All the steps discussed so far aim at enhancing the capabilities of the existing organisations, in order to enable the nations in the transatlantic area the better to cope with the challenges, risks and dangers confronting them now and in the foresee- able future. But our long-term vision is for a zone of common security and collective action from Finland to Alaska, where membership of NATO and the EU has de facto created a zone in which partners such as the US, NATO and the EU often have largely identical political interests, even though they oc- casionally pursue different objectives and have different stra- tegic outlooks, responsibilities and capabilities. They are signatories to quite a few international treaties and agreements that tie them together, but their political coordination and cooperation need to be improved. As we have repeatedly stat- ed, we are convinced that there is no security for Europe with- out the US, but we also dare to submit that there is no hope for the US to sustain its role as the world’s sole superpower without the Europeans as allies.
As such an alliance serves the strategic interests of both sides, the US and the EU, we propose, as a first step towards a new and wider transatlantic bargain, the establishment of a US–
EU–NATO steering directorate at the highest political level, based on existing treaties and agreements, such as the US–EU Agreement, the Washington Treaty and the EU Treaties. Its immediate task will be the coordination of common re- sponses in crises where common interests are in danger. The point of such a directorate would be to better liaise for the common good, to coordinate who takes the lead on which issue, and to ensure that the three entities support each other. Of course, this could not happen without capabilities. Without capabilities, such institutions are nothing. But in this case, the parties do have capabilities. It is, therefore, our hope that those capabilities can be better harnessed and directed. The US would be persuaded and kept involved by, among other things, its effective double influence in the directorate, with its presence felt not just through the direct US component, but also through its presence as a component of NATO. It is hoped that this ‘double vote’ on such a group would encour- age the US to become more involved in the international de- bate than it has been in recent years.
Obviously, NATO members that are not (or not yet) EU members could take the view that they have only one vote, whereas EU members who are also in NATO have two. To eliminate this irritation, one could decide that NATO will always be the body in which a topic is discussed first, and that those NATO members who are also EU members will under- take not to deviate from their NATO vote when the issues are discussed in EU bodies. Thus, EU deliberations would be- come discussions of how to implement a decision that NATO has taken and to which the EU will contribute (under a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ or similar arrangement).
The steering directorate would also be able to provide ideas and considerations for other bodies, not least to put things on
the agenda of the G8, for that body to consider further. The steering directorate would likewise be the ideal body to intro- duce long-term issues into the practical arena.
That is why we propose its establishment as the first step on our roadmap towards a new transatlantic bargain. Should it turn out to be a functioning arrangement, then it will become the body that could – and indeed should – be tasked with developing the necessary instruments for the foundation of a transatlantic forum of cooperation, mutual assistance and se- curity with a hitherto unknown degree of integration, i.e. a new transatlantic charter for peace, security and stability. That is what we mean when we speak of a new transatlantic bargain on collective defence and common security.
But we are convinced that this approach could also help the two mutually indispensable partners, the Europeans and the North Americans, to go step by step towards close coopera- tion beyond the domains of security and defence – and in time even further. The transatlantic body that will emerge at the end of our roadmap will thus be capable of directing thought towards far wider and longer-term issues than are normally on the table at international discussions. Climate change and other very long-term issues that will impact on all the nations involved could be raised at such a forum, whereas they are unlikely – or less likely – to be raised at the institu- tional level. It is, therefore, hoped that we could move for- ward, step by step, towards more, wider and better transatlantic cooperation.