EL LÍQUIDO DE GOBIERNO

PCCs were introduced in 2011 following the election of a Conservative-led coalition government and at a time when Britain's main political parties had converged in seeking reforms to police authorities. Loveday & Reid (2003) are widely credited with introducing the idea of electoral reform later pursued by the Conservatives (e.g. May, 2013, 2016; see Newburn, 2012). Unfortunately, Jefferson & Grimshaw's (1984) proposals have been largely forgotten despite being the first to actually propose directly-elected commissioners.

As discussed in the previous chapter, they proposed introducing directly-elected 'public commissions' tasked with defining police priorities and directing resources according to the public will, although, crucially, the police would retain independence over individual operations (a position shared by Loveday & Reid, 2003). However, they were thin on how these commissions were to be composed, canvass opinion, and resolve competing demands.

Two decades later, Loveday & Reid (2003) also made similar proposals in their scathing assessment of the capacity of British, Dutch and French governance structures to deliver a responsive police service, which they also blamed for increasing crime and conflict between ethnic groups at the time. Loveday & Reid proposed introducing American style structures whereby the police would be unambiguously placed under the control of elected mayors or local council leaders. To ensure the police were responsive to local demands rather than national government, constabularies would be financed entirely through local taxation and divided into smaller units to coincide with their mayor or district council's geography. Further, what constitutes operational independence would be deliberately narrowed to cover individual operations only so as to ensure the greatest of scrutiny and policy direction from elected officials. All specialist operations would be merged under a National Crime Agency accountable to the Home Secretary who would also provide support to local forces when required, although this specific proposal would probably exacerbate the dissonance and lack of responsiveness of specialist units to local communities that the authors claim to address.

In opposition, the Conservative Party (2005:15) adopted electoral reform in their 2005 manifesto promising a smaller but tougher government with harsher crime policies, stricter

controls on immigration, and greater accountability of public services including of the police. The manifesto proposed devolving control over policing to locally elected police and crime commissioners but was thin on their functions until its 2010 manifesto set out what powers they would enjoy: “setting policing priorities for local communities”, “setting the budget and the strategy for local police forces, with the police retaining their operational independence” (Conservative Party, 2010:57). The Liberal Democrats (2005) also proposed devolving powers to local councils and residents including in relation to the police but did not specify how they would do so. The Labour government briefly flirted with idea of electoral reform before backtracking in 2008 following claims of the politicisation of the police after the-then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ian Blair, resigned and alleged he had been forced to do so by the newly elected Conservative Mayor (Newburn, 2012; Sampson, 2012). Interestingly, Labour had in fact been an earlier advocate of stronger democratic oversight of the police. One of its greatest achievement in this regard was introducing a police authority to oversee the Metropolitan Police as part of a wider devolution of powers to the capital through the Greater London Authority Act 1999. Up until then, the Metropolitan Police was the only constabulary without a dedicated police authority and was solely accountable to the Home Secretary. The Act created the position of a powerful elected Mayor of London who enjoys a wide portfolio, including sharing joint responsibility for the Metropolitan Police with the Home Secretary. However, the Home Secretary retains powers to appoint and dismiss the Commissioner, deputy commissioners and assistant commissioners although, in practice, this is usually in consultation with the Mayor. It also created a separate and very influential, wholly elected London Assembly to hold the Mayor to account in fulfilling his duties but also the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and deputy and assistant commissioners through a dedicated sub-committee. Yet as early as 2005, and certainly by 2008, Labour had cooled

to the idea of stronger electoral controls over the police and instead proposed to increase police-public consultation through expanding its flagship neighbourhood policing teams and also giving residents powers over how their local councils dealt with anti-social behaviour (Labour Party, 2005).

Following the Labour government's re-election in 2005, its Home Secretary commissioned a review into the modernisation of the police and later fully accepted its recommendations. Flanagan's (2008) review tackled a range of issues including how to enhance local police accountability. Whilst he reviewed various models, including those proposed by Labour and the Conservatives, Flanagan (2008:85) declined to endorse any particular one and instead called for a distinctly consumerist approach through the “acceleration in fully adopting a citizen-focused approach to policing; putting customer service and the interests and needs of local people at the core of priority setting.” The specific form that this took, he argued, was less important than achieving the outcome of giving the public a genuine say over policing and ability to the hold their police to account. Subsequently, ahead of the 2010 election, Labour vehemently opposed the Conservatives' plans for directly-elected police and crime commissioners (PCCs), attacking what they saw as the politicisation of policing (Labour Party, 2010). Instead, it proposed yet further expansions to its neighbourhood policing model by giving local residents a 'right' to hold senior officers to account, although it did not specify how, and also proposed firmer action against forces by introducing powers to “take over” borough commanders, entire police forces or chief constables deemed to be consistently failing.

It was only once the Conservative-led coalition government was elected in 2010 that police authorities were replaced with directly-elected PCCs in all police force areas outside of

London16 _{by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act (PRSR) 2011. Under the}

Act, PCCs inherit their predecessors responsibilities for securing an efficient and effective constabulary and holding the chief constable to account, but they also gain firmer powers over the budget, to commission services that could contribute to safety or crime reduction, and to hire and dismiss their chief constables.

As Loveday & Reid (2003) repeatedly highlight, chief constables' dual reporting to both their police authorities and the Home Secretary produced conflicting lines of accountability with the latter gaining precedence. The Act attempts to address this by placing chiefs firmly under their PCCs control through a number of provisions. First, and unlike their predecessors, PCCs enjoy complete control over drafting the police and crime plan which sets their force's priorities, although they must consult the public and their police and crime panels, and publish a response to any of the latter's recommendations.17 _{Although chief}

constables must be consulted for each and every revision to the plan, they can only make suggestions, they have no legal power to make recommendations, and but are still legally obliged to have 'regard' to the plan in carrying out their duties. Relatedly, the Act repealed Labour's legislation which imposed central targets upon the police and gave commissioners the legal right to do so, although the Home Secretary has since repeatedly encouraged them to avoid imposing targets (e.g. May, 2013).18 _{PCCs also gained powers to manage the}

police budget, estates, land and other resources without requiring the consent of the Home Secretary.

16 _{The Mayor of London performs the duties of a PCC in London and currently delegates this responsibility} to a deputy. The City of London police retains its former police authority and so does the British Transport Police which polices the national railways and the London Underground network.

17 _{Police and crime panels are a group of locally elected councillors within a PCC's geographic area set up} with the conflicting duty of scrutinising their commissioners but also supporting them in their activities. 18 _{As the Rt Hon Theresa May was appointed as the Secretary of State in May 2010 and maintained this}

position throughout the fieldwork, from hereon references to the Home Secretary will be referred to in the feminine form.

Finally, PCCs inherit powers to hire chief constables but, more significantly, have stronger powers to dismiss them with only limited checks. PCCs must inform their panels of their nominated chief constable to enable them to hold a 'confirmation hearing' to reach its own conclusions and potentially veto this decision. This process also governs any other appointments made by the PCC, such as a deputy PCC, although in such cases they have no right of veto. PCCs lost powers to appoint and dismiss deputy and assistant chief constables who are now under the control of their chief constable. Where a PCC invokes their power to dismiss their chief, they are no longer required to obtain the Home Secretary's permission but they must first inform their panels and provide them with enough time to scrutinise that decision. Ultimately, however, commissioners are not bound by the panel's subsequent verdict. Clearly, by removing national targets and the legal requirement for the Home Secretary's consent to appoint and dismiss their chief constables or manage police resources, PCCs enjoy greater executive powers than their predecessors and can exercise their functions with considerably less interference from national government.

What the Home Secretary does retain is quite broad and wide-ranging powers of regulation, including to arbitrate any conflict between PCCs, chief constables and police and crime panels. To ensure the adequate policing of nationally strategic issues, the Home Secretary issues a Strategic Policing Requirement setting out the threats facing the country for which chief constables must also have 'regard' to in addition to their PCC's priorities (Home Office, 2012b). Whilst this contains an assessment of the threats, it does not impose any performance measures upon local actors. The Home Secretary must also publish a Policing Protocol setting out how the relevant actors within this new landscape of policing

must work together and, importantly, also refrain from using their powers so as to promote co-operation (see Home Office, 2011b). The Act also amended the Police Act 1996 to ensure that the Home Secretary could still require chief officers to provide her with information on any local or national matter and even make this information public.

What is clear from the provisions outlined so far is that the Home Secretary has not abdicated responsibility for policing but rather the Act has bolstered the powers of local policing bodies to allow “the Home Office to withdraw from day-to-day policing matters” (Home Office, 2011b:para27). Of course, chief constables retain their operational independence in determining the direction and control of police officers and civilian staff, although they must act “in such a way as is reasonable to assist the relevant police and crime commissioner to exercise the commissioner’s functions” (para23). Perhaps in recognition of the potential for conflict to arise in this politicised system, the Protocol obliges PCCs and their chiefs to “work together to safeguard the principle of operational independence” (para35) but chiefs are obliged to ensure that commissioners request for “access to any information must not be unreasonably withheld or obstructed” (para19). Ultimately, it also deliberately left what constitutes operational independence undefined so as to provide PCCs and their chiefs room to negotiate, with the Home Secretary retaining her role as the final arbiter. Despite this, it is unclear whether the Home Secretary would continue the long tradition of ruling in favour of chief constables against their local policing body, and the research on PCCs thus far is silent on this matter.

As can be seen, overall PCCs gain stronger power than their predecessors even if they lost control over assistant and deputy chief officers. They are also closer to Jefferson & Grimshaw's (1984) proposals for directly-elected 'public commissioners' rather than

Loveday & Reid's (2003) American-inspired reforms which recommended placing chief constables under the control of mayors or council leaders and limiting what constitutes operational independence. However, current government intention to devolve powers to local, directly-elected mayors who would also act as the PCC for their area, similar to that in London, goes some way to realising Loveday & Reid's model. Yet, this all casts doubt upon the claim that British policing has been 'Americanized', particularly given the ongoing central importance of operational independence which is virtually non-existent in the United States and the reluctance of national government to completely abdicate its responsibility for policing (Newburn, 2012; Sampson, 2012). But whether PCCs can fill the historic democratic deficit characterising local police accountability with their enhanced powers and public profile has been subject to surprisingly little academic scrutiny and one that this thesis investigates. Further, since national government still supplies the lion's share of the police grant and directs national policing bodies, the literature has been silent on how future Home Secretaries may use these levers to steer local policing (Newburn, 2012). This is perhaps better analysed in relation to specific policing issues rather than more generally, as this thesis does. Unfortunately, despite PCCs having completed their first four-year term,19 _{the academic literature thus far is dominated}

by theoretical speculation and a lack of empiricism which this thesis seeks to fill (cf. Caless & Ownes, 2016). However, they do raise important questions outlined in the concluding section and answered in the rest of this thesis.

3.4. Conclusion

Directly-elected PCCs were introduced under huge expectations to reverse the historic democratic deficit in local police accountability that arose from the legislative changes

19 _{Following the initial elections in 2012, a second PCC election took place in May 2016. Unlike in 2012,} these were held on the same day as other local council and mayoral elections.

discussed in the second part of this chapter. In particular, PCCs are tasked with enhancing the police's responsiveness to their diverse communities through using their firmer powers to ensure the police are attentive to local concerns and by also ensuring that the public can participate in more firmly setting police priorities, three core elements of what constitutes democratic policing (chapter 2). As chapter 2 argued, the overriding concern for democratic accountability of the police is to promote equity but the research into PCCs is still in its infancy and most assessments of their ability to fulfil these criteria has been speculative.

Flanagan (2008) warns that elected commissioners could produce a governance model unrepresentative of Britain's diversity and even argues that appointed police authority members were more representative of their local communities than elected councillors, and also held a wider skill set. This is something supported by Lister & Rowe's (2015) analysis of the first cohort of PCC candidates. According to Lister & Rowe (2015:364), the lack of female PCCs reflects a “[white] male hegemony within party political structures” as the female-male ratio is actually lower than that of Members of Parliament and even chief officers, and there are no ethnic minority commissioners. This, they argue, “present[s] a significant challenge to the democratic legitimacy of the office... [which] may be having unforeseen and important consequences for the social organisation of the police” (ibid). Arguably, this largely reflects the lack of diversity in political parties' nominations but the authors main concern is for its potential consequences on democratic legitimacy and particularly on how policing priorities are formulated. Their analysis of the manifesto pledges of all 2012 candidates illustrates a severe lack of attention towards issues concerning ethnic minorities and therefore, they conclude, demonstrates just how narrow PCCs have interpreted their already “brittle” mandate having secured a turnout of only

15%, the lowest turnout of any modern election (Electoral Commission, 2013). However, whilst Lister & Rowe's findings show the narrow framing of policing and crime issues during the first election, their analysis does not take into account the police and crime plans of candidates subsequently elected which legally sets out their force's priorities. This means that their findings cannot be indicative of how PCCs conceptualise their role whilst in office and is something analysed in chapters 8-9 of this thesis. What it does raise is real questions about PCCs' ability to overcome the temptation to prioritise the concerns of majority or privileged groups and at the expense of those most affected by the operation of police powers but least likely to participate in these institutional processes.

Police authorities are alleged to have been 'out-of-touch' and unaccountable to their populations, in turn created a police service unresponsive to local populations. The next chapter analyses this further in relation to the use of police-initiated stops. The electoral nature of PCCs supposedly enhances the public's say in policing, at least through commissioners duty to consult the electorate when devising their plans and setting their priorities. However, this is a narrow interpretation of participation and, as Jones (2008) and Reiner (2016) argue, such limited and periodic input does not necessarily produce more responsive or democratic policing. PCCs are of course free to introduce whatever mechanisms they feel can give their electorate a more meaningful say over policing but this relies upon their own initiative and can lead to significant variation across the country. Further, the traditional reliance upon community consultation groups is unlikely to resolve inequalities as they tend to include already privileged groups, potentially resulting in what Reiner (2016) calls a 'plutocracy'. The lack of statutory footing of any alternative, more innovative initiatives developed by PCCs to improve public input means that its success is entirely reliant upon the co-operation of their chief constables. Yet research casts doubt

upon anyone but the most determined of commissioners to move accountability beyond the existing 'explanatory and co-operative' forms that have prevailed. This is particularly difficult given how powerful chief constables have been in determining the extent to which their local policing bodies can hold them to account (e.g. Jones et al., 1994; Millen & Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013). This itself raises questions about whether even this shallow explanatory form of accountability has been achieved. Even progress made by police authorities on more general issues has been due to astute chief officers permitting such developments to take place rather than any forceful attempt by those bodies (Millen & Stephens, 2011; Caless & Tong, 2013). Thus PCCs must come to terms with their far more experienced counterparts who are particularly adept at frustrating external reform (e.g. Shiner, 2015a, 2015b).

Finally, the fundamental issue of power has rightly remained core to much police scholarship even if couched almost exclusively in terms of operational independence.