2. Marco de referencia
2.3. Jóvenes: caracterización
In addition to pension factors mentioned above, there are several factors that powerfully influence workers’ retirement decisions. Prominent among these other factors
18 The authors assume that agents know their lifetime. The possibility of a bequest motive in saving is
considered in the retirement literature are the role of Social Security, employer provided health insurance and poor health.
Social Security plays an important role in the retirement decision as DB plans (Feldstein and Liebman, 2002). Social Security will transfer income from working years to retirement years and this transfer will expand the budget constraints in the retirement period. The Social Security benefit structure alters retirement incentives since the benefits will be provided only after individuals retire and the present value of benefits depends on retirement timing. Although any individual’s Social Security benefit is adjusted according to the retirement timing, the adjustment is not actuarially fair enough to offset the total changes in the present value of benefits. There is a vast literature that attempts to evaluate the effects of Social Security on retirement. Diamond and Gruber (1999) use the March 1994 and 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS) and find that the retirement rate for men increased dramatically at age sixty-two, which is the age of eligibility for early retirement under Social Security, and at age sixty-five, which is the normal retirement age. Coile and Gruber (2004), using the first four waves of HRS data, show that Social Security wealth and forward-looking measures such as the option value and the peak value are important for explaining retirement behavior, while accrual variable is not.
The substantial body of literature on health insurance and labor force participation includes the issue of the retirement decision. There are three main sources of health insurance for older individuals: employer-provided retiree health insurance, federal government health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid), and commercial individually purchased health insurance. Non-portable employer-provided health insurance tends to reduce job mobility, i.e., have job lock effects. This effect can affect older workers who are close to retirement age. If health insurance loss is costly, then insurance coverage will motivate continued work. However, if employer-provided health insurance is available for retirees, then coverage for employer-provided health insurance does not affect the
retirement decision. Madrian (1994) measures the importance of “job lock” effect, i.e. the reduction in job mobility due to the non-portability of employer-provided health insurance. Using 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) data, she finds that job lock reduced voluntary quit probability by 4 percentage points, from 16 percent to 12 percent, equivalent to a 25 percent reduction in job mobility. Kapur (1998), however, using the same 1987 NMES data, finds that job lock effect was small and statistically insignificant. Madrian and Gruber (1995) estimate the effect of continuation of coverage provided under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reduction Act (COBRA) of 1986 on retirement,19 using March Current Population Survey for the years 1980-1990 and the 1984-1987 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Their estimation results suggest that one year of continuation coverage raises the retirement rate by 30 percent.
Buchmuller and Valletta (1999) examine the effects of employer provided health insurance on the labor supply of married women. Since health insurance is commonly provided only to full time workers, spouses who prefer to work short hours, but have no alternative source of insurance, may work long hours in order to get coverage for their families. Using the April 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) Employee Benefits Supplement, they analyze wives’ labor supply. Their empirical analysis employs the reduced form equation that includes a dummy variable representing husband’s health insurance. Their results show that the coefficients on husbands’ health insurance status and offers were significantly negative, implying that husbands’ health insurance coverage reduces married female labor supply. Rogowski and Karoly (2000) demonstrate that access to post-retirement health insurance has a large effect on retirement. Older male workers with retiree health insurance are about 11 percent more likely to retire than
19 This bill requires employers to offer continued coverage to displaced workers, albeit at full cost to the
counterparts who would lose employer-provided health insurance upon retirement. However, this may overestimate the true effect due to potential self-selection bias. If workers who expect to retire early select into jobs with retiree health benefits, then this would tend to bias the coefficient on retiree health insurance upward. Thus this, estimate may best be interpreted as an upper bound of the effects of health insurance on retirement. Blau and Gilleske (2003), however, suggest changes in health insurance, including access and restriction to retiree health insurance, have only a modest impact on the employment behavior of older males from their simulation using HRS data.
The role of poor health is thought to have effects on retirement through two different channels – by changing the budget constraint, and preferences (Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). Poor health has a detrimental effect on labor earnings. Many ill employees will be less productive in the short run, and be less likely to invest in long- term skills in the long run. In response to lower pay, unhealthy workers might be more likely to leave their jobs, reduce hours, and eventually retire. Poor health can alter the value of peoples’ time and people’s perception of the utility of work versus leisure. Dwyer and Mitchell (1998) use HRS data and find a strong correlation between subjective physical health problems with early planned retirement. Men in poor overall health expected to retire one to two years earlier. This effect persists after correcting for potential endogeneity of self-rated health problems. However, they do not relate this result with the pension benefits. Since poor health can shorten life expectancy, individuals may want to retire early to maximize pension the benefit (Hurd and Smith, 2002).
The relationship between bequest motives and retirement decisions has been explored little. However, suppose that individuals save not only for themselves but for the sake of their families, bequest motives should have an influence on the individual’s financial decision and savings and should have some impacts on the retirement decision.
Munnell, Sunden, Soto, and Taylor (2003) show that intended bequests and unintended bequests increase as retirees receive more of their pension benefits as lump sums rather than as annuity payments. A probit regression20 for those aged 51-61, HRS 1992 shows that DC wealth as a share of total retirement wealth (DB, DC and Social Security) has positive significant effect (0.206 measured by marginal effect). Alternatively, a Tobit regression using the probability of a large bequest as dependent variable shows the same effect. These results imply that DC plans have some impacts on the retirement decision through the intended bequest motives and wealth accumulation. Hurd and Smith (2001) find that increases in household wealth are associated with increases in bequest probabilities.
20 The dependent variable is the indicator variable with a value of one if the household expects to leave a