"Power is the currency of politics" (Gamson, 1961).
Coalitions now lie at the very heart of New Zealand governments. Political parties’ strategies determine their effectiveness and stability. However, politicians often conduct themselves in perplexing ways. Policy positions might be expected to form the very basis of difference (and cohesion) between political parties. Yet, parties have formed alliances with others that advocated seemingly opposing policies and still others spurned potential partners that publicly supported similar ideals. Increased insight into the reasons that lie behind politicians’ actions helps in understanding and predicting the life-spans of governments. This perception enables analysis of the potential combinations of governments forming after an election, predicting forthcoming public policy and decision-making. This awareness also facilitates the recognition of events that might cause a government to fail leading to a change of public policy. Similar factors and motives assume different levels of importance depending on the phase of government and the type of political system in which it operates.
Four main stages of a government have been identified for this study: pre-election, formation, duration, and termination. The events of the general elections determined the line between the pre-election stage and the formation of a government. However, the boundary between the events of a government forming and its duration were less clear. Similarly, events that occurred during the life of a government sometimes lead to its downfall. In addition, minor events occurring during the early forming of a government might assume critical proportions later on. This was because politicians made strategic decisions during each of these phases depending upon their ambitions at the time. Such political decisions determined the type of coalition that might form, how long it might last, and what policies were enacted or decisions taken that might trigger an early collapse of a government.
A set of assumptions about the motivations of key politicians was considered fundamental to enable the prediction of any likely coalition formation and demise (de Mesquita, 2001; Laver & Budge, 1992). Three main categories of motive have been advanced to enhance the accuracy of predicting the types of coalition that might form: office-seeking, policy-seeking, and vote-seeking. These motives are the threads that weave through politicians’ decision-making.
However, politicians’ motives are not always readily apparent. For example, early theorists considered that politicians were motivated solely by self-interest and used this axiom as their cornerstone of political analysis (Downs, 1957, p. 28; Riker, 1975; Schumpeter, 1943, p. 282). They argued that politicians desired power for the perquisites that high office bestowed. To this end, they argued, a politician might develop populist policies solely to gain enough votes to get into power. Even if the end goal for a political leader was to be in a position to determine major government policies, they might then have to adopt office-seeking strategies to implement certain ideals and policies (de Swaan, 1973; Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p. 19).
Politicians might also act as if to reject office simply as a ruse to increase their electoral share. Parties usually maximised their own utility by choosing the best option available to them (Brechtel & Kaiser, 1999). However, Muller and Strøm (1999) argued that many politicians were motivated by ambitions other than self-interest. Politicians possessed not just office-seeking motives but also desired to achieve policy wins and may deliberately spurn office in order to achieve desired policy outcomes (de Swaan, 1973; Laver & Budge, 1992; Laver & Schofield, 1990; Strøm & Muller, 1999). At other times parties have resigned from a coalition government and rejected the perks of office over policy disputes with the major partner party. As such, politicians have to make hard decisions and their choices have depended upon the circumstances at the time (Muller & Strøm, 1999).
This chapter explores politicians’ motives within the framework of a coalition’s lifecycle. However, politicians operate within a complex political system, the attributes of which restrict their freedom of independent action. The make-up of their government and the constraints, imposed by any constitution and conventions as well as the party and parliamentary system, prevents autonomous action. These attributes with their inherent restraints and constraints form part of the discussion in this chapter.
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Once formed, governments have the power to perform almost autonomously as long as they retained the confidence of the legislature (Laver & Shepsle, 1990, p. 887). They have the power to enact their policies often without fear of any major compromise or amendment. Therefore, the direction of a single-party majority government would normally be relatively easy to predict compared with that of a coalition. If no single party obtained an absolute majority in the legislature following an election or government defeat, then three likely outcomes were predictable: a minority government, a minimum winning coalition, or a surplus majority coalition (Crombez, 1996).7 Coalition governments have occurred between individuals (or groups) who had different objectives and often diverse policy goals, and so were often only temporary alliances between elections.
This examination of coalition theories ignores single-party majority governments. The concentration is on minority governments (coalition or single-party) or majority coalitions of two or more constituent political parties. An important body of research has centred on coalition governments in Western European democracies, where there has been a high incidence of proportional representation electoral systems and coalition governments since 1945.8 Although much of the literature reviewed in this study is based on Western European parliaments, the theories as outlined have some application to the case studies in New Zealand. However, the application has limitations. Each country possesses different traditions, constitutions and conventions. Importantly, the Western European studies have in the main drawn upon empirical data and have not included New Zealand. Therefore, the studies were useful in providing a framework rather than a rulebook for application to New Zealand. The relationship between the Western European studies and New Zealand is revisited in chapter 4.