It is perceived by some that restricting public jobs to citizens is a way of adding political stability and legitimacy to the regime (Peck, 2017; Shin, 2017); similarly, the Saudi government co-opts young Saudis by offering free education and ‘monthly salaries’ through higher education organisations. Statistics in 2013 showed that 86% of high school graduates were enrolled in public education institutes . Saudis aged between 19 and 24, who are eligible for higher education benefits, represent 12% of the population and this total is expected to remain above 10% until 2025 (Saudi Arabia. General Authority for Statistics, 2018). The institutions that are responsible for skill formation in Saudi Arabia are restricted to citizens and divided into two groups. The first group is under the control of the Ministry of Education (known as the Ministry of Higher Education prior to 2015), which comprises 26 public universities with an admission capacity of over 200,000 students each year. All of these universities offer bachelor’s degrees or higher level degrees in social and applied sciences (Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Education, 2018). In contrast, the other group includes both the higher technical institutes (49 colleges, only 10 of which are for women), which offer diplomas in fields such as communications and information technology, and the vocational institutes (71 schools) that prepare semi-skilled workers such as electricians and mechanics, which offer degrees that are equivalent to high school education. Both of these forms of vocational institute are under the control of the Technical and Vocational Training Corporation (2018). Notably, all full-time students in these two groups within the higher education system are entitled to free tuition fees and monthly salaries of around 260 USD for the duration of their education.
Furthermore, in addition to the substantial educational opportunities available within the country, the government also launched the King Abdullah Scholarships programme which has provided opportunities to study overseas to more than 200,000 Saudis since it was initiated in 2005. More than two-thirds of these students have been receiving their education in North America and Europe. All students enrolled in this programme enjoy monthly salaries, health insurance, and full coverage of their tuition and fees (Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Education, 2018).
Although there has been a considerable amount spent on building universities and colleges to increase the capacity for engaging young Saudis, it has been argued that this does not adequately address the issue of weak employability among Saudis nor the lack of employers interested in developing workers’ skills. Several published studies (e.g. Budhwar and Mellahi, 2007; Sadi and Al-Buraey, 2009; Baqadir, Patrick and Burns, 2011; Yusuf, 2014) argue that the main obstacle to the success of Saudisation is a lack of skilled Saudis who then avoid performing unskilled jobs as these jobs are poorly paid and are considered demeaning. Hussain, (2014: 9) observed that ‘non-interest in the available jobs and low skills among Saudis are the major factors which induce the private sector to employ foreign workers’. Moreover, Hussain’s sweeping generalisation has also been evident in the work of other scholars (e.g. Ramadi, 2005; Al-Asfour and Khan, 2014; Rahman, 2018). Yamada, (2015) argues that Saudi career preferences can be attributed to two main factors. The first is related to the Bedouin culture, which considers manual jobs to be ‘dishonourable’. The other is related to the prestigious lifestyle that followed the oil price boom of the 1970s, which made administrative jobs in the public sector a tradition for Saudis. Consequently, as argued by Al-Asfour and Khan (2014: 247), ‘Saudis are hardly found in menial jobs or any low-ranked jobs, such as janitorial positions; these jobs are done by foreign workers, and these posts are looked down upon by most locals’. A counter argument to this could be that the desperate search by capitalists for cheaper and easily exploitable workers to maximise their revenues has caused antipathy among Saudis towards forms of occupation that do not offer career development and entail a high degree of exploitation (Alzalabani, 2017: 61). For example, the high level of Saudisation in manual, well-paid jobs in the petrochemical sector shows that manual labour can be very attractive to Saudis. Notably, organisations in this sector, such as Aramco and Yanpet, offer advanced training through their in-house training centres (Jehanzeb, Rasheed and Rasheed, 2013).
While the Saudi education system is accused of inefficiency because it produces unskilled Saudis who are expensive and lack work discipline, the government allows firms, through the Kafala system, to recruit and hire cheaper expatriates who possess the requisite skills. Therefore, there seems to be a contradiction between the state policies of Kafala and Saudisation and this hinders employers from hiring Saudis (Al Dosary, 2004; Harry, 2007). Nevertheless, in 2000 the Saudi government initiated the HRDF to enhance Saudis’ employability by providing subsidies for salaries and training costs. The total amount of
funding given to companies who complied with HRDF in 2015 was 392 million USD. Additionally, in 2011 the scheme began offering short training courses for unemployed and employed Saudis utilising both face-to-face and distance learning. Additionally, firms are obliged to annually offer ‘off the job’ training for all their Saudi workers. Nevertheless, the impact of recent legislation on firms’ approaches to training has yet to be researched. Recent research reveals that training opportunities for Saudis in various sectors are very limited. For example, Al-sharif (2014) found that Saudi Arabian Airlines offer training programmes for Saudis mainly to acquire basic skills such as English language and customer services skills. These findings were echoed in Alwekaisi's (2015) thesis investigating family- owned businesses. Similarly, AlGassim, Berry and McPhail (2012) investigated six MNCs in the hotel sector and found that these firms tended to offer training only to Saudis who performed below the job requirements. It can be inferred from these empirical studies that firms provide basic training only when it is necessary. Nevertheless, these studies have overlooked the influence of the HRDF legislation on the training offered by firms; thus, little is known about firms’ compliance with this state policy. Additionally, they focused on managers’ perspectives towards training, overlooking workers’ demands to become involved in training which is a source of struggle between capital and labour (Smith, 2016).