Proyección

Grix (2002) states that the research process is interrelated, with the researcher’s view of the world; this is shaped by the experience one brings to the process and what the individual believes can be researched (ontological position). Grix (2002) suggests that this links what we know about that topic (epistemological position) to how you acquire it (methodological approach). Hence, for the current research, the objective was to analyse what and why certain strategies and mechanisms were put in place by NGBs to leverage an increase in sports participation. This research focused on the process of implementation and examined this practice from the policy formation at the national NGB level, through to local policy implementation within VSCs. The subsequent philosophical approaches will be used.

3.3 Ontology

Ontology “is the way we think the world is” (Fleetwood, 2005, p.197) and this

is the starting point of all research. In effect, ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality (Blaikie, 2007). Ontological positions largely fall into ‘objectivism’, where social phenomena is thought to live

independently of social actors, then ‘constructivism,’ is the belief that the phenomena

is continuously created and revised through social actors (Grix, 2002), whilst CR is situated between the two.

Realism itself has been described in many forms, by several scholars and Blaikie (2007, p.93) suggests these are split into six categories:

1) ‘Shallow realists’ believe that the researched phenomenon exists independently of us, but also that we can have direct contact with this and it is

‘only that which is observed…by the senses… that is relevant to science’.

2) ‘Conceptual realists’ assume that reality exists independently of the human mind. They note that reality is not directly observable or the property of any individual, but is a structure of ideas.

3) ‘Cautious realists’ also identify that reality has an independent existence, but due to the flaws and interpretative nature of human senses, suggest that reality cannot be measured accurately or directly. Hence the researcher must approach their investigation with a critical attitude.

4) ‘Depth realists’ believe that three domains exist within reality. Empirical (what is observed through our senses), actual (what exists independently of the observation) and real (the underlying mechanisms and structures that may not be observed). These levels of reality ensure ontological depth and a stratified reality.

5) ‘Idealists’ suggest that the human mind develops representations of reality, and social actors produce and reproduce interpretations of social reality through daily life.

6) ‘Subtle realists’ emerged to improve on existing approaches, they highlight that an independent reality exists and cultural assumptions prevent access to it.

They emphasise the fact that ‘all knowledge is based on assumptions and purposes, and is therefore a human construction, it is not certain’.

Depth realism has been strongly linked to CR (Creaven, 2000). Yet, Bhaskar originally did not use the phrase CR to outline his philosophical standpoint; but rather

the terms ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’. It was these two

approaches, through which the term CR arose, which is now accepted by Bhaskar and others involved in the realist movement (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie, 2013). Yet, unlike positivists they do not privilege direct observation. Realists believe there are deep structural relationships that are critical to allow an explanation of behaviour to be possible, however these are not directly observable (Marsh and Furlong, 2002). The early use of CR was by Campbell (1987) through the description

of his theory, which he called the ‘evolutionary epistemology’ of the phrase CR. This

was used to refer to the joining of ontological realism and epistemological relativism,

which is essential to Bhaskar’s views (Maxwell, 2012).

The term ‘critical realism’ has been met with many misconceptions. Sayer (2000, p.2) states that many believe realism offers “privileged access to the truth”. The

distinctive feature of critical realism “is the belief that there is a world existing

independently of our knowledge of it”. Fleetwood (2005, p.198) states that just because “an entity can exist independently of our identification of it, does not always mean it does”. Thus, this autonomy of the world or entity from our knowledge impedes any possibility of this assumption of ‘access to truth’. Sayer fittingly describes this independence through the term “evident fallibility of our knowledge” (2000, p.2). All

as expected or our assumptions were not met, this helps to justify the belief that the

world can be independent of our knowledge. As in comparison “if the world were a…

construction of our knowledge, then our knowledge would surely be infallible” as no lapse in expectations or mistakes would occur (Sayer, 2000, p.2). Once any

misconceptions highlighted above are eliminated, CR offers “great promise for social science and theory… providing an alternative to several philosophical and methodological positions which have been found wanting” (Sayer, 2000, p.2).

The ruling characteristic of the realism approach is the refusal to believe that it is probable to have any objective or complete knowledge of the world and it allows alternative valid accounts of any phenomenon to be accepted (Maxwell, 2012). Lakoff (1987) highlights this distinction between objectivism and realist and states that:

“Scientific objectivism claims that there is only one fully correct way in which reality

can be divided up into objects, properties, and relations. . . . Scientific realism, on the

other hand, assumes that “the world is the way it is,” while acknowledging that there

can be more than one scientifically correct way of understanding reality in terms of

conceptual schemes with different objects and categories of objects” (p.265).

In relation to research paradigms, CR sits centrally between positivism and interpretivism, which provides a more balanced research perspective (Byers, 2013). In basic terms researchers using this perspective are merging these two contrasting paradigms, by asking how (interpretivism) and why (positivism). In CR, the social world is comprised of four modes of reality: material, ideal, artefactual and social. It is this unique aspect in which multiple modes of reality exist for the phenomenon under investigation (Byers, 2013). ‘Material’ is not dependent on human activity, they are tangible mechanisms (such as a policy), which are often observed, whereupon they may be referred to as conceptually mediated (Ackroyd, 2004; Byers, 2013). ‘Ideal’ refers to conceptual, intangible entities such as ideas, beliefs, language and behaviour (Ackroyd, 2004). Artefactual is the buildings, computers, as well as “the interpretation

of mechanisms over time…i.e. this is just the way things are done here” (Byers, 2013, p.10). ‘Social’ relates to unplanned social structures and casual powers such as norms,

Using a critical realist ontology, reality is seen as an open system that is structured, Sayer (2000, p.73) states that “these structures may have powers emergent

and irreducible to those of their constituents… and a variety of contingent relationships…co-determine the occurrence of events”. Downward (2005, p.307)

refers to this as social ontology and echoes the focus around the structured world, in

which “relationships between these constituent features are causal in bringing about outcomes”. Furthermore, the critical realist perspective views structures and agents,

as elements that in conjunction determine the outcomes of social phenomena (Byers,

2013). Structures are the “relatively enduring institutionalized relationships between

social positions and practices located at different levels of analysis that constrain

actor’s capacities to ‘make a difference” (Reed, 1997, p.25). Underlining that, both

structures and agents are causal forces, by both initiating and constraining such action,

through agents’ production and reproduction of structures (Grix, 2010). Yet, “agents are not without power to resist pressures from the structures they created” (Byers,

2013, p.11). Thus, when investigating multiple realities through the critical realist perspective, the analysis of the mechanisms created and/or implemented by NGBs, cannot be understood by just investigating the structures alone, the influential agents also need to be considered.

3.4 Epistemology

The way we think the world is (ontology) influences what we think can be known about it, which is known as epistemology (Fleetwood, 2005). Within social research there are six epistemological positions to consider, empiricism, rationalism, falsificationism, neo-realism, constructionism and conventionalism. Blaikie (2007) highlighted some key features of the different positions.

Empiricism proposes that the human senses create and verify knowledge. A neutral observer can produce reliable knowledge, if they do not distorted contact with reality. Rationalism suggests that knowledge is examined directly through human thought and takes into account that reality is formed of both the observable and

unobservable. This can be investigated though the “consequences it has on people’s lives or thought processes” (Blaikie, 2007, p.94). Falsificationism advocates that

knowledge is produced through a process of trial and error, as theories exist prior to

and are then tested against observations to “falsify or confirm them” (Blaikie, 2007,

due to the lack of ability to observe reality. Neo-realism accepts that there are casual relationships that are independent of the observer, which are formed by the mechanisms that produce them (Blaikie, 2007). Constructionism provides an

alternative to empiricism and rationalism. By suggesting “knowledge is neither

discovered from an external reality nor produced by reason independently to such

reality” (Blaikie, 2007, p.22), it is the process of people understanding their encounters

with others and the physical world. This process of meaning-giving has emerged into two sub-groups from constructionism: social constructionism and constructivism.

Social constructionism proposes that reality is created through the individual’s

interpretations and subsequent explanation of social constructions, whereas, constructivists propose that reality is structured through the individual. They place a strong emphasis on individual viewpoints and the meaning-giving activity that occurs

in the individual’s mind, through the cognitive processes. Conventionalism advises

that theories are created to allow individuals to deal with the world. Nevertheless, they do not describe reality but rather they suggest what the observer considers to be real (Blaikie, 2007). Realists can accept weak social constructionism, as the social character of knowledge does not mean that it is unable to successfully identify real objects (including social constructions), which exist independent of the researcher (Sayer, 2000).

Blaikie (2007) stresses that ontological and epistemological assumptions should not be looked at independently, as different approaches can form different combinations. Social constructionism implies that social phenomena and its meanings

are “continually being accomplished through social actors, and is not only produced through social interaction, but is in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2012, p.33).

Yet, if the world or social phenomena is ‘socially constructed,’ how does that interact with the critical realist view that the world is independent? This is a necessary consideration to clarify, when using critical realism as an ontology and social constructionism as an epistemology. Sayer (2004, p.7) states that the first step is to

critically investigate “construction” and how it develops over time, as well as, asking what is “constructed” and by whom, is it researchers or actors?

Primarily, Sayer (2004) suggests there is a difference between a construal (a mental construction or interpretation of the world) and a construction itself (materially constructing something). An interpretation (construal) informs material constructions, such as organisational practices, i.e. participation programmes are not merely a social

construction and are an incomplete one at that (Sayer, 2004). This is because on its own it is unable to control or safeguard the effects that were intended. These depend on other conditions, not outlined in the participation programme specification such as

understanding, “trust, certain shared assumptions and social norms” (Sayer, 2004,

p.7). Sayer (2004) highlights that construal and construction may merge in communication; for example, in which an iterative process is occurring across time, with the specific social phenomena that have been constructed and then interpreted by others. Most social phenomena is the product of activity, prior to the observations that are made by the researcher. These observed constructions exist independently of those they can influence, meaning social constructionism fits generally with the realist principle (Sayer, 2004).