La ética como generadora de confianza social.

Before discussing blameworthiness more seriously, let us forestall one poten- tial confusion. We should of course note that an action’s being blameworthy (or an agent’s being blameworthy for performing a certain action) does not mean that theexpression of blaming is appropriate (or even possible) in the case.3 Perhaps we can consider a case where a group is being driven to a destination. The driver claims that they have knowledge that one route is best, against the advice of several of the passengers. Because of his failure to take good advice, we would normally accept that the driver is blamewor- thy for the group’s being late. This might appropriately be borne out in an expression of blame in some way. A passenger might rightly say “It’s your fault we’re so late” or “You should listen to us next time”, or impose some other social censuring. However, perhaps the passengers know that the driver has recently had some sort of serious life problem, is currently finding it very difficult to deal with negative responses or is prone to extreme over- reactions that make him unable to perform simple tasks. In this instance, it might be inappropriate for them to blame him – that is, to express the blame sentiment. Obviously, in the latter case, it certainly would not be

2

Derek Parfit, for example, suggests that something like this might be successful (2011, p.165). Richard Yetter Chappell agrees with this diagnosis and justifies his project in a similar way (2017).

Mulgan actually suggests the contrary claim — that our strongest relate to “the right- ness and wrongness of actions” (2006, p.3).

3

Skorupski takes pains to clarify this distinction in The Domain of Reasons, and suggests that this is an area Mill was insufficiently clear on (2011, p.292).

appropriate to blame him while he driving. This distinction – between the blame sentiment and the act of expressing blame – is important to keep in mind. When someone isblameworthy this can be understood as their being

blame-feeling-worthy (Skorupski, 2011, p.292).

So, what is it toblame someone? While we may say in ordinary language that something, even inanimate objects, are ‘to blame’ for some state of affairs – like “the faulty brakes were to blame for the crash” or “I blame the bad weather!” – our talk of moral blame is more than simply establishing a causal role. It is also clear that blame can be rightly felt (or appropriate) and yet not expressed. This much is generally agreed upon, but the exact nature of the role of blame in our moral lives is not.

One feature of blame is that an instance of blame makes a claim of a moral failing. For it to be appropriate to feel blame towards someone for being late, doing so must involve a negative evaluation of her conduct. However, Smart correctly noted that our notion of blame is more than that of moral grading (1961, p.303). While there is a way of thinking about praise as simple evaluation, the purpose of which is communicative — to indicate that someone possesses a skill or has performed in such a way — blame doesn’t work this way. Saying that someone is a very good singer is an act of praising, while saying that they are not good at singing is (generally) not one of blaming.

It is a contested issue what theproper function of blame is. Macalester Bell identifies fives distinct aims of blame, each of which are valuable in a certain way.

1. Blame marks the damage done to our relationships.

2. Blame informs wrongdoers of their wrongdoing.

3. Blame motivates its target.

4. Blame educates and motivates the moral community.

5. Blame expresses condemnation / avoids moral condonation.

(2013, pp.267-268)

These are all plausible effects that acts of blaming might have. Clearly not all expressions of blame will involveall of these features, or even have

all these features as possible outcomes. It may not be possible to damage a relationship that is non-existent or already toxic.4 We need not accept that these effects must all (or even mostly) are present for an expression to count as blaming, but these are often consequences of acts of blame.

Scanlon sees the first these as the most important. His account of blame focusses on how one’s relationship with the target of the blame is altered. He claims that “to blame a person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment of impaired relations holds to be appropriate” (2008, pp.128-129). It also requires that the target is a moral agent, the type of relationship one must be engaged in for blame to be appropriate is a “moral relationship that we stand in to all rational creatures” (2013, p.87). Sher, providing a different type of account, sees blaming as including “a set of affective and behavioral dispositions, each of which can be traced to a single desire that the person had not performed his past act or not have his current bad character” (2006, p.112). Strawson famously regards blame as an expression of a reactive attitude. This expression (if successful) will typically have some of the effects Bell describes. He also notes that blaming requires treating a person as a moral agent. Strawson expresses this thought when he contrasts the attitude involved in a human relationship with “the objective attitude”, in which someone is regarded as merely “an object of social policy”, something “to be managed or handled or cured or trained” (2008, p.9).

While Strawson, Scanlon and Sher offer very different accounts of what it is to blame, they share certain features. Expressing blame is only appro- priate in the context of moral agents. When blame is applied, it implies that the target has exhibited some moral failing. Because of its social roles, blame seems to be a concept extremely important to our navigating the moral world and our living with others generally.

Due to of the variety of negative consequences of being blamed for an individual, we do not want to be the appropriate targets of blame, i.e. we do not want to be blameworthy.

4_{Because Scanlon sees blame as involving modification of relationships, this type of}

case offers a prominent problem for his account of blame – the ‘stranger problem’ (e.g. 2013).

5.1.2 The Relationship Between Blameworthiness and Wrong-