LA CAPACITACIÓN DOCENTE COMO DESARROLLO Y COMO CULTURA

rough indication of the growth o f the middle class. The four occupational categories used to measure the 'middle class' are: 'professional and technical', 'administrative and managerial', which comprise the upper middle class and the 'clerical' and 'sales' categories which comprise the lower middle class. See Crouch, 1993:142 & 156.

commercial opportunities. As a result large sums of money were spent on elections at all levels in the party. In 1980 Datuk Musa Hitam as UMNO vice-president and Deputy Prime Minister complained that UMNO was becoming a "get-rich-quick" club and said, 'there were some members who bragged they had spent $50,000 during an election campaign to become a "wakil rakyat" (assemblymen). Once they become a "wakil rakyat, " they would set out to recover what they had already spent or even double it' (ST, 1:12:1980). The problem of 'money politics' was also emphasized by the party president and Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, who revealed that he knew of a case where someone had spent $600,000 in his bid to become a divisional chairman in 1985 (NST, 20:5:1985).

During the 1970's the social change taking place in UMNO and the implications of that for the relationship between politics and business were masked, partly by the rapid expansion of the economy for most of the period, and partly by the administocratic background and more consensual political styles associated with the then Prime Ministers, Tun Razak and Tun Hussein Onn. The growing nexus between politics and business became both more apparent and firmly established however with the elevation of Dr Mahathir to the Prime Ministership.

The assumption of power by Dr Mahathir coincided with two important developments: the emergence of an increasingly influential core of bumiputra businessmen on the one hand, and the concentration of power in a few key regulatory agencies of the state on the other. The link to fuse these two elements was provided by the outlook and personality of Mahathir. Dr Mahathir was driven by an ambition to transform Malaysia into a modem industrialized society. The impetus for Malaysia's move to heavy industrialization in the early 1980's with the setting up of the Heavy Industry Corporation of Malaysia (HICOM) (whose most celebrated project was the national car) came from Dr Mahathir. The 'Look East Policy', 'Malaysia Incorporated' and 'Vision 2020' were all Mahathir inspired policies directed to the simultaneous achievement of an industrialized society of which the 'modern Malay' with the necessary entrepreneurial and technocratic skills was an integral part.

The engine to achieve this vision was business. Whereas Dr Mahathir's predecessor, Tun Hussein Onn, had kept businessmen at arms length, Dr Mahathir embraced them. His antipathy to the bureaucratic establishment and the conventional channels of policy implementation were both personal and political. By background and temperament Mahathir differed from Malaysia's former Prime Ministers, all of whom had been drawn from, or were closely associated with, the former Malay 'administocratic' elite.

Mahathir, the commoner and professional, had never been part of that elite and felt little empathy with it. He was instead excited by, and identified with, the values and ethos of business. His close circle of advisers were businessmen, particularly the new Malay entrepreneurs, one of the most prominent of whom, Daim Zainuddin, he appointed as Minister of Finance in July 1984. A number of these new Malay entrepreneurs had found elements of the bureaucracy conservative and obstructionist, particularly where their own rather freewheeling business activities were concerned. Such attitudes found a resonance in Mahathir's antipathy for bureaucrats who sought to regulate and intervene unnecessarily in business and whose enthusiasm for implementing his bold plans for Malaysia's industrialization were often suspect.

It was against this background that the shift in relationships between politics, the bureaucracy and business took place. As Leigh (1992:120) observed, 'bureaucrats' power in contemporary Malaysia is derived from their political masters, and is not characterized by the autonomy they were previously believed to have enjoyed. ... The argument that they played a central role was validly made for the 1970's but that contention (in the 1980's and 90's) is no longer viable.' As this shift of power in the Malay elite from politicians and administocrats, to a combination of politicians and businessmen occurred, so the political system also assumed a more patrimonialist caste. Persons who were politically loyal and committed to the leadership's world view were given authoritative positions, rather than those who were merely technically competent (Jesudason, 1990:78).

The imposition of political criteria in appointments extended from the foremost planning agency, the EPU, to the central bank (Bank Negara), as well as to the banking system more generally. During Tun Ismail's long tenure as Governor of Bank Negara (from 1962 to 1990), that institution enjoyed considerable independence and influence both in the formulation of economic policy and where senior appointments elsewhere in the banking system were concerned. However in the 1980's, the independence and influence of Bank Negara in economic policy was considerably diminished, while appointees to senior posts in the major banks were invariably regarded as close to the political leadership or were strongly identified with its views.

The erosion of Bank Negara's powers in the 1980's was highlighted when, following pressure from the Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, the Governor of the bank, Tan Sri Aziz Taha, was forced to quit his post. Aziz, who headed the bank from 1980 to 1985, won a reputation for his integrity in trying to resist political pressures in making decisions that would affect banking policies and security transactions. Aziz favoured

conservative monetary policies and sought tighter supervision and regulation of the banks and of Kuala Lumpur's rather freewheeling securities market. He was particularly concerned about the extent to which growth was being stimulated through share and property speculation rather than through investment in infrastructure and manufacturing (Interview, Aziz Taha, 22:1:1992). Such a view clashed with Daim's expansionary fiscal policies and desire for more bank credit for share acquisition.

Through his chairmanship of the Capital Issues Committee (CIC), Aziz also exercised wide authority over all transactions by companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). By blocking or altering the terms of proposed acquisitions, takeovers or new share issues, CIC rulings put Aziz at odds with many prominent members of the newly emerging Malay business elite including Datuk Azman Hashim (Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank chairman), Tan Sri Ibrahim Mohamad (Promet Bhd chairman) and Daim himself who complained about his decisions to Dr Mahathir (FEER, 21:3:1985). After Daim became Minister of Finance in July 1984, he and Aziz clashed over the central banks' policy of limiting lending for purchases of shares on the KLSE29. Ultimately Aziz's opposition to the policy was overruled after Daim obtained Prime Minister Mahathir's support on the matter (AWSJ, 4:3:1985). The waning of Bank Negara's influence and particularly the power of its Governor became most apparent in April 1985 when Daim stripped Aziz of his position as chairman of the CIC in a move which brought the powerful securities supervisory agency directly under Daim's authority. The chairmanship of the CIC passed to a senior bureaucrat located in Daim's ministry (Tan Sri Thong Yaw Hong, then secretary-general of the Treasury), a move which significantly increased Daim's power in business circles and at the same time signalled Aziz's departure as governor of the bank.

There were other examples elsewhere in the banking system where political loyalty rather than mere technical competence appeared to be the prime criterion for appointment. For instance Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, who had been closely identified with Daim's business interests and those of UMNO in the early 1980's, was appointed

29 During the stockmarket boom o f the early 1980's many Malaysian businessmen, and particularly the