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Common pool resources are defined as community owned and managed resources.

CPRs can also be defined as those resource management systems in which resource or facilities are subject to individual use but not to individual possession or disposal, where access is controlled and the total rate of consumption varies according to the number of users and the type of use (Williams, 1998; Kumar, 2002).

CPR’s managed under common property regimes share two important problems (Quiggin, 1993; Williams, 1998; Lovett et al, 2001):

1. Exclusion of resource users is difficult

2. Use of resources by one person subtracts from the welfare of others

The first problem – difficulty of exclusion – arises from several factors including the cost of parcelling or fencing the resource and the cost of designing and enforcing property rights to control access to the resource (Vedeld, 1992; Ostrom, 1995). The second problem – subtractability – creates rivalry between different users. The resource units that one user extracts from a CPR are not available to others. Each user is thus capable of subtracting from the benefits the others derive from a CPR (Ostrom, 1995).

A major problem with CPR’s is in preventing “free-riders” from utilising the resources (for example water or nutrients) without contributing to their upkeep.

Perceptions of what constitutes a CPR show remarkable consistency despite factors such as the wide geographical range, broad ethnic affinities of rural people in semi-arid regions and different production systems (pastoral, agro-pastoral and agricultural) (Stevenson, 1991). Perceptions of CPR’s are inclusive in nature and comprise rangelands, forests, wildlife, water and agricultural land. With regard to Tanzanian, the resources that are of particular interest are water and agricultural land.

With respect to access, control and rights of usage, CPR’s are held under a variety of property-rights regimes (Berkes, 1989; Stevenson, 1991; Ostrom, 1995), including:

• State property

• Communal property

• Private property

• Open Access (non-property) regimes

A few CPR’s can be easily classified under a property-rights regime. For example, forests, lakes and riverbanks are often considered as state property and are administered through specialised government agencies (Williams et al, 1995 and 1998). For this category of CPRs, various codes and legislative edicts prescribe in considerable detail usufruct rights for different users and penalties for infractions. For many other CPRs, a neat classification is not possible. Furthermore, a given resource may produce flows that are subject to two different property regimes (communal or private) seasonally or over the long term.

Figures 2.20 and 2.21 simplify the principle of ‘open-access’ to resources. The diagrams demonstrate how resources that are under non-property regimes are open to all potential users; there is no control over their allocation. CPR management tries to add structure to the management and allocation of resources.

According to Stevenson common property is a form of resource management in which a well-delineated group of competing users participates in extraction or use of a jointly held, fugitive resource according to explicitly or implicitly understood rules about who may take how much of the resource' (Stevenson, 1991)

Figure 2.20: Equal Access to Water Source. A simple representation of a resource (water from the river) and how it is open to all farms for access (a non-property regime).

Figure 2.21: Diverting the Water Resource. Farm A has greater access to the resource than farm B (State property regime).

Whereas open access approaches benefit the individual farmer, particularly those with easy access to the resources, CPR tries to instigate an allocation procedure for resources. When decisions are being made there is a transition to CPR management methods as the decisions are likely to affect more than one farmer within a village (Msangi and Kajiru, Personal Communication, 2003). The views of all stakeholders within a community need considering.

CPR may be a beneficial management approach for farms that have only limited resources. The entire local community cooperates in extracting and using the resources, e.g. water and nutrients. However, such resources are not evenly shared among the community members. Under the ‘open access’ regime the fraction allocated to each farmer is a function of the individual’s social status or the position of his land. In contrast, CPR seeks to allocate resources according to a set of rules that are decided upon by the community. These rules need to be perceived as ‘fair’ for villagers to consider being involved in CPR approaches. In practice richer farmers may benefit most, but if they overexploit the resource too much, the poor will start to break the rules and guidelines that were set out by the community, and the CPR regime will collapse. The implementation of a CPR approach by a local community is often only undertaken if it is recognised to be beneficial in terms of profit, but more

importantly beneficial in terms of livelihood sustainability, and is not overtly influenced by social status.

The broad range of common pool resources means that they are central to the majority of rural livelihoods in semi-arid Tanzania. Most of the population in Tanzania can be classified as poor (Hatibu, 2000). Specific local characteristics can be applied for classifying the poor. These include housing, livestock, land and labour. These criteria can help in assigning levels of interest and management for determining the most feasible and sustainable approaches to resource management (Mzirai and Kajiru, Personal Communication, 2003).

Through experience and intrinsic knowledge of farming practices, Tanzanian farmers have learnt to cope with and adapt to differing situations in relation to the availability or lack of natural resources. A sound understanding of the issues that characterise wealth within Tanzania will help in determining how the Tanzanian DSS is to be of assistance to the different levels of user.

The assumption can be made that the poor probably gain less from CPR than the wealthier members of the community (Eggertsson, 1990). For example the poor cannot benefit from rangelands with regard to livestock rearing as they own little, if any, livestock (Ostrom, 1990; NRSP report, 2001). By contrast, if the poor cannot afford irrigation but can use CPR then they benefit more than the rich as the rules set out by the community to utilise CPR aim to benefit all community members.

Family size will influence the need to employ others to work on ones land as most villagers use family labour. However, labour availability (the ability to employ others to work on ones land), rather than access to farmland, constrains the poor from maximising their benefits from CPR. High transaction costs compound this problem.

North (1990) defined transaction costs as the costs of measuring what is traded as well as the costs of monitoring compliance with agreements. In general, there are no precise definitions of these costs, but they are recognized as being the costs associated with establishing contacts, monitoring them and ensuring their compliance (Williamson, 1979; Escobal, 2001). Lovett, 2001 sub-divided these costs into:

• Search and information costs

• Bargaining and decision costs

• Policing and enforcing costs

These costs in Tanzania are at present high because of diverse interests and many users. If transaction costs exceed the benefits of CPR management, then the management strategy will fail or will not be used in the first place.

Various opportunities exist for instigating any improvement in livelihoods. However these face logistical limitations. The options available were determined during a workshop on CPR carried out in Tanzania as part of a NRSP (Natural Resources Systems Programme) in 2001. These options are as follows:

• Increasing livestock ownership

- Requires equitable access to rangelands

- Is limited by the carrying capacity of the land, which fluctuates in space and time

• Increasing land availability for agriculture

- Land quality, availability of water, farm inputs and labour supply will all limit increasing land availability

- The capacity to use land is a constraint in some areas

• Improving security of employment for poor people

- Requires the establishment of commercial farming and supportive labour laws

- May lead to further alienation of the people using CPR

• Improving productivity during dry periods

- Secure water supplies for irrigation, cattle and pastures could improve productivity

- Is limited by the availability of water and any increase in productivity requires equitable access

• Encouraging sustainable use of CPR for small scale markets

- The rural poor rely on CPR to provide meat, wild fruits, wood and medicines for personal consumption and sale

- The danger is in short term gains at the expense of long term sustainability

The main focus in this study has been upon the management of water and nutrient resources, as well as appropriate land use strategies and agricultural practices.

A common framework for the analysis of CPR issues is described in Figure 2.22.

Figure 2.22: Common framework for the analysis of CPR. A dynamic model for CPR decision-making. (As derived by NRSP Project SA-R7973, 2001)

Components of this flowchart ultimately need to link with the flowcharts expressed for the development of decision support systems (Figures 3.1 – 3.5). This will help to

Drivers of Change

Needs to meet the needs of the users, create political support, compensate losers Process required: Stakeholder management, legal reforms, better governance

demonstrate a single process-driven solution for the development of decision support systems for resource management.