Virtually all mitigation funding in the United States comes from federally funded grant programs. Nongovernmental programs, whether private, nonprofit, or public, also provide the monetary, material, and technical assistance that individuals, businesses, and communities require to mitigate their hazard risks. The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBHS), for example, creates guidance documents that illustrate various structural and nonstructural mitigation techniques. IBHS employees work with various entities, such as day care centers, to help them reduce hazard vulnerabilities. Another program administered by a public-private partnership in Florida, provides grant money to home- owners that wish to structurally mitigate their homes from storm damage. Rebuild Northwest Florida approves grants to qualified homeowners that help them improve the strength of their houses through such mitigation measures as creating secondary water barriers, improving roofing and roof decks, bracing gable ends, applying tie-down (“hur- ricane”) straps, reinforcing wall-to-wall connections, and much more. The success of this particular program is already spawning similar programs throughout the state and, it is hoped, throughout the country.
Conclusion
Disasters occur in every state. The direct costs of these events are staggering, but the indi- rect effects to the economy and the social fabric of communities is even worse. Mitigation works. The case studies included in this chapter are just a few examples of successful,
sustained programs that reduce risk and make communities safer. Mitigation programs exist at all levels of government, and there is a growing interest in the private sector for taking mitigation actions to reduce their risk exposure. To many people, even in a time when terrorism preoccupies the emergency management psyche, mitigation is—and should be—the future direction of emergency management.
C A S E S T U D Y
Mitigating the Tornado Hazard in Kansas Schools
Wichita, Kansas, lies right in the heart of tornado alley—the area cutting across the center of the United States where tornadoes are most likely to strike. When strong tornadoes strike homes and buildings, the result almost always is disastrous. When they strike schools, where all the children of the community may be gathered at once, the physical and emotional loss can be confounded tenfold. On May 3, 1999, that is exactly what happened.
Luckily, when Chisholm Life Special Education School for teenagers to young adults and Greiffenstein Special Education Center were severely damaged by a pack of tornadoes, the schools were closed and no students were present. Although the county office of emergency management had conducted a hazard assessment in recognition of the tornado threat and identified areas of safe refuge within both structures, major damage occurred in several of these identified areas, where students surely would have congregated. The significance of these findings was not lost on community members, who recognized that they may not be as lucky the next time tornadoes strike.
Using all the information gathered in the postevent investigation relating to the schools, the state of Kansas used funding from several federal sources (including the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and a supplemental appropriation from Congress) to identify and build additional protection measures for schoolchildren in the state. The Kansas Division of Emergency Management and the Kansas Hazard Mitigation Team decided to construct in-school tornado shelters with the funds and ensure that shelters be included in any new school construction or renovation project.
In Wichita, two safe room projects were initiated within the public school district, which by design will serve approximately 7,800 of the district’s 9,000 students. The facilities also will protect many more community members, who use the facilities extensively for various activities including precinct voting, church worship services, and community outreach and recreation, such as the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts. The structural mitigation components have been accompanied by associated processes and procedures, such as
• The creation of a shelter management team.
• The creation of shelter maintenance procedures and schedules. • Shelter warning, training, and drill procedures and schedules. • Weather monitoring.
• Shelter access inspections.
• The creation of shelter activation procedures, including head count, shelter security, in-shelter monitoring of weather, and stand-down procedures.
Sedgwick County Emergency Management continues to work closely with the Wichita Public School District to evaluate areas of refuge in the schools. Evaluators identify the schools’ safest areas and make recommendations that instruct school administrators in the best methods for increasing occupant safety. Using this evaluation, the school district officials are able to determine the most appropriate and practical means of creating the shelter (which may include constructing an entirely new school, building an addition on to the existing structure, or retrofitting an identified area).
Today, all newly approved shelter construction carried out in the Wichita program meets the criteria presented in the FEMA publication Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters. In addition, all shelter construction projects are inspected by a trained team that assists in determining the best location for shelter areas, identifying areas that need improvement, and determining how to resolve any structural concerns.
Tulsa Safe Room Program
Tulsa, Oklahoma, lies in the heart of tornado alley. Tornadoes with major damage have hit Tulsa on an average of every four or five years. The May 3, 1999, tornadoes killed 44 people and decimated communities throughout Oklahoma. As a result of these storms, the president declared a major disaster. Oklahoma was provided the opportunity to take advantage of new construction technology to mitigate the effects of tornadoes. The concept of “safe room” construction was developed and pilot tested in 1998 by the Wind Engineering Research Center of Texas Tech University with financial support from FEMA. Safe rooms are anchored and armored rooms that provide shelter during tornadoes, even above ground. Tulsa proposed to FEMA that it use its HMGP funding provided through the president’s declaration to provide grants to homeowners to build safe rooms in their homes (see Figure 3–1).
FIGURE 3–1 November 23, 2001, Tulsa, Oklahoma (disaster alley in the Eastland Mall). A safe room wall section is
shown here. The insulated concrete form is cut away to show reinforcing steel. The cavity is filled with concrete. Photo by Kent Baxter/FEMA News Photo.
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Under their Project Impact designation, Tulsa formed a coalition of partners, including FEMA, Oklahoma State Emergency Management, Home Builders of Greater Tulsa, Tulsa Public Works, State Farm Insurance, and other community partners. This coalition then agreed on building and construction standards, permitting, certification and compliance procedures, and public education and awareness programs. This coalition set as their goal to build a tornado safe room in every newly constructed and existing home by the year 2020. This program was supported through a variety of public and private funding, but the major key to its success was the partnership of the building and construction community (see Figure 3–2).
Tulsa builders embraced the safe room concept and quickly made it a positive marketing tool for their business. The city continued to encourage growth of the program by providing certain financial incentives. Eleven major Tulsa builders launched the first safe room subdivision in a new upscale residential area of Tulsa. It
is believed to be the first safe room subdivision in Oklahoma, and perhaps the first in the nation, financed entirely by private builders.
The program continues to expand not just within Tulsa and Oklahoma, but to other states and communities in tornado alley as well. Within Tulsa, wheelchair- accessible safe rooms have been designed and built. The next step is building safe rooms in public buildings and schools. The technology exists, but the societal questions of size, access, quantity of space, and related issues are still being worked on.
The Tulsa safe room project provides an excellent example of taking advantage of the opportunity afforded in the postdisaster climate. Its success provides an even better example of how building coalitions, particularly with the private sector, ensures sustainability of the mitigation program.
The Castaic Union School District
The Castaic Union School District, located in southern California, is a case study that demonstrates the threat from multiple hazards. After the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the Castaic Union School District conducted a study of the
earthquake-related risks that threatened their elementary and middle schools and administration buildings. The assessment revealed that earthquake-related structural damage was not the only risk the school district faced.
The district maintained and operated 63 buildings (77,000 square feet of usable space) in northern Los Angeles County, which consisted of a mix of permanent and portable structures with construction dates as far back as 1917. These structures service approximately 1,200 students and 115 staff members. The San Andreas and San Gabriel fault systems, two of the most active faults in the country, pass through the area in which the district is located. In addition, the USGS has concluded that significant new earthquake activity may occur along both the San Andreas and San Gabriel systems.
These factors led the Castaic Union School District to conclude in its study that the probability of a large earthquake affecting the facilities was high. The district also learned, however, that the risk went well beyond possible damages caused by ground shaking. Along with the expected seismic damage, the study revealed two additional threats: flooding from the Castaic Dam and fire or explosion from a rupture in nearby oil pipelines.
The district’s risk assessment study indicated that the school buildings were located within the inundation area of the Castaic Dam (located only 1.7 miles upstream). If the dam were to fail, the school buildings and their occupants would be inundated with catastrophic flooding. The 2,200-acre reservoir above the dam could release nearly 105 billion gallons of water, inundating the area below the dam with 50 feet of water. In 1992, the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) reexamined the seismic performance of the dam. Based on the analyses, the DWR considers the dam to meet all current safety requirements and to be able to resist failure caused by the maximum credible earthquake; however, the district’s risk assessment concluded the probability the Castaic Dam will fail is never zero.
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Along with the threat posed by the Castaic Dam, the study also revealed that the buildings were at high risk of damage from both fire and explosion if nearby pipelines failed. Two high-pressure crude oil pipelines currently cross the campus (a 1925 gas- welded pipeline and a 1964 modern arc-welded steel pipeline), both of which could rupture during ground shaking or ground displacement in earthquakes. An analysis of the lines and the fault conditions near the district indicated a 35 percent chance of failure somewhere in the Castaic area as a result of any large earthquake.
This information caused alarm about the safety of the district’s facilities. In the event of a pipeline failure, a fire or explosion could result from the ignition of the released oil, putting both facilities and people at great risk. Additionally, the ability to prevent a nearby fire from spreading would be limited by the decreased reliability of water lines and hydrants, as well as the increased demands on emergency fire services after an earthquake.
Using the results of the district’s risk analysis, it was determined that the potential economic costs from either a dam failure or oil pipeline break following an earthquake were enormous. The first potential cost to the school district would be incurred from both building and content damage. Replacement of the school buildings would cost an estimated $7.7 million. Second, if such an earthquake occurred, alternate school facilities would have to be located and rented at an estimated cost of more than $500,000 per year. Third, the community would have to absorb the costs of losing the educational services provided by the district in the time period between the actual loss of the facilities and the relocation to temporary facilities. The school district calculated the cost of the lost public services based on the operating expenses required to provide the services. The daily cost of lost educational services was estimated at $28,601.
In addition to these direct and indirect financial losses, the risk of earthquake- related casualties in the district’s facilities was determined to be significant. In an earthquake-induced dam failure, the predicted speed of inundation on the campus caused the risk of casualties to be very high. When calculating this risk, a casualty rate of 250 individuals was determined based on the average hourly rate of campus usage in a typical week. In the event of a dam failure during school hours, the loss of life could be as high as 1,200 students and 115 faculty members. In an earthquake- induced potential pipeline failure, the district calculated a casualty rate of 9 individuals and injury rate of 45 individuals. Once again, the actual number of casualties increases dramatically if the earthquake and pipeline failure occurs during school hours.
Through the cost-benefit analysis, the district determined that the most feasible method to reduce its risks would be to condemn the structures on the old, high-risk site and relocate the campus to a low-risk area. Given the nature and severity of the potential hazards, mitigation options other than relocation were judged infeasible.
Once the decision was made to relocate, the district went to work to identify an alternate site for the school facilities. The selected location for the campus was completely out of the dam inundation area and far removed from the high-pressure oil pipelines. Thus, the risk posed by the dam and oil pipelines hazards would be eliminated.
Although the campus would still be within an active earthquake fault area, the new campus buildings would be constructed to fully conform to 1995 building code provisions, making them more resistant to seismic damage than the buildings being replaced.
The district then agreed to turn the land over to the Newhall County Water District as soon as the relocation effort was under way. The old school property is located above two active wells, which the water district can use to supply their customers in Castaic. In doing so, they changed the property deed to restrict human habitation and development and to return the site to natural open space.
The Castaic School District financed the relocation effort through a combination of grant money from FEMA and the sale of bonds. The district applied for and received a $7.2 million grant through FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program for the market value of the property, including the existing structures and infrastructure. The district used this funding, plus $20 million generated by school bonds, to rebuild the elementary school, district office, and middle school, and to relocate the elementary school students into temporary buildings during the construction of the new facilities. The new middle school opened in the fall of 1996 and the new elementary school opened in August 1997.
Virgin Islands Building Code
On September 18, 1989, Hurricane Hugo, a Category 4 storm, passed over the Virgin Islands with sustained winds of 130 mph, leaving near-total devastation in its wake. Losses of $1.5 billion included damage or destruction of 95 percent of the buildings and 90 percent of the power supply. Almost all public buildings, including hospitals, schools, and shelters, sustained major damage or were destroyed. The tourist industry was in a shambles. All communications with Puerto Rico and the mainland were severed. A presidential disaster declaration was announced.
The government of the Virgin Islands, with support from FEMA, began an immediate effort to identify measures to mitigate damage from future storms. Projects identified included upgrading the building codes and building practices, training building inspectors, initiating projects to harden the power grid, and establishing public education programs to show residents how to perform simple mitigation measures and their value.
With technical assistance from FEMA, a new building code was written and implemented. The code required anchoring systems, hurricane clips, shutters, and other measures to hold buildings together and reduce flying debris. Piers, water production, distribution, and oil storage facilities were strengthened. A massive public education program was launched.
When Hurricane Marilyn hit, the public buildings performed well, but most single-family homes lost their roofs. Once again, the building codes were amended to strengthen the quality of residential construction. The governor’s office initiated a comprehensive program to repair damaged roofs. The Home Protection Roofing Program provided more than 350 homeowners with roofs to withstand a Category 2 storm.
Hurricane Georges, occurring in September 1998, packing winds of more than 100 mph, put these measures to the test. The results were excellent. Public and private efforts had retrofitted or rebuilt most of the structures on the island by
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September 1998. Damage to homes was limited to less than 2 percent of the islands. All hotels survived with little or no damage. Power was interrupted to 15 percent of the island but was fully restored within two weeks. Schools and other public structures were undamaged and provided safe havens for the residents to ride out the storm. Officials attribute the reduction in damages not just to the stronger code but also to the intensive education effort for building officials, contractors, and building owners about proper building practices and other mitigation strategies (Figure 3–3 shows an example).
Arnold, Missouri
The city of Arnold, Missouri, is located about 20 miles southwest of St. Louis at the confluence of the Meramec and Mississippi Rivers. The geography of Arnold causes it to be affected by backwaters from the Mississippi and direct flooding of the Meramec and its tributaries. The floodplains of both rivers had experienced extensive development. Because of these concerns, Arnold adopted a floodplain management program in 1991; however, it had no storm water management program.
The Midwest floods of the spring and summer of 1993 resulted in record flood losses and damages totaling between $12 to $16 billion. Nine states, 532 counties, and more than 55,000 homes were flooded. The 1993 floods had a devastating effect on the 18,000 residents of Arnold. Approximately 250 structures were under water, and more than 528 households applied for disaster assistance, which amounted to more than $2 million. The city had to operate more than 60 sandbag sites to hold off the waters. Parts of the town were under water for up to two weeks.
When the water receded, the city of Arnold started an aggressive program to voluntarily buy out properties in the floodplain. It proposed the purchase of single-family homes, commercial structures, and mobile homes. It developed a plan
FIGURE 3–3 Guam Memorial Hospital before and after rebuilding and adding
to turn the purchased land into an open space greenway along the west banks of the Meramec and Mississippi Rivers (see Figure 3–4). It initiated a public education campaign for the purchase of flood insurance, because only 208 of the 908 floodplain properties had flood insurance.
Although it was unable to implement the 1991 floodplain management plan,