The analytical tools, developed and presented in section A allow for a systematic comparative evaluation of self- and co-regulation schemes. For this study, a selection of non-UK schemes with a focus on consumer-protection issues has been made (see Table 2). The eight cases chosen offer a mixture of
• application fields (Internet codes of conduct; content-rating schemes)
• geographical regions (European Union, North America, Australasia)
• self- and co-regulation (intensity of governmental involvement)
• particularly successful/best-practice and unsuccessful schemes (according to the literature)
Table 2: Selected Cases
Successful schemes outside of the UK Unsuccessful schemes European Union North America Australasia
Internet Codes of
Note: Cases marked with an * in the table are described as good or best practice in the literature
Approach
The starting point is the study’s primary goal to examine whether and how success and failure of selected self- and co-regulatory schemes can be explained by their respective institutional design, by characteristics of the industries involved and by the established regulatory environment. Evaluation is supposed to show if differences regarding the performance of the institutions studied can be explained by differences of contextual factors and institutional success factors.
The evaluation of successful or unsuccessful performance calls for different approaches in the two fields of application, because the primary objectives (intended outcomes, impacts) vary considerably. Hence, from application field to application field, there are differences in the mixture of performance criteria selected for empirical analyses.
For media content-rating schemes, we prioritise the performance indicators awareness of and attitude towards the rating schemes. The rationale for the selection of awareness and attitude as key criteria is given because success of a content-rating scheme depends on broad public awareness and understanding of the scheme and of the meanings of the content classifications in use. It further demands public confidence in the rating institutions, the rating schemes and the ratings as such. A successful rating institution also depends on industry (content providers) awareness of rating schemes. Industry needs to know the schemes, how to use the rating systems and how to comply with rating rules. Moreover, the growing number of rating schemes (motion pictures, television, Internet, games) demands awareness of schemes across the communications sectors and for awareness on how the ratings relate with other schemes. Finally, the political responsibilities regarding protection of minors demand an awareness of rating/classification issues among the public policy makers.
For the Internet codes of conduct, we focus mainly upon adoption and action variables, as these are considered as priority criteria for their performance. Success of an Internet code of conduct heavily depends on the level of adoption by the industry. A code without any signatories hardly provides any added regulatory value. Action – i.e. in terms of compliance with a code of conduct – is referred to as a second crucial performance criterion. Added regulatory value is achieved if the signatories of a code effectively comply with the objectives and standards they have agreed on.
Evaluation should show if differences regarding performance in the respective fields of priority can be explained by contextual factors and institutional success factors.
Theoretically it would be possible to assess all the above-listed success and contextual factors (section A-2 and A-3) and to investigate the significant differences. However, given considerable differences regarding the explanatory potential of the various factors and indicators developed, further selections of factors are useful and necessary.13
The selection of success and contextual factors for empirical investigations is based on an approach driven by basic assumptions regarding theoretically plausible interrelations between performance indicators (outcome/impact) on the one hand and institutional/organisational success factors and contextual factors on the other. Each assumption combines at least one performance criterion with one institutional/organisational success factor or with one contextual factor. Among many possible assumptions only those which are considered particularly relevant for the selected/prioritised performance criteria in the two fields of application have been selected for empirical investigation (Content-rating schemes: Awareness & Attitude;
Internet Codes: Adoption & Action).14
Selected Basic Assumptions on Awareness of and Attitude Towards Media Content-Rating Schemes in the Film/Broadcasting Industry:
A 1: The range of resources that alternative regulatory institutions can draw on essentially promotes their ability to increase public awareness of the institutions.
Rationale: The ability of alternative regulatory institutions to gain public awareness (visibility, knowledge, and understanding) for their content rating-schemes depends – inter alia – on adequate resources in terms of funding, staff, and communications strategies (marketing activities, technical support). The awareness among the general public is particularly relevant because the success of media content-rating schemes strongly depends on broad knowledge and understanding of the scheme.
A 2: Strong involvement of non-industry members in alternative regulatory institutions promotes the attitude towards the institution in terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy.
Rationale: The attitude towards alternative regulatory institutions in terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy depends – inter alia – on adequate involvement of industry members in media content-rating schemes. Adequate involvement of non-industry members can counter self-serving tendencies by the non-industry (i.e. provide a watchdog function) thus contributing to public trust in a rating scheme and its overall legitimacy. Involvement of non-industry members (e.g. consumer representatives, independent experts) may be achieved, for example, by appropriate representation of non-industry members in the decision-making bodies of the alternative regulatory institution.
A 3: Involvement of governmental actors in alternative regulatory institutions promotes the awareness of the institution among policy makers and it contributes to the attitude towards the regulatory institution in terms of trust, credibility and legitimacy.
Rationale: Awareness and credibility of alternative regulatory institutions depend – inter alia – on adequate involvement of governmental actors in alternative regulatory institutions. State oversight of rating institutions may counter the industry’s self-serving tendencies. Political responsibilities regarding protection of minors call for an awareness of rating/classification issues among the public policy makers and for awareness of how various rating schemes across the communications industries relate to each other.
Table 3 shows the prioritised fields for empirical evaluation of the selected media content-rating schemes. It summarises and operationalises the “4A concept” and the related contextual and institutional/organisational success factors.
Table 3: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Media Content-Rating Schemes
Performance criteria Awareness (and knowledge) Attitude: trust, credibility and legitimacy
Selected indicators for
empirical analysis public awareness of the existence, goals and meaning of rating schemes and their processes (and how the public can use them)
industry (content providers) awareness of rating schemes, and how to use or comply with them
awareness across the communications sectors, and among public policy makers, and how the ratings relate with other schemes
success factors Adequate resources in terms of funding, staff, and communications
Contextual factor Adequate involvement of governmental actors Selected indicators for
empirical analysis encouragement of self-regulation by government (carrot; inspiration) demand for self-regulation by government (stick; threat)
financial government support (subsidy)
involvement of government personnel (information) government involvement via contracts (contractual)
collaboration between government and the alternative regulatory institution (ARI) in regulatory practice (cooperation)
defined division of responsibilities between government and ARI (periodic) review of the scheme by state authorities
political appreciation of the scheme and its outcomes (symbolic support) co-regulation within a legal framework
Selected Basic Assumptions on Adoption of Internet Codes of Conduct and Action/Compliance with the Codes of Conduct:
A 4: A high intensity of competition in the ISP market in a country decreases the incentives for ISPs to adopt and accept alternative regulatory institutions on a large scale.
Rationale: The level of acceptance of alternative regulatory organisations and the level of adoption of alternative regulatory modes in a country depend – inter alia – on the intensity of competition in the ISP market in the respective country. Strong competition in an ISP market decreases the incentives of ISPs to accept additional regulatory authorities alongside statutory authorities. Moreover, intense competition reduces the incentive to comply with voluntary codes of conduct, which put additional restraints on the options for market behaviour in a competitive market. In effect, intense competition hampers the adoption of alternative regulation on a large scale, i.e. adoption by many market participants. At the same time, intense competition can promote the adoption of alternative regulatory institutions on a limited scale, i.e. adoption by some market participants who aspire to the reputation benefits accruing from self-regulatory measures.
A 5: Strong international involvement of a national Internet organisation with an international Internet organisation and intensive modes of cooperation within this international Internet organisation contribute to a high level of adoption of alternative regulatory modes at national level.
Rationale: The level of consumer protection on the Internet in a country depends – inter alia – on adequate international cooperation between national Internet organisations.
The international involvement of a recognised national Internet institution (e.g. via membership or formal agreements) is a prerequisite for transnational cooperation in order to meet transnational regulatory challenges. A high level of adoption of standards at international level combined with intensive modes of cooperation within the respective international Internet institution (i.e. cooperation going beyond mutual exchange of opinions) increases pressure on national Internet organisations to adopt and comply with standards on which agreement has been found at international level.
A 6: Extensive powers of alternative regulatory organisations to impose sanctions on violations of principles of a code of conduct promote industry compliance with rules and obligations under a code.
Rationale: The level of compliance with a code of conduct depends – inter alia – on the powers to impose sanctions where there are violations. Hence, adequate power of sanction in the case of malpractice (violations/non-observance of principles/objectives) is considered to be a key success factor for alternative modes of regulation. The level of sanction powers available to an alternative regulatory institution affects the credibility of the whole alternative regulatory system, the room for manoeuvre and action of the alternative regulatory organisation and the incentives of industry members to comply with rules and obligations. Strong incentives for compliance are present if violations of principles result in significant disadvantages for the respective violator.
Table 4 shows the prioritised fields for empirical evaluation of the selected Internet codes of conduct. It summarises and operationalises the “4A concept”, and the related contextual and institutional/organisational success factors.
Table 4: Selected Evaluation Criteria for Internet Codes of Conduct Performance criteria Adoption: concurrence with schemes and
acceptance of authority Action: compliance, complaints and disputes
complaints and disputes on how code is implemented (if at all)
sanctions and adjudications
governmental (non-)engagement (e.g.
proposed regulations/court decisions)
Contextual factors Intensity of competition
Availability of international organisations that could take over regulatory tasks
Selected indicators for
empirical analysis number of market participants
intensity of competition in the ISP market in a country
recognised international Internet organisations adequate modes of international cooperation to meet transnational regulatory challenges contribute to international efforts for the solution of transnational regulatory problems
Using the above outline approach for empirical investigations it has to be borne in mind, that it is based on a range of selections according to prioritised fields for analysis. Many additional contextual and institutional/organisational success factors do in fact influence
improves with the number of factors researched, a reduction of factors was unavoidable given the limited resources of this research project. The following analysis of the selected criteria must be understood as a basic attempt to search for and to explain interrelations between performance, contextual and institutional/organisational success factors. The analytical framework developed, especially the elaborated lists of performance criteria, success factors, contextual factors and the related indicators for empirical measurement (see sections A) can be guidance for systematic follow-up research.