Justificación de la calificación ambiental

3.1.1 Approach

This section explores how the approach taken towards intermediaries, SMEs and large companies/large investments might be developed. This section is structured as follows. – Objectives of an ‘ideal’ state aid policy—building on the analysis of section 2, section 3.2

proposes the elements of what an ‘ideal’ state aid policy might look like if its sole aim were to address innovation market failures. Here, some overarching objectives of state aid policy in addressing innovation market failures are set out.

– Identifying the gaps—the approach to identifying the gaps in the current state aid rules is twofold:

– section 3.3 provides an initial assessment of the potential gaps in the current state aid rules, based largely on desktop research. Each of the current rules is examined in turn, to gauge the extent to which it meets the above overarching objectives by incorporating the types of criteria, indicators and questions outlined in section 2; – section 3.4 then explores in more detail the gaps that may in practice be present in

the state aid rules, by drawing on the more specific lessons learned from Oxera’s discussions with relevant parties. These practical issues relate both to the types of market failure that may emerge, and the information requirements placed on Member States.

– Policy recommendations—having identified the main gaps, section 3.5 proposes options for improving the use of the current frameworks and moving towards a more ‘ideal’ state aid policy. Key considerations are the current gaps identified above, and the level of information that should be required from Member States in each case, given that a priori market failures would be expected to occur in certain situations more than in others. The recommendations focus on four areas of special interest to the Commission:

– state aid to intermediaries;

– state aid to young or start-up innovative SMEs; – state aid to large innovative firms;

– state aid for large innovative investments (or mega-projects).

– Instruments—it is for Member States to decide which policy instruments they wish to use. However, section 3.6 discusses briefly how the instruments might be assessed within the state aid rules.

The overall aim of this section is to provide some suggestions on how the existing rules might be complemented by further guidance, or modified, to target state aid more effectively. This could assist both the Commission in assessing state aid proposals put forward by

Member States, and Member States in presenting proposals to the Commission in the first instance. The analysis may be used to complement the guidance on state aid for innovation issued by the Commission, which is currently in the form of a consultation document, and is discussed in the introduction (European Commission 2005c). Within its recent consultation, the Commission considers that a new and separate framework for innovation would not be in line with the objective of simplifying state aid rules. Rather, it focuses on how the current rules might be improved to better enable targeting of state aid at innovation market failures. The current section focuses on the economic arguments regarding the rules for, and practice in, assessing state aid.101

3.1.2 Key findings

In summary, the key insights through following the above approach are as follows. – Broad versus narrow frameworks—some of the state aid frameworks are, by design,

more focused on innovation market failures than others. For example, the regional aid and SME aid rules naturally have somewhat broader agendas than the risk capital and R&D aid rules.102 _{However, the criteria, questions and indicators developed in section 2} could be used alongside any of the existing rules to assist decision-making. This may also mean that the de minimis regulations,103 _{which require very little analysis of}

innovation market failures, are used less often. The potential problem lies not so much, for example, in the de minimis provision, but in the gaps in the existing frameworks that may lead to recourse to the provision.

– Risk capital—the Risk Capital Communication (European Commission 2001c), of all the state aid rules, best captures the innovation market failure agenda. It adopts largely a checklist approach. Through transparent guidance, it adopts a number of the criteria and questions developed in section 2.4.5. The framework also recognises the important role of financial intermediaries. The current framework does not appear to place an undue information burden on Member States, and there may be scope for considering further the factors developed in section 2.4.5 to supplement the analysis, and to use these as a complementary checklist. However, there is the potential for the framework to lead to a high information burden if, given the aid intensity, an opening procedure is triggered. Consideration might be given to adopting a more flexible approach, in which an opening procedure is not triggered as readily, so long as the Member State has provided

sufficient evidence upfront against this (in effect) expanded checklist, and the aid is sufficiently targeted.

– R&D framework and large versus small firms—the R&D Framework (European Commission 1996), which adopts upfront criteria, takes into account several relevant factors for assessing innovation market failures, developed in section 2, although there are some gaps. In particular, the Framework is not explicit on the types of market failure that arise in different circumstances, and may not require sufficient detailed analysis of innovation market failures in assessing proposals involving support to larger firms. Following section 2, there could be more scope for approving schemes aimed at small firms based on higher-level metrics. Given that smaller firms would a prioribe expected to suffer from a wider range of market failures than larger firms, this may ensure a better balance between incurring Type II versus Type I errors in providing state aid. Changes to the R&D Framework are not necessarily required.

– Incubators—no specific framework exists that recognises the important role of

incubators as intermediaries, or which provides guidance on assessing incubators. As 101 _{This section does not explore the legal issues regarding the current state aid rules, modifications to the rules, or the issuing} of further guidance to accompany the existing rules.

102 _{European Commission (1998), (2001b), (2001c) and (1996), respectively.} 103 _{See European Commission (2001a).}

such, good quality schemes may not be readily permitted under existing rules (eg, under the R&D or SME aid frameworks), and concerns have also been expressed over the lack of transparency (regarding a scheme that has been put forward). Reliance on the regional aid framework, SME aid and the de minimis provisions is not ideal. Section 2.4.4 identified guidance that could be used to assess and approve incubator schemes. This guidance might be considered in the context of Article 87(3)(c).

– Large-scale investments—in appraising very large-scale investments that might qualify for state aid under Article 87(3)(b), a transparent and robust economic framework supporting this decision-making process is probably required. Detailed questions on innovation market failures could be asked, and the criteria developed in section 2.4.6 might be used (although the theory and evidence are limited in this area). Nonetheless, it should also be recognised that whether a particular investment qualifies for treatment under Article 87(3)(b) will often be essentially a political decision.

– Evidence—more use of independent experts to assess innovation market failures might be helpful in the context of proposals put forward to assist larger firms.

What does this mean in terms of the broader options for modifying the way in which intermediaries, small firms, large firms, and large-scale investments are currently treated under the various state aid frameworks? The options are as follows.

1. No change in approach—the status quo is retained, with no changes to the existing frameworks or guidance around these frameworks.

2. Strict criteria—the Commission defines upfront stricter criteria and indicators for making decisions, requires a higher burden of proof, and analyses in detail individual proposals put forward to it against these criteria.

3. Broad criteria—this is an in-between case. The Commission might publish upfront guidance on the issues it would examine, which a Member State should bear in mind if claiming that a particular scheme aimed to resolve innovation market failures.

The potential options for modifying the current treatment of intermediaries, small firms, large firms, and large-scale investments are as follows.

– Intermediaries—potentially, for incubators, option 3 could be adopted. The guidance would outline what would be expected of any proposals put forward by Member States for assistance to incubators. In respect of financial intermediaries, option 3 could be adopted, with the existing framework complemented by a further checklist.

Consideration might be given to adopting a more flexible approach in cases where an opening procedure might otherwise be triggered.

– Young, innovative or start-up SMEs—option 3 could be adopted, depending on the sector. Schemes that seek to address market failures in relation to smaller firms might be approved on the basis of higher-level metrics.

– Larger firms—stricter criteria (option 2) could be adopted in approving state aid to large firms for undertaking innovative investments. The extent of spillovers, coordination, and financial market failures might be explored in more detail.

– Large-scale investments—these raise additional considerations. In appraising large- scale investments that might qualify for state aid under Article 87(3)(b), detailed

questions regarding the presence of innovation market failures could be asked, and the criteria developed in section 2.4.6 could be used (option 2).