Ortiz vs. Posadas (1931) Facts:
• 13 out of 16, including president of the municipal council of Tabaco Albay, were present and voted for Ordinance No. 25 concerning cockpits in this manner:
7 in favor 6 voted against 3 absent.
• One judge of first instance of the province held that it was valid, while another judge of first instance of the province held an ordinance enacted under similar circumstances invalid.
Issue: WON Ordinance is valid Held: NO, invalid
• Section 2224 of the Administrative Code is clear. It needs only application, not interpretation. The ayes and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances, (2) all propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and (3) any other proposition, upon the request of any member. The same idea is carried into the succeeding sentence. For the passage of
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- 154 -(1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating indebtedness, the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members present. "Creating indebtedness" refers to "proposition" and not to "ordinance." The contention that only ordinances creating indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the members of the municipal council, is devoid of merit.
• The basic idea of the legislative body to make impossible the approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness by minority votes of municipal councils, at meetings hastily called is wise. Legislative intention should be effectuated.
• Section 2224 of the Administrative Code, requiring in mandatory language the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council for the passage of any ordinance, whether or not an ordinance creating indebtedness, an ordinance passed by less than that majority is invalid.
Casino vs. CA (1991)
• Petitioner was a licensee of a cockpit under Sections 2285 to 2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Gingoog City issued Resolution No. 49 in 1984 classifying certain areas of the city as residential zones, including the cockpit. The classification led to the cancellation of petitioner's license to operate the cockpit.
• Resolution No. 378, in 1985 the area was reclassified as within the recreational zone, allegedly amending Resolution No. 49.
9 SP members participated 4 voting
4 voted against 1abstained.
The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for the amendment.
• By virtue of said Resolution No. 378, the succeeding city mayor issued to petitioner the permit to operate a cockpit in 1986 which was renewed by another permit issued in 1987.
Issue: WON the mayor's permits issued in 1986 and 1987 are null
and void because Resolution 378 did not amend Section 6.44 of Resolution 49, the three-fourths (3/4) votes not having been obtained in passing said Resolution 378.
Held: YES, void
•
Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and the Local Government Code require only a majority for the enactment of an ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the resolution in question without complying with the categorical requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very same ordinance sought to be amended. The pertinent provisions in the aforesaid city charter and the Local Government Code obviously are of general application and embrace a wider scope or subjectmatter. In the enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. Undeniably, however, Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and explicitly provides for a different number of votes.
•
Rule: Where there is in the same statute a particularenactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect only such cases within its language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
!!!Dan Gat's Notes:
Ortiz and Casino decisions are bad precedents. Sanggunian may no require a higher OR LOWER (1 vote!?) voting requirement?
Malonzo vs. Zamora (1999)
Issue: WON Ord. 0254 was enacted in violation of Secs. 50 & 52
of the LGC
PETITIONERS: Ordinance 0254 was passed in accordance with Sec. 50 &52 of the LGC12. Matter of adoption or updating the
house rules was taken up and the council arrived at the decision to create an ad hoc committee to study the rules. Even if it failed to comply with said sections, it would only mean that the old rules will continue to be in force
RESPONDENTS: Sanggunian violated Sec 50 & 52 LGC as it conducted 3 readings on Ordinance 0254 on the 1st day of its
session without 1st organizing itself and adopting its rules of
procedure
Held: NO
It cannot be inferred that the Code mandates that no other business may be transacted on the 1st regular session except to
take up the matter of adopting or updating rules.
There is nothing in the language of the provision which restricts the matters to be taken up during the 1st regular session.
Adoption or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the 1st regular session but this cannot mean that
the local council could not act till then.
There was sufficient compliance with the Code when the Sanggunian adopted a set of house rules with the request to create an ad hoc committee to study the existing house rules.
KAPUNAN dissenting
12 which requires that on the 1st regular session following
the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter, the Sanggunian shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure.
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- 155 -De Los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan (1997) Facts:
• Mayor De los Reyes and 2 SB members were charged with falsification of a public document, Resolution 57-S-92.
• Resolution alleged to be anomalous for it was not approved by the SB. The minutes of their proceedings made no reference to its supposed approval.
• Petitioner De Los Reyes: deliberations and passage of resolution are legislative in nature. As the local chief exec. he has neither the official custody of nor the duty to prepare the resolution. He therefore could not have taken advantage of his official position in committing the crime.
Issue: WON the final step in the approval of an ordinance or
resolution, where the local chief exec affixes his signature, is purely ministerial.
Held: NO
The grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an O/R as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local chief exec the discretion to sustain the O/R at the 1st instance or to return it to the sanggunian with his
objections.
Hagonoy Market Vendor Assn. vs. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan (2002)
Facts:
• 1 Oct. 1996: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. It also provided that it shall take effect upon approval. Ordiance was also duly posted.
• In the last week of Nov., 1997, the petitioner’s members were given copies of the approved ordinance and were informed that it will be enforced in Jan., 1998.
• Dec. 8, 1997: The association filed an appeal with the Sec. of Justice, assailing the constitutionality of the ordinance
• The DOJ Sec. dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of time, i.e. beyond 30 days from the effectivity of the ordinance on 1 Oct. 1996 as prescribed under the LGC.
• Appeal to CA, CA dismissed.
Issue: WON the petition should be dismissed Held: YES
• The appeal of the petitioner with the Sec. of Justice is already time-barred.
• Sec. 187 (Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings) of the LGC requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Sec. of Justice within 30 days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended.
• In the CAB, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in Oct. 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in Dec. 1987, more than
a year after the effectivity of the ordiance in 1996. Clearly, the Sec. of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred.
• The timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Sec. 187 of the LGC are mandatory.
!!! Dan Gat's Notes:
Section 187 LGC is indeed mandatory. But if you want to question the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the tax ordinance, you can bypass appeal to the Secretary and Section 187 and go directly to the courts.
Marahomsalic vs. Lim (2000) Facts:
• Then Mayor Alfredo Lim launched a campaign against so- called “known” and “confirmed” drug pushers in Manila in an effort to curb the drug problem in Manila.
• He ordered the Western Police District Command authorities to spray-paint the houses of “confirmed” drug pushers in the city with written words and remarks
Issue: WON Manila City Ordinance No. 7926 is unconstitutional Held:YES
• According to the Art. 7 of the Civil Code, acts, orders and regulations of administrative or executive agencies must be in harmony with the valid existing laws and primarily with the Constitution.
• Test of a valid ordinance:
o It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; o It must not be unfair or oppressive;
o It must not be partial or discriminatory; o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
o It must be general and consistent with public policy; and o It must not be unreasonable.
Moday vs. CA (1995) Facts:
• 1989: SB of the Municipality of Bunawan passed resolution 43-89:
- authorized the mayor to initiate the petition for expropriation of a 1 hectare land along the national highway
- owned by Percival Moday
- for the site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities
• Said resolution was approved by Mayor Bustillo but subsequently disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan:
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- 156 -- expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment o the government center
• The Municipality then filed a petition for eminent domain and its motion to take or enter upon the possession of subject matter was subsequently granted by the RTC.
Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by
virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Held: YES
1. The Municpality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of
eminent domain is expressly provided for in BP 337 (LGC) in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain- A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
2. Section 153 of BP 337 grants the SP the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that: - it is beyond the power of the SB or Mayor to issue
- Velazco vs.Blas: If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal council or president
THUS, the SP was:
- without authority to disapprove the resolution for the Municipality of Buanwan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain and its SB the capacity to promulgate said resolution
3. Resolution 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as
lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners’ property
Voodoo Fire in Haiti (Part 3):
A violent fit of trembling shook the woman. It was as if a demon lover had taken possession of her and were exploring her limbs to their very extremities. Someone handed her a black cock which she raised high above her head. The scene was diabolical. There stood the naked negress, her sweat-streaked body glistening in the ruddy firelight, and at arm’s length she held a terrified black cock, the very symbol of Satan, squawking and flapping its wings, while the feathers flew in all directions. An awful sickness gripped me. I felt as if I were looking into the very depths of evil. The thunder of the drums grew to an avalanche of deafening reverberations.
Slowly the body of the Mamaloi relaxed from its rigid posture. She began to turn; faster—faster—faster. Like a madman she spun round on her toes. She swung the cock now only by its
legs and as it flew through the air in dizzy circles it spread its wings wide in the last convulsions of death. As though carried through the air by the beating pinions the negress whirled forwards in frantic ecstasy. The drums rose to their shattering finale, the woman stopped motionless, and then – a miracle – the dying cock twisted its neck convulsively and crowed – crowed loud and raucous into the surrounding night. It was the final touch of horror. (265-271)
Hunting the Elusive G-Spot (Part2)
The G-Spot is embryonically analogous to the male prostate. In plain English, certain embryonic cells develop one way if the child is female and another way if the baby turns out to be male. In boys, the prostate gland is responsible for the production of fluid that makes up semen. In girls, the area that would have been the prostate becomes the G-Spot. The reason that some medical authorities have said that it doesn't exist is because the G-Spot engorges only with stimulation, making it very hard to locate in autopsy studies, the primary source for new anatomical research.
The G Spot cannot possibly live up to all the hype it has received; it is simply one more pleasant place to stimulate in some women. While all women have a G-Spot, not all women notice anything different when it is stimulated--and some women actually dislike the sensation. So don't be discouraged if you can't find your own G-Spot, or that of a partner. And don't be alarmed if you don't like the sensation. Remember, every body is different!
(continued…)
Ju dicia l I nte rv ent ion
Rule 63, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
SECTION 4. Local government ordinances. — In any action
involving the validity of a local ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local governmental unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Solicitor General shall be notified and entitled to be heard. (4a, R64)
Perez vs. Dela Cruz (1969) Facts:
Vice Mayor Perez (Naga City), who was presiding a private conference with 7 city councilors in the matter of selecting the
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- 157 -secretary of the municipal board and the chairman of various standing committees of the board, expressed her intention to vote on these matters – to create a tie vote and thereafter to exercise her power as presiding officer to break the deadlock.
Four concilors sought to prevent the Vice Mayor by filing with CFI of Camarines Sur.
Held:
1. The Vice Mayor of Naga City as presiding officer of the Municipal Board cannot be a member of the same board: In the absence of any statutory authority constituting the vice- mayor as a member of the municipal board, in addition to being the presiding officer thereof, it cannot be read into the law something that is not there. Differences in law beget differences in legal effects.
The mere fact that the vice-mayor was made the “presiding officer” of the board did not ipso jure make him a member thereof; and even if he “is an integral part of the Municipal board” such fact does not necessarily confer on him” either the status of a regular member of its municipal board or the powers and attributes of a municipal councilor.
CAB: There is nothing in the Charter of Naga City which provides that the vice-mayor of said city is a member of the municipal board. He was not even designated as “Acting Mayor” in case of temporary incapacity of the Mayor.
2. Vice-Mayor is allowed to vote only in case of a tie. He is not allowed to vote twice (to create a tie and break the deadlock). CAB: Since there are 7 councilors, a tie is not possible. Vice Mayor’s vote in case of a tie is no longer necessary.
3.
Courts with jurisdiction over the case to prohibit Vice Mayor from exercising to vote twiceDoctrine in Vera vs. Avelino that prohibition refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person not exercising legislative functions is based on the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances which is not applicable to local governments. The case is irrelevant to the issue in CAB in addition to the actuality that executives at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and sometimes judicial functions, in addition to their purely executive duties. By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the validity of municipal proceedings. And in CAB, the petitioner, in insisting to exercise the right to vote twice in the municipal board, acted without jurisdiction and power to do so, and may be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition. In reply to petitioner’s assertion that the acts sought to be restrained are mere “probable individual actuations” beyond the reach of a prohibitory writ, suffice it to state that prohibition is essentially a preventive remedy and is not intended to provide for remedy for acts already accomplished.
Petitioner’s threat of voting twice was not an empty or meaningless gesture for record shows that she voted twice for the approval of the alleged amendment to the rules of procedure.
Homeowner’s Association of the Phils., Inc. vs. Municipal Board of City of Manila (1968)
Facts:
Homeowner’s Association brought action for declaratory relief to nullify Manila Municipal Ordinance4841 declaring that a state of emergency existed in the matter of housing accommodations in Manila, in view of prevailing scarcity of land and buildings for residential purposes there.
Sec1 and 2 declared that lessors and sublessor of land and buildings primarily devoted to residential purposes cannot increase their rentals beyond certain conditions.
Held:
1.
Assuming that the City had such powers and assuming the existence of the emergency, ordinance is illegal and unconstitutional (Note: Court did not decide if the city has power to declare a state of emergency and if such emergency existed)The police power of municipal corporations is subject to constitutional limitations. Individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of police power only to the extent that may be fairly required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
When the demands of public interest are brought about by a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights must be co- terminus with the existence of the state of emergency. The statute passed to meet a given emergency, should limit the period of its effectivity.
Otherwise, that which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become a permanent law When the cause for the grant of power was temporary, so should the grant be, for the