IT 1.1.4.2 Exigencia de calidad de aire interior

Education PhD Student in Economics, University of Vienna, Thesis Title: The Privatisation of Public Utilities

Research Student in Economics, European University Institute

MSc in Economics, University of Bristol, Dissertation with Distinction

BSc in Economics and Sociology, University of Bristol, First Class Honours

Employment Econometrician, E-Control, Austrian Regulatory Au-thority for Electricity and Natural Gas

Full-Time Assistant, University of Vienna

Teaching MSc-level courses: (a) Sector-specific problems in Public Utility Management, (b) Financial Services: Risk, (c) Advanced Topics in Public Utility Management; BSc-level course: (a) International Public Utility Manage-ment

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Awards MSc and PhD scholarship from the British Economic and Social Research Council, (2003)

Full-time postgraduate scholarship from the Austrian Ministry for Education, Science and Culture (2004) Research grant, University of Vienna (2007)

Projects Competition on the Rails: Evidence from the UK Expe-rience, 2006 - 2007 , funded by the Austrian National Bank.

Abstract

The thesis presents three essays on privatisation and market reform in infrastructure industries. An analysis of the British railway sector over a period of 40 years in-vestigates whether the privatisation and divestiture of the former state monopolist led to performance improvements. Statistical and econometric analysis highlights the importance of scale economies. Further, there are strong suggestions that while liberalisation initially led to an increase in cost efficiency, performance deteriorated over time. The second essay looks at a very broad sample of over 2000 publicly and privately owned utilities in OECD countries. A range of performance measures are used to establish that market reform and private ownership have a statistically and economically significant impact on firm profitability and efficiency. Sub-sample ana-lysis further suggests that the effects are not uniform across industries. Building on some stylised facts, the third essay builds a theoretical model of contract length in a monopoly franchise bidding system. In particular the model introduces a mechanism which can induce bidders to reveal the total surplus-maximising contract length to the uninformed regulator.

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Zusammenfassung

Die Dissertation beleuchtet verschiedene Aspekte der Privatisierung und Liberalisie-rung in den Infrastruktursektoren Wasser, Transportwesen, Energie, und Postdienst-leistungen. In einer Analyse des Britischen Eisenbahnsektors ¨uber einen Zeitraum von ¨uber 40 Jahren, wird der Frage nachgegangen ob die durchgef¨uhrten Reformen und Restrukturierungsmanahmen zu ¨Anderungen in der Kosteneffizienz oder Qualit¨at gef¨uhrt haben. In einem zweiten Essay wird auf Basis einer Stichprobe mit ¨uber 2000

¨offentlichen und privaten Infrastrukturunternehmen untersucht ob, und in welchem Ausmaß, Unterschiede im Hinblick auf finanzielle Kennzahlen erkennbar sind. Im letzten Kapitel wird in einem theoretischen Model ein Auktionsmechanismus vorge-stellt, welcher die optimale Laufzeit bei Monopol-Konzessionen (“franchise bidding”) offenbart. Dabei wird unterstellt, dass die Bieter ¨uber mehr Informationen als der Re-gulator verf¨ugen und der Mechanismus daher die Bieter dazu veranlasst, zumindest einen Teil dieser Informationen dem Regulator bekannt zu geben (“truth revelation”).

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