on their formulation” of accounts of social justice (Miller, 1992: 555). Questions which should be assessed on a factual level are often treated as issues open to subjective interpretation. As deep disagreements regarding the demands of social justice are frequently informed by disparate ideas of the extent to which individuals are dependent on society in realizing their goals, the need to confront the underlying assumptions about our social context and human nature will remain instrumental to the resolution of many moral disputes (Taylor, 1995: 291). What counts as acceptable claims on the basis of social justice has to be partially determined with reference to the factual accuracy of its underlying assumptions.

Empirical studies elicit overwhelming and widespread agreement on abstract principles of distributive justice among individuals from diverse social and economic backgrounds, even while there remains to be substantial disagreement on the practical assessment of the causes of personal success in existing societies (Miller, 1992: 585;

Kluegel & Smith, 1986: 2), and, by implication, on whether achieved outcomes are fair and acceptable from a moral perspective. Conflicting beliefs regarding the relative importance of various factors in determining personal success lead to considerable differences of opinion on the fairness of existing societies. Accordingly, the greatest challenge to the advancement of just practices in democratic societies appears not to lie in the strive for consensus on the exact principles of justice, but in the promotion of an adequate understanding of, and accurate knowledge concerning, the nature of our communal social reality. For this reason, the final chapter draws heavily on empirical evidence to outline the nature of our actual social context, in order to offer a more realistic account of the effects that the practice of economic inheritance have on the actual life prospects of individuals, as well as on the overall fairness of the basic social structure.

The fact that many moral disagreements are informed by contrasting perceptions of the nature of our social reality does not imply that accurate empirical information concerning the actual nature of our social reality will automatically lead to the easy resolution of these moral disputes. Yet, the broad consensus that exists between individuals from all different socio-economic backgrounds about abstract principles of distributive justice is a source of hope, because it allows for the possibility of positive change, by showing that better understanding of, and information regarding, the actual state of affairs can lead to wider agreement on what can be regarded as necessary and acceptable moral objectives in the context of democratic societies. We can improve the process by which we exercise our judgement if we “do our cognitive best, exercise our most critical analytical reasoning, empirically test and compare our theories and ideas in order to determine which are false and which closely approximate the truth” (Hammond, 1996: 6). As Sam Harris writes in The Moral Landscape: How Science can Determine Human Values, questions about moral values are really questions about the well-being of conscious creatures. Differences of opinion on moral questions are to a large extent due to the incompleteness of our knowledge about human well-being, and the range of acceptable views will become

narrower as opinion becomes increasingly constrained by fact (2010: 10). The dichotomy between how we think about physical health and how we think about mental or societal health reveals a bizarre double standard, which is predicated on the assumption or pretence that we do not know anything about human well-being (2012:

19). But human well-being

entirely depends on events in the world and on states of the human brain.

Consequently, there must be scientific truths to be known about it. A more detailed understanding of these truths will force us to draw clear distinctions between different ways of living in society with one another, judging some to be better or worse, more or less true to the facts, and more or less ethical.

Clearly, such insights could help us to improve the quality of human life - and this is where academic debate ends and choices affecting the lives of millions of people begin (Harris, 2010: 2 – 3).

We might never be able to identify a single right answer to every moral question or an ultimate best social arrangement which would enable people to have the best possible lives. This does not imply that we cannot identify options which are clearly better than many others or resolutely reject those which are unfair and detrimental to human well-being and individual life prospects. The absence of absolute certainty does not make the effort to find better, more morally compelling solutions any less worthwhile or consequential.

Conclusion: Property as Malleable Social Relation

Property rights are contingent social constructs, the nature and content of which are determined by existing customs and convention, and can vary significantly. Property rights are based on a social consensus that developed rather haphazardly over time, and while the institution of private property has been retrospectively justified and is incorporated in many of our legal declarations, there has never been a point in time during which the general distribution or principles of property rights have collectively been decided on – only a process of gradual reform that has continuously been informed and constrained by previous and current entitlements. There is thus nothing inevitable about the specific manner in which we chose to administer property rights.

The implication of this is that we can and should reflect on the desirability of our present property arrangements, as the distribution of property frequently has a decisive impact on the current and future prospects of individuals. Accordingly, this chapter set out to assess and re-evaluate our current understanding of, and moral justifications for, private property rights, in order to establish the background conditions against which the practice of economic inheritance can be evaluated from a moral perspective.

This chapter contested both the idea of absolute ownership and the notion of the radically independent individual, who is solely responsible for her success and wholly entitled to the products of her endeavours. It demonstrated that property rights are contingent legal constructs which can and should be evaluated and reformulated on the basis of the social outcomes that are realized as a result of the existing institutional framework. Theoretical analyses of the moral principles on which justifications of the institution of private property are usually based revealed that none of the justificatory arguments of ownership prove to be complete and conclusive in their own right. An overview of the merits and implications of various justificatory principles revealed that any compelling justification of private property inevitably had broadly egalitarian implications. Specifically, it showed that, to the extent that these principles can provide a convincing moral defence of private property acquisition, they cannot be extended to include the practice of economic inheritance as it currently exists. The fact that the justificatory principles of ownership, including that of liberty, all had egalitarian implications prompted a concise look at what could be considered a relevant conception of equality within the context of contemporary democratic societies. The idea of moral equality, understood as a relational standing of mutual recognition and respect, which is safeguarded through the protection of certain rights and access to basic material resources, was propagated. Finally, the concluding section offered a motivation for the inclusion of substantial empirical evidence concerning the nature of the existing social context in moral assessments of social institutions and practices. The next chapter will draw extensively on the insights developed here in its moral evaluation of the practice of economic inheritance.

Chapter 3: Analysing and Addressing Injustices Inherent in the Practice of