For Theodoret, it is obvious that the divine nature, being infinitely more exalted than the human nature, has precedence in the union of the Incarnation. In his mind, there
492 Ibid., 184. 493 Ibid., 186. 494 Ibid., 173. 495 Ibid., 173–74.
is an interaction between the two natures. However, de facto it is a unidirectional phenomenon: the divine nature affects the human nature but not vice versa. In the Refutation of the Seventh Anathema, Theodoret says that in the union the human nature was raised from the dead, carried into heaven, and received immortality from the divine nature — all characteristics foreign to it.496
Theodoret’s understanding of the change in the properties of Christ’s human nature after the Resurrection echoes Gregory of Nyssa’s teaching. Gregory taught that after the Resurrection Christ’s humanity underwent a transformation and, in a sense, achieved a fuller unity with the Logos. Thus, after the Resurrection, the passions of human nature cannot be associated with Christ. Gregory says:
As a result, these [natures] no longer [i.e., after his resurrection] seem to exist separately on their own, according to some kind of distinction, but the mortal nature, mingled with the divine in a way that overwhelms it, is made new, and shares in the divine nature—just as if, let us say, the process of mixture were to make a drop of vinegar, mingled in the sea, into sea itself, simply by the fact that the natural quality of that liquid no longer remained perceptible within the infinite mass that overwhelmed it.497
Change is a logical impossibility for the divinity, whose characteristic is absolute perfection: “the divine is immutable and invariable, it is incapable of change or
496 Ibid., 181.
497 Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius III.3.68–9 (GNO II, 132: 26–133: 4) (translation in Brian E. Daley, “‘Heavenly Man’ and ‘Eternal Christ’: Apollinarius and Gregory of Nyssa on the Personal Identity of the Savior,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 10, no. 4 (2002): 481–82). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa,
Antirrheticus against Apollinarius (GNO III.1, 201: 10–20). For a history of research on the Christology of
Gregory of Nyssa see Morwenna Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa, Ancient and (Post)modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96–107. Ludlow helpfully surveys the scholarship on Gregory’s Christological teaching and terminology. Although she does not clearly state her own opinion, the amount of attention paid to the positive assessments which see in Gregory’s Christology an anticipation of Chalcedon indicates that Ludlow endorses this opinion.
alteration” (Refutation of the First Anathema).498 Yet human nature is mutable, being part of the created and limited order. Theodoret does not make allowance for the possibility that a lesser category (human nature) can affect and change the superior, uncreated category of existence. Only divinity belongs to the latter and it is immune to any change by its very nature (cf. Refutations of the First, Fifth and Sixth Anathemas).499
Therefore, Theodoret does have an understanding of communicatio idiomatum in the union effected in the Incarnation. The exchange of attributes of the natures is
understood more as a corrective process in which the divine nature perfects and compensates for the shortcomings of the human nature, rather than as an equal
partnership of the two natures. Thus, just as in the Expositio, Theodoret’s Christology at this stage is not symmetrical, but the divine nature of the Logos is the principle
constituent of the union.
This type of communicatio idiomatum is logically necessary to preserve the respective attributes of both the divine and human natures. The divine nature cannot be affected by the human nature in the union, since it is an absolute perfection. At the same time, it is natural for the human element in Christ to benefit from the union with Godhead and to progress in perfection — hence the resurrection from the dead, ascension, and immortality.
4.8. “Unmixed” in the Refutation of Cyril’s Twelve Anathemas
Neither in the Expositio nor in the Refutation did Theodoret’s Christological model make any allowance for the commingling of the divine and human natures in the
498 Pásztori-Kupán, Theodoret of Cyrus, 173. 499 Ibid., 173, 79–80.
union of Christ’s incarnation. Besides being a logical impossibility, for Theodoret such a union is also a blasphemy which robs the Logos of its Godhead:
[if] the union according to hypostasis…was a mixture of flesh and Godhead, we shall contradict…with all zeal and shall refute the blasphemy. For mixture is necessarily followed by confusion, and the admission of confusion destroys the property of each nature. Things that have blended do not remain what they were before; to say this about the Logos…would be entirely absurd.500
Similar arguments are advanced in the Refutation of the Third and Fourth
Anathemas, where Cyril is charged with propounding a commingling of natures in Christ, which according to Theodoret results in Arian and Eunomian heresies. He goes on to say:
Having assumed that a mixture had taken place, he proposes that there is no distinction of terms in those uttered in the holy gospels or in the apostolic
writings…let then this exact teacher of the divine dogmas explain how he would refute the blasphemy of heretics, while attributing to the Logos what was uttered humbly and suitably by the form of the servant (Refutation of the Fourth
Anathema).501
Theodoret’s understanding of the quality of the union is best described in the Refutation of the Fifth Anathema: “whilst we apply the phrase ‘partaking’ [κοινωνία] we worship both him who took [τὸν λαβόντα] and that which was taken [τὸ ληφθὲν] as one Son, nevertheless, we acknowledge the distinction [διαφορά] of the natures.”502
For Theodoret the union of the divine and human natures was quite real. It was the closest possible union; so close, in fact, that one could speak about one subject of personal reality in Christ. He does not hesitate to say that in the Incarnation it was the
500 Theodoret, Refutation of the Second Anathema (Ibid., 175.) 501 Ibid., 177.
Logos himself who “formed a temple for himself in the virgin womb” (Refutation of the First Anathema).503 Also, through this union the divine nature, being infinitely greater, has also affected the human nature – the human nature became immortal:
…the nature of the human being is mortal, yet the Logos is life and life- giver, and raised up the temple which had been destroyed by the Jews [Christ’s body], and carried it into heaven … [the temple] being mortal by nature it became immortal by its union with the Logos, then did it receive what it did not have… (Refutation of the Seventh Anathema)504
Consequently, the union of the divine and human in Christ was a reality resulting in the exchange of properties. The human nature in the union received certain properties of the divine nature, while the divine nature through the union with humanity “emptied itself” and deigned to impassibly undergo in Jesus all experiences of the human nature. Thus, Theodoret can accept the term Theotokos: “since the form [of the servant] was not disrobed of the form of God, but was a temple holding the indwelling God…we label the Virgin not “man-bearer” [anthropotokos] [only], but also “God-bearer”, applying the former title to the fashioning, forming and conception, and the latter to the union.” (Refutation of the First Anathema).505