Stop being a tree hugger. Let’s face it and forget all this fancy footwork regarding automation and complicated controls. It all boils down to skill. Bringing the discussion home, browsing NTSB accident reports for aircraft that involuntarily departed the runway during landing (so-called runway excursions) brings up several overrun accidents. An overrun is not having enough stopping distance so you go off the end whereas an excursion is not being able to keep it between the sides and you make an inappropriate exit (i.e. you go off the side into the grass). Investigators focused more on tailwind conditions as a major contributing factor of overruns, but hardly mentioned runway surface condition (i.e. rain) as a cause of overrun accidents. In one particular report regarding American Airlines flight 331, investigators concluded:
In the last 10 years, many aviation safety organizations have studied runway overruns involving transport-category airplanes to identify high risk factors that lead to overruns and strategies to mitigate risks. A common finding is that the risk of an overrun is greatly increased when landings are conducted on contaminated runways in tailwind conditions. Any tailwind increases the approach and touchdown groundspeed of an aircraft, requiring more runway length to decelerate. This factor can be critical where poor runway conditions exist… (NTSB 2).
In other words, it seems that the NTSB is saying that whereas runway surface conditions are important in analyzing stopping distance, it is a tailwind that will significantly deteriorate stopping performance and is therefore considered the prime factor that pilot decision making should account for in a land/go-around/divert decision process. Yet, this is still in reference to overruns, not excursions.
The ATSB (Australian Transport Safety Board) has a fantastic publication that looks at 120 excursions (termed veer-offs) and overruns worldwide from 1998 to 2007 (ATSB 9). In brief, most excursions occurred in Asia (30%) and were attributed to the following:
Flight crew technique and decision factors:
– incorrect crosswind landing technique (i.e. failure to correctly crab or de-crab the aircraft on approach), inappropriate use of differential braking or nosewheel steering, or exiting the runway at high speed.
Weather factors:
– runway condition (e.g. ice, snow, standing water, rubber contamination), wind shear, crosswinds and tailwinds, inaccurate reporting of crosswind conditions or reverse thrust effect in a crosswind.
Systems factors
Page | 95 “…flight crew technique and decision-related factors were present in 59 accidents, and accounted 37 per cent of all contributing factors identified. They were often the result of a long or fast landing following an un-stabilized approach, which was, in turn, due to excess airspeed or deviation from the glide path during the approach. Delayed flight crew action in the use of braking devices is also a common crew technique/decision- related contributor to runway excursions. In veer-offs, incorrect crab technique or incorrect use of differential steering and reverse thrust was also present as a crew technique/decision-related factor” (ATSB 23).
“Crosswinds are a major contributing factor to runway veer-offs. Common factors involved in crosswind-related excursions are flying an incorrect crosswind approach, a crosswind above SOP limits, or a failure to use correct braking techniques for crosswind conditions. Veer-offs accounted for eight per cent of all approach and landing accidents and serious incidents worldwide between 1984 and 1997, with crosswinds and wet runways involved in the majority of those (FSF, 2000f). Analysis of the 120 runway excursion accidents on landing recorded in the WAAS showed that of the 49 veer-off accidents that occurred between 1998 and 2007, a crosswind was a contributing factor in 18 (37 per cent) cases. A wet, water-affected, or contaminated runway was present in 30 (61 per cent) of the veer-off accidents” (ATSB 62).
So there you have it, a pretty damning account of pilot technique in Asia. In my conclusion and firsthand observations it’s the stem of inadequate training. This inadequacy is exacerbated by lack of continued practice and honing of skill due to a “sky is falling” reaction to anything aviation related. Regarding the Asiana crash in SFO:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/asiana-airlines-flight-214-crash-caused-by-boeing-planes- being-overly-complicated-9562331.html
Hart said the accident underscores a problem that has long troubled aviation regulators around the world – that complicated automated aircraft controls, designed to improve safety, are creating new opportunities for human error.
The Asiana flight crew “over-relied on automated systems…” This epidemic in aviation does not begin and end with South Korean airlines; it is absolutely rampant in China and indeed at Tianjin airlines. The inability of professional airline pilots to handle their aircraft is covered up and exacerbated by automation which in turn, due to its complexity, adds confusion and anxiety in situations where it is inadequate and requires human intervention. IF you fly at Tianjin airlines you will need to actively protest the requirements to turn on the autopilot at 400ft on departure and click it off at 200ft on approach. This practice is unacceptable and it WILL dull your
edge. Be careful. Be forewarned if you don’t heed my words not to go fly there.
One of these days they are going to have an issue at altitude and it’s not going to be a lack of oxygen that’s the problem; it’s going to be a lack of common sense and grey matter between the ears.
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