La comprensión y su importancia en el aprendizaje

Treaty. It also redefined the Council of the BTO, its authority and voting procedures, and obliged the Council to submit an annual rqport on its activities, particularly those relating to the control of armaments, to an Assembly of the WEU. This Assembly was to be composed of the member states representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Protocol n "On the forces of the Western European Union" set out maximum levels of peacetime armed forces which member states could possess, which could not be varied without unanimous agreement of the other member states. Protocol HI "On the Control of Armaments" provided the framework for the renunciation of the production of certain types of weappns by the FRG.

The final Protocol, number IV, provided for the establishment of an Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA) situated in Paris. This body, responsible to the WEU Council, was charged with the task of verifying that the commitments contained in Protocol in were adhered to. The two main tasks in this verification process were: firstly, the collection and analysis of statistical and budgetary information, from the member states and NATO, on the level of armaments for forces maintained under national command on mainland Europe, and those forces under SACEUR command, secondly the ACA had to physically verify the accuracy of information gained from documentary controls via so called "Field Control Measures." These involved irregular visits to production plants, depots and forces in mainland Europe by ACA investigation teams.*®

The Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) was not established until 1955, when the WEU Council meeting of 7th May discussed the findings of a working party on the production and standardisation of armaments, and possible common production methods for member states. The French had strongly advocated such a body during the London Nine Power Conference.** In the event, however, the SAC proved to

*® See ibid passim for details.

** See Eden 1960 op cit pl69, vdio notes that:

be far less ambitious than the fully fledged arms pool proposed by the French. As constituted by the Council it consisted of seven rq>resentatives, one from each member state. The SAC was funded from the WEU budget, and was free to establish any working group or sub committee which it saw fit. A small international secretariat was situated in Paris, headed by an Assistant Secretary General of the WEU, who also served as vice chairman of the SAC proper. A biannual report was required by the Council on the activities of the SAC during the preceding months. EARLY ORGANISATIONAL STEPS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES The first NATO body established in the field of defence production was established as early as November 1949. Consisting of national delegates meeting in committee at frequent intervals, the Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB) was charged with examining defence production in NATO member states, and making recommendations for rationalisation and the means of increasing production in those areas where the greatest deficiencies were exposed. The successor to the MPSB, known as the Defence Production Board (DPB), was created in December 1950. This assumed the functions of its predecessor, but introduced two improvements. First, a coordinator of Defence Production was ^jpointed at the head of an international staff. Second, the heads of the national delegations were to be continuously present in London.**

In late 1950 a series of reports were produced by Task Forces which had been set up under the auspices of the MPSB and DPB. Nine teams of senior production specialists drew up the reports after an extensive round of visits to NATO armaments producing countries, drawing from site visits and meetings with government officials. The reports aimed to highlight those areas in which "production additional to that already planned by the countries themselves"** would be necessary in order to

42

43

standardisation of European armaments, under the aegis of the BTO. The scheme had obvious attractions, but raised endless practical difficulties. In particular the Americans would naturally be reluctant to channel all their supplies through the new Brussels Treaty structure".

See NATO Facts and Figures 1989, Brussels: NATO Information Service p263. Also Francis Beer tn^grarion and Disintegration in NATO 1969, Columbus, Ohio: Oiio State University Press pl30-131, and Ismay 1955 op cit pp127-128.

satisfy NATO’s minimum force levels. The Temporary Council Committee (TCC) set up in 1951, and the Annual and Triennial Review procedures subsequently adopted by NATO, took the DPB reports as a starting point from which to develop proposals. The Military Agency for Standardisation, set up in early 1951 and based in London under the Standing group, had responsibility for the promotion of standardisation of operational and administrative practices and war material. With the creation of the NATO International Staff/Secretariat in 1952, a new Production and Logistics Division was formed to assume the activities of the DPB, chaired by a NATO Assistant Secretary General.**

The three chief activities of the Production Division were; (1) Long term production planning.

(2) Acting as export broker for the exchange of information, and guiding technical studies.

(3) Participating in the Annual Review, which involved analysing equipment requirements and resources for current and future years.**

According to Ismay, the aim of the new body was

"to use available resources to the best possible advantage by correlating the production programmes of the member countries multi- laterally at the planning stage."**

In 1953 a series of Correlated Production Programmes were undertaken by NATO. These had been planned in 1952, and aimed to achieve a degree of correlation in the programmes of NATO members for a number of major equipment items, ranging 44

45 46

NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p263. Li October 1960 foi# body became foe Production Logistic# and Infrastructure Division, and in September 1967 foe title was once again changed to foe Defence Support Division during foe reorganisation which followed foe transfer of NATO from Paris to Brussels. The broader group included defence research activities. Aftm January 1979 foe Defence Support Division also assumed reqwnsibility for Command Control and Communications, and Air Defence Systems.

Beer 1969 op cit pl32, Ismay 1955 op cit pp128-129. Ismay 1955 op cit pl28.

from aircraft, to ships, artillery ordnance and electronic equipment." These programmes developed on the basis of a number of existing bi-lateral projects undertaken in the period after the establishment of NATO. As early as 1949 Belgium manufactured Derwent jet engines for installation in British Meteor aircraft built under licence in the Netherlands, and France manufactured Nene jet engines and Vampire aircraft.** Belgium and the Netherlands produced jointly 440 Hawker Hunter aircraft between 1955-58,*’ while Italy produced 221 of the American F-86 fighter under licence, as well as de Havilland Venom and Vampire aircraft. Bell 47 helicopters and Fokker S-11 trainers in smaller numbers.*® The United Kingdom also produced Hawker Hunter and Vickers Supermarine Swift aircraft, and Dassault produced Mystere aircraft in France as part of the correlated production programme.** An interesting (and virtually unique) example of US production of a foreign weapons system, was the phased production of 403 British B57 Canberra bombers in the United States between 1953-59.** The 1953 Correlated Production programme, therefore, involved the production of British, French and United States aircraft in five western European states. Other correlated production programmes on electronic equipment and ammunition also produced useful results.**

The correlated production programme concept never really took off, however. The programmes were limited in scope, and in scale, involving production of existing systems by more than one NATO member. As NATO itself noted:

47 48

NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p264-265, Bmay pp 128-29.

NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p264. See also C J E Harlow The European Annainents Base; A Survey. Part II; National FmcuTement Policies 1967, London: Institute for Strategic Studies p3, 52 and Ismay 1955 op cit pl27.

*’ Harlow idem. Fokker were the major contractor for this co-production agreement. Fairey and SABCA in Belgium were the major sub-assembly supplier, with Belgian armaments/engine manufacturer F N manufacturing the Rolls Royce Avon engines under licence.

50

51 52

53

ibid pp58, 60. Of the 221 F86 aircraft produced under US offehore contracts, 63 were for Italy, 60 for France, 88 for the FRO, 4 for Norway and 6 for the Netherlands.

NATO Facts and Figures 1989 op cit p264.

ibid. No destination other than foe USA is mentioned for foese aircraft, in any of foe sources. The aircraft were probably re-exported as part of foe MDAP-OSP programme.

"No attempt was made to draw up any overall master plan for the equipment of all NATO forces which would parcel out production to the most efficient or economical sources. Such ideas canvassed in the early days of NATO, ran into a number of obstacles. National authorities naturally tended to favour home industries and to be reluctant to finance multinational projects. Member countries were at different states of economic development. There were serious security problems. Furthermore, large programmes imposed upon industries would have had the effect of smothering incentive and reducing useful competition in the private industrial sector of many of the countries concerned."**

Correlated production was gradually abandoned in favour of individual project collaboration. To some extent, the failure of correlated production to proceed, or to develop further, is indicative of the more general failure of those in favour of a more integrated, or ev«i supranational, armaments collaboration regime to bring about their desired ends. As Vandevanter notes,** the period between the establishment of the MPSB in 1949 and the mid 1950’s was one of consistent rebuffs for supranational or integrationist plans. Despite early high hopes among those in favour of transforming NATO into a supranational directing mechanism, with broad powers in both the

military and economic spheres, the reality was to prove quite different. There is 1 evidence that William Herod, the American Defence Production Coordinator of the

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introduction of a common defence budget for NATO, and the establishment of the

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DPB as a control mechanism for an international syndicate to take orders, design i weapons, let contracts and distribute production. The unwillingness of the member

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idem

Brig Gen E Vandevanter Com m on Funding in NATO 1967, RM-5282-PR, Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, California pp 13-20.

and armaments collaboration.

"By the mid-1950’s NATO nations were greatly disillusioned about the future of coordinated defence production. The organisational structure had progressed through the following stages:

(1) a very loose collection of individual, uncoordinated, national

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(2) a presumably powerful, but actually relatively impotent, coordinator i for Defence Production;

(3) a presitigious but still powerless Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics of the International Staff aided by national delegations of technical staff aided by national delegations of technical assistants; and

(4) a subministerial Defence Production Committee reminiscent in

structure of the original Military Production and Supply Board. Thus, ! after much experim«itation, final authority was once again in the I

hands of a committee of national representatives.

The system as developed by the end of 1954, with the Defence Production | Committee sitting at the aq>ex of the collaboration process, was ess«itially the I

one that is in use today (1964), though the name was changed in 1958 to the Armaments Committee.""

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In the period 1949-54, armaments collaboration was implemented largely, though not I

exclusively, through American, and in smaller quantities Canadian, military î assistance. This helped to raise European stock levels, rebuild European defence

production capacity, and promote a degree of standardisation via the dispersal of

uniform, generally American, equipment. Ismay notes that the total monetary value j of United States and Canadian aid programmes for the period 1948-1954 exceeded I

$30 billion (at 1955 prices). Over half of the total was for military equipment, $11.5 billion was for economic aid (including goods, machinery, training and financial

57 _{Brig Gen E Vandevanter Weapons Production in NATO; A Study of Alliance Procesaes 1964}

support) and the balance for military training and "intermediate type aid" for specific projects within the defence budgets of European NATO states.** Military equipment expenditure in NATO states rose from 23% of total defence expenditure in 1951 ($9.7 billion of $42.04), to 35% in 1952 ($20.8 billion of $59.8 billion) to 40% in 1953 ($24.8 billion of $62.77 billion).*’

Most American equipment was by direct transfer, although a proportion was in the form of Offshore Procurement and "defence support" (ie economic). A total of $17.5 billion of equipment and other items to support the defence efforts of European NATO members was given between 1949-55, although as Ball points out, for every dollar furnished in aid by the United States, the European NATO members were spending $3 for themselves.*® Similarly in the period between July 1949 and December 1956, the United States provided $12.9 billion of military assistance (excluding deforce support). This compared to $81 billion spent by the Europeans themselves.**

Canadian aid in the same period amounted to $1.275 billion (April 1950 - mid 1956), provided to every European NATO member excqpt Iceland, which had no armed forces, with an additional $143 million for 1956-57.**Ismay puts the figure for Canadian assistance between 1950 - 55 at $850 million for equipment, and $260 million for training aid. The equipment expaiditure included: equipping 3 European ground divisions (one Belgian, one Dutch and one Italian); providing 500 F86 Sabre jets complete with spares; radar sets, minesweepers and a wide range of ammunition and supplies. Much of this equipment was of modem US designs, which enhanced standardisation.**

58 _{Ismay 1955 op cit pl35.}

*’ ibid p p lll and 126. All figures are for 1955 US dollars.

60 _{M Margaret Ball NATO and the European Union Movement 1959, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd: p88.}

** ibid p89. Defence support aid was discontinued in 1957. No funds were requested for fiscal year 1958. ** ibid p89. See also "Canada’s Mutual Aid Programme* NATO Letter 1956, November 1, Vol 4 (2) pp 19-

20.

In respect of American aid in the same period, Ismay details a total of $15 billion of equipment expenditure, including $1.73 billion MDAP-OSP aid, and excluding $388 million Special Military Support for France. The MDAP-OSP aid was made up chiefly of $852 million for ammunition, $366 million for aircraft and related equipment, and $239 million for ships.** Vandevanter estimates that, by 1958, over one half of all the heavy equipment in use by the European NATO members had come from either the USA or Canada.** By the late 1950*s, however, American policy began to change, amounting to a switch, as Beer wryly notes, "from the patron saint of the mid-1950’s to most active competitor of the early I960’s."** By 1957 American aid began to decline. Assistance programmes to European NATO members were seen by the Americans as less pressing, as the economic position of those countries improved.

Faced with balance of payments problems and increasingly restive domestic defence equipment manufacturers, a policy shift in favour of increasing European defence contributions took place within the US Administration. The arms markets of Europe were an inviting source of contracts for American companies, and much of the equipment provided by the United States in the years 1949-56 was in need of replacement. In addition, the newly rearming Federal Republic of Germany promised to be a large and potentially important source of orders for military equipment during the late 1950’s and early I960’s.*’

Before proceeding to analyse the development of the regime during the 1960’s, it is necessary to examine the period discussed above from a process based perspective. CONCLUSION: THE TRIUMPH OF INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

The institutional character of the armaments collaboration regime can justifiably considered to have been determined by 1955. The intergovernmental, as opposed to

** ibidpl37.

Vandevanter 1964 cit pl4. ** Beer 1969, op cit pl45.

supranational, nature of the regime was directly attributable to the failure of the EDC as the discussion above demonstrates. Other inputs naturally contributed to the triumph of intergovemmentalism over supranationalism, but it is difficult to overstate the centrality of the ill-starred effort to construct an int^rated European Army. The period between 1949 and 1954 resulted in an unequivocally inter-govemmental structure for the armaments collaboration issue area, and fatally weakened prospects for a strong, integrated armaments collaboration regime.

The organisational structures in place, chiefly NATO, but also after 1954 the WEU, could not provide the engine necessary to drive a supranationally based armaments collaboration regime forward. The hegemonic state, America, could not impose an integrated regime, and none of the European states had either the resources or the political strength to promote such an integrated armaments collaboration regime. The following analysis will account for this outcome, using a process model to demonstrate why the regime was "captured" by intergovemmentalism. In addition to this explanation, the utilisation of a process based model can offer valuable insights

into the political processes operative during the period, and help to explain the | subsequent lack of progress in the armaments collaboration issue area. I

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The intergovemmental cast, which the early years of the liberal hegemonic regime, | afforded the armaments collaboration regime, cannot be seen as the outcome of

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regime under the aegis of the EDC. On the coU^se of this option, the United States ! acquiesced in a British brokered compromise solution, which institutionalised an

intergovemmental approach and, arguably, fatally damaged future prospects for

armaments collaboration by restricting such collaboration to a few, largely I unsuccessful, NATO led projects. In all three cases the United States failed to

achieve her objectives. Why should this be the case, bearing in mind the continuing centrality of the United States to European security during this period?

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As in the previous period of regime negotiation discussed in Chapter 6**, the United States retained considerable influence capability during this period. The huge scale of American economic, and, more importantly, from the point of view of this analysis, military equipm«it aid discussed above, represented the only feasible source