LA CALIFICACIÓN DE RIESGO DE LAS INSTITUCIONES

In July 2000, the NCC approved a regulation transforming itself into the National Council (NC). Its membership expanded to 33 individuals (later 36), which represented a broader political, social, and private sector cross-section of Timorese society, including pro-autonomy groups. NC members were appointed by the SRSG based on popular nominations from the CNRT, with Gusmão appointed as its head.

The creation of this new decision-making body was not without problems. After its creation FRETILIN members suggested that the selection process was dominated by non- FRETILIN figures and presented this as the central reason for the Party’s withdrawal from the CNRT a month later in August. Others suggested that, once Mári Alkatiri and Ana Pessoa secured the key portfolios of Economic Affairs and Internal Administration in the First Transitional Cabinet, FRETILIN no longer felt it necessary to cooperate with rival groups.508 The First Transitional Cabinet was sworn in on 15 July 2000, with portfolios split between senior UNTAET personnel and Timorese leaders. The positions held by Timorese related to development or institutional matters, while UNTAET class usually seeks to control which parts of the indigenous traditional will be promoted and incorporated into the positively sanctioned national identity they seek to promote and which parts will be excluded”, David Mearns, Looking Both Ways: Models for Justice in East Timor (Sydney: Australian Legal Resources International, 2002), p. 5.

506 _{Informant Number 5.} 507

Barbara Lule interview, Ermera, 6 November 2001.

retained control over areas relating to security, rule-of-law, political affairs, and financial control of budgetary matters.509 UNTAET’s Governance and Public Administration Pillar (GPA) was transferred to the newly established East Timor Public Administration (ETTA) as the beginning of capacity-building for self-government.510 The government departments of UNTAET’s public administration pillar became the foundations for future ministries within ETTA and were placed under the responsibility of the Transitional Cabinet resulting in FRETILIN gaining significant control over the nascent public administration. Nevertheless, the process was a gradual shift towards greater local control over state-building and formed part of an important tutelage process in self- government. The new co-administration approach was, in the words of José Ramos- Horta, “an ideal solution for Timor Leste’s transition to independence” that provided “clear institutional mechanisms” for shaping state-building and policy development.511

Although clear institutional mechanisms for power-sharing between UNTAET and the Timorese were created, there existed other obstacles to power-sharing that were not so easily resolved. “Policy entrepreneurialism” of UN staff, or actions designed to “put on the best face” to promote the careers of UN staff and consultants, meant that Timorese officials still faced an uphill battle to take real control of the embryonic public administration.512 Continuing tensions between East Timorese and internationals led to

509 _{‘UNTAET, East Timor Shapes New Cabinet and Legislative Body’, Tais Timor, 24 July- 6 vol. I, no. 12}

(August 2000), p. 1. The NC was originally five members but was expanded in October 2000 to include José Ramos-Horta as member in charge of Foreign Affairs. International Cabinet Members included: Peter Galbraith in charge of Political Affairs; Jean-Christian Cady, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in charge of Police and Emergency Services; Judge Gita Honwana-Welch responsible for Justice; Michael Francino in charge of Finance. National Cabinet Members included: Mári Alkatiri overseeing Economic Affairs; Ana Pessoa responsible for Internal Administration; João Carrascalão overseeing Infrastructure; Father Filomeno Jacob dealing with Social Affairs: and José Ramos-Horta in charge of Foreign Affairs; and José Ramos-Horta in charge of Foreign Affairs..

510 _{United Nations Development Programme, Ukun Rasik A’an – The Way Ahead: East Timor Human}

Development Report 2002…, p. 33.

511

See ‘UNTAET Considers Alternative Proposals for East Timor Administration’, Tais Timor, 12-25, vol. I, no. 9 (June 2000), pp. 1,5; and Beauvais (2001), p. 1129.

512 _{Susannah Linton notes that UN consultation with the East Timorese leadership in both the NCC, and}

later NC, on drafting UNTAET regulations establishing a transitional rule-of-law was minimal, see Susannah Linton, Rising From the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor,

further rounds of “negotiations” to find “creative solutions” by the NC, which threatened to resign before the Brussels donors conference scheduled for December. Gusmão contributed to these efforts in his New Year’s Eve 2000 address to the nation,

Foreigners should bear in mind that the essential condition for their operational success is to be aware that they do not come to save East Timor but rather to fulfil a mission of support.513

International personnel were unwilling to take a secondary role or subordinate to the authority of East Timorese inside ETTA. This sometimes revolved around self- perceptions of superiority given their higher levels of education, qualifications, and professional status. It also stemmed from a disjuncture between UNTAET’s conflicting governance mandates. DPKO personnel were more comfortable and familiar with a direct implementation approach used in emergency operations. This approach proved ill- suited for capacity-building, or for transferring administrative control as called for in UNTAET’s state-building mandate.514

Together with the discussion in Chapter 3 outlining the development of a “two-track” transitional administration (UNTAET/ETTA), Diagram 6 below outlines the political development process through different stages of political reconstruction between December 1999 and January 2005.

513

Xanana Gusmão, ‘New Year’s Message by Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão’ (Díli: December 31, 2000).

Diagram 6 – Stages of Political Transition, Reconstruction, and Crisis (dates approximated)

Humanitarian Assistance and peacekeeping (internal/external security)

UN Agency house assistance December

1999

June 2000

First transitional government formed

August 2001

March 2004

State-building begins, ETTA established

March 2002 Chaotic stage of political development Constitutive stage of political

development _{Constituent Assembly elections}

Second transitional government formed Formation of independent government

Sector investment program released

Regression to chaotic political stage

March 2006

Complex capacity-development begins National development plan Constructive stage of political development January 2003 (UNMISET advisors) March 2005 Drafting of Constitution Parliament formed President elected June 2006

Church protests and calls for new government

Army protests, co-opted and leading to calls for new government

Weak government capacity to handle political crisis

New peacekeeping intervention led by Australia

Factional fighting and brink of civil war Opposition parties manipulate grievance to fuel crisis

External/internal anti-government attacks lead to downfall of Alkatiri and solidify factional political divisions within society

Weak structures of authority, high levels of crime and political contestation, low- intensity political crisis NC established NCC established UNTAET insulated from internal political power struggles Downsizing of PKF begins Downsizing of PKF and UNMISET ongoing Increasing levels of internal political competition Transition to UNMISET Transfer of executive policing and security functions to independent government December 2002, acute political crisis Pressure on UN to withdraw mission presence UNTAET established Transition to

UNOTIL Low intensity

political crisis Withdrawal of Australian Peacekeepers Onset of acute political crisis Rising levels of anti-government rhetoric Transition process from UNOTIL begins