La Calidad Educativa, un Tema de Impacto Social

Issues of power and dependency are constantly woven throughout Dichter‘s book.255 The desire to move from charity ‗band-aids‘ to more ‗sustainable‘, ‗accountable‘ and ‗participatory‘ development was a significant philosophical shift since World War II. Dichter notes that the motivations of even the most ‗tough-minded‘ development agencies such as the World Bank stemmed mostly from a genuine instinct to help. Anger and resentment toward them when help stopped, however, nearly always emerged:

The quantum of ‗feel-good‘ we get from giving them help is so large that they are getting the short-end of the stick in the exchange. To make it right, they need to ask for more, and at some level they do not want to.256

The psychological dimension of ‗resentment‘ (rancour expressed against benefactors), coupled with the economic dimension of reciprocity (something needs to be returned for the gift) can create an extremely toxic dynamic of dependency for both residents and agencies. Combined with a third factor of close proximity between development workers and slum residents, these three powerful forces can undermine the freedom sought by all involved. Dependencies, real anger and a sense of exploitation can be felt on all sides.

In urban slums like Klong Toey these forces can be exacerbated even more than in the most extreme rural development projects. This is because development initiatives in urban slums are easily assessable by donors and potential donors in a way that rural villages are not. Close to international airports and hotels, it is not uncommon for a constant stream of donors to visit urban-slum development projects. It‘s only natural then that those doing the work on the ground each day would want funds from donor-visitors in return for sharing their experiences of poverty. In fact, one development worker in the large Kiberia slum Nairobi said, ‗our extreme poverty is our greatest natural asset‘.257

255 _{See, for example, Dichter, Despite Good Intentions, 128-150.} 256 _{Dichter, Despite Good Intentions, 156.}

Another urban factor helping to create dependencies is the swirling economic currents found in cities. These include the roles of the formal sector such as local, national, multinational and global business competition as in most cities, but in slums they can also include large informal sector and organized crime interests. These deep and swirling currents often compete together in slums in ways that are mostly unheard of in isolated villages. For example, even starting up a small food or transport business is potentially a complex, expensive (even compared to a Western city) and even dangerous proposition because of the diverse legal and illegal competition and interests that must be understood and negotiated.

Urban residents also live in an economy where they rely fully on financial income to survive. Unlike their rural counterparts, it is difficult to supplement any income with home- grown food for themselves or for bartering. In rural areas the ability to produce one‘s own food is a kind of safety net that naturally limits dependence. An income generation project in an isolated rural village may work or not, but if the family already has access to its own rice and eggs it is not as big a risk to be involved in the project as it would be for urbanites. Development success can be a bonus for the rural poor, whereas the urban poor are dependent on project success for their survival.

A key economic factor for urbanites is time. As we have seen, significant time is needed to build trust, confidence and skills as well as to find and evaluate solutions, if long-term change is to happen in a community. Where the urban poor are disadvantaged in development projects, therefore, is that time literally equals much needed money. The kinds of seasonal rhythms and traditional family set-ups that allow rural people time to volunteer in churches, committees and associations are often impossible for the urban poor. If employment is the difference between eating or not, and you are surplus urban labour, then you must take work whenever you can get it. This economic reality can bankrupt the kind of ‗social capital‘ that communities need to be communities. Development work in such contexts can‘t rely simply on local volunteers, but requires salaries and income if residents are to leave paid work to join in. The need to pay for the time of participants obviously makes it easy to create dependencies. The project works while there is an income stream for local staff and stops when that dries up.

Dependences can undermine transformation and create conflict. If alleviating poverty has to do with freedom to choose real life, then this is significant. This struggle between residents and agencies can be seen visually in Klong Toey where on one end of the central

arterial there is an section known locally as ‗NGO alley‘ because of the cluster of large aid and development agency buildings based there. Tour buses of donors, ready with cameras, are a common sight. There is even a bicycle tour that takes tourists through the slum to show them its poverty. At times residents complain that their neighbourhood ‗feels like a zoo‘.

A WV case study from Urban Advance also pointed to ongoing funding as an issue in an urban project that was showing promise.258 In Sao Gabriel District, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, WV was seeing real changes happening with housing, health and schooling. Using a sophisticated community organizing strategy aimed at empowering locals and moving on, WV‘s Urban Advance saw: 200 homes built with Habitat for Humanity; a primary school built; electricity and street lighting put on by the government in one slum; health care and two health stations; three water reserves built; public bus services so that residents could take jobs in the city; public telephones installed; streets paved by the government; and a coalition which provided job training, employment opportunities, schooling, health care, and counselling to street children.259 However, these results were not enough to save the project from funding cut backs. As well as high staffing turnovers, difficulties in matching needs with local interests and broader networking,260 the report noted ‗low salaries of staff‘, ‗threats of closing‘, ‗limiting funding‘ and ‗there was not enough innovation used in developing funding streams appropriate to urban settings to generate support.261 The program closed and momentum was lost.

Forces of dependency are especially complex in slums like Klong Toey. For the basic needs of residents to be met educational and health institutions are needed, but these are expensive in cities and permanent space is difficult to find in slums. Few are able to achieve self sufficiency using short term ‗seeding grants‘. Once donor funds dry up, for example with a small school, it is not normally possible for slum children to pay enough fees to cover the costs of the whole school‘s annual budget. Given that governments often see these neighbourhoods and residents as ‗illegal‘, where can the extra funds come from except for current or new donors?

There can also be a kind of double standard here between donors and their expectations of recipients regarding dependencies. For example, most Western countries do not expect 100%

258

Urban Advance, Belo Horizonte (World Vision, unpublished).

259 _{Urban Advance, Belo Horizonte, 3.} 260 _{Urban Advance, Belo Horizonte, 4.} 261 _{Urban Advance, Belo Horizonte, 4.}

of the funding for their schools to come only from student fees, or for 100% of hospital costs to be covered by patients. Few in the West would argue that they are ‗dependent‘ because they do not cover 100% of their own education or health-care costs, but similar institutions in the Two- thirds World are viewed with suspicion if they are not able to quickly become self-sufficient.

The development industry in slums also struggles with another double standard. Projects are often expected to become self-supporting within a few years, while the same agencies are dependent upon this same supporter-base. For example, a development agency may support a project by advertising and raising funds for it from their supporter-base as well as by helping to plan and evaluate the effectiveness of the project. For this service the INGO takes a percentage. Yet when the funding period finishes, the project that has raised funds receives no more funds, but the development agency still depends on the same supporter-base for a percentage of the next project. This double standard is rarely lost on the local project workers or residents over time.

Some International NGOs and Mission agencies have tried to avoid this dynamic by partnering with or setting up very large community based non-government-organization (CBNGO). This can help deal with increasingly complicated legal and donor obligations and can help the INGO support many different projects through the one organization. The development workers and CBNGO are still dependent on funds, however, and need to find new projects in order to survive. The agenda for funding new projects is often still on the partnering International NGOs terms, however, so CBNGO workers need to keep finding ways to fit the funding criteria. This may not have anything to do with the actual needs and assets of slum residents toward transformation.

Culture is a further complicating factor in terms of dependence. For example, the Thai cultural value of the hierarchical relationship of Pi-Nong (benefactor-recipient) is intentionally a dependent relationship. This cultural value certainly exacerbates dependencies in Klong Toey, where Pi-Nong relationships can often be a kind of survival strategy. Who your benefactor is (the one who can look after you) often determines your income security and status. In Klong Toey the role of Pi to Nong applies as much to heads of extended families as to the heads of organized crime syndicates; heads of churches as much as heads of local NGOs. So concerns about competing for a Pi’s role as well as making others further dependent on existing Pi’s are real challenges for any Klong Toey poverty alleviation strategy that aims to be sustainable over

a long period of time. Because wealth is difficult to generate in slums, many Klong Toey residents can be dependent on non-government aid and government organizations, as well as organized crime syndicates.