Adger (2006) stated that even poor people have capacities in the form of networks, knowledge, and skills. For the poor people at the bottom, social capital is one of the few remaining assets available (Fukuyama 1996; Dordick 1997; Woolcock 2001). In the Delta, social capital in the form of bonding exists and in many places, these bonds are being transformed into collective efforts in what one can refer to as civil society. Individual agency and different types of collective resilience are evident in Delta communities even under the difficult authoritarian context, as recognized in local-led relief efforts after Cyclone Nargis. But as Sen (1999) noted, individual agency is ‘qualified and constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities’. Under military rule, the Delta communities were living with all these constraints to their individual and collective agency.
Steinberg (2001) asked the question in his book on the State of Myanmar, ‘To what degree will the state allow citizens to band together to pursue common interests?’ (p.40). In other words, will it allow civil society to be formed or to flourishing? After Cyclone Nargis with its much-lauded civil society effort, it is now safe to say that civil society did exist even under the difficult circumstances of authoritarian government in Myanmar. After observing the crucial role of civil society in relief efforts after Cyclone
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Nargis, one observation on civil society was that ‘a dynamic, varied, active, mobilized and intelligent civil society exists in Myanmar’ (CCPS 2009, p.v).
But the different dynamics of civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis can be understood from local and national governance contexts. Most villages in all zones stated that they had informal groups functioning around religious activities before Cyclone Nargis. Larger and more well-to-do villages had social groups that could extend voluntary works in providing service to vulnerable populations such as old people. Whenever these groups raised their visibility, they were being watched by the local authorities. An example that illustrates such a working environment comes from research Zone III. The name of the informal organization is called ‘Saturday Group’ and it was formed by young men and women from the town of Kungyangone and satellite areas. The name ‘Saturday Group’ came from the day of the week they usually gathered at the temple for merit making. Later they were involved more in social work by mobilizing resources among themselves. This kind of activities is reflected in the observation of Doan (2008):
Rural communities in Myanmar are relatively socially cohesive, providing a strong foundation for effective local safety net that is extremely important particularly in the absence of safety nets from the state and employers. (p.36)
But the Myanmar government, like many authoritarian governments, did not want to see these groups’ services as they were assumed as proxy indicators of the government’s capacity shortage. Local groups had to manoeuvre carefully in order not to appear to be undermining local authority in their initiatives. Still, once the actions became visible, the local authorities monitored them in many ways. As in the case of the ‘Saturday Group’, the local authorities closely watched group activities even after Cyclone Nargis, when interaction with civil society groups from the town increased. In fact, the ‘power over’ mood of the military government is at odds with the ‘power with’ mood of civil society which is based on social capital among the local people. The civil society operated in various forms under the military regime and social capital aspects demonstrate changes in civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis.
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Aldrich (2012) used the commonly used concepts of social capital namely bonding, bridging and linking capital, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 Social capital formation (Aldrich 2012, p.33)
The first type of social capital called ‘Bonding social capital’ represents strong ties within a community connecting individuals in the form of a horizontal network (Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Putnam 2000; Aldrich 2012). Bonding is usually strong in communities sharing similar demographic characteristics (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). It is common to see such strong bonding social capital in the Delta society as the religious leaders, friends, family members, and neighbors form a network in varying degrees in village communal settings.
‘Bridging social capital’ is formed by the social ties between people who share similar social and cultural traits such as economic status, interests and political stance (Aldrich 2012). The third type, ‘linking social capital’ is the least personal form of social capital. It represents a vertical connection by which individuals can build mutual interaction with institutions and individuals who have relative power over them (Szreter and Woolcock, 2004). Australian Red Cross (2012) echoed that the positive contribution of these three networks was ‘vital to sustaining community vibrancy and
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prosperity and form part of an interrelated system of group and individual relationships’ (p.14). Aldrich (2012) claims that the bonds are important for reducing vulnerability of communities and promoting their resilience. He argues,
Recovery from natural and other disasters does not depend on the overall amount of aid received nor on the amount of damage done by the disaster; instead, social capital – the bonds which tie citizens together – functions as the main engine of long term recovery. (p.1)
Conceptually, it can be argued that what was strongly present in the Delta before Cyclone Nargis was ‘bonding’ social capital. When the poor people in the Delta tried to ‘get by’ with the vulnerable emergency, they needed to leverage bonding social capital. But resources available in the rural area via bonding social networks were rarely adequate to move up to greater resiliency. The dominating features of poverty provided merely small opportunity and options to bridge and access resources, knowledge, and information to strengthen themselves. Barr noted that bridging can help people to move up from a stage of ‘getting by’ to ‘getting ahead’ (Barr 1998). In the restricted environment of the military rule, civil society in Myanmar lacked venues to link to the institutions that could bring ideas and resources. Therefore, without bridging and linking social capital which could empower and enhance their resilience, rural communities happened to be struggling with all available bonding social capital which provided relative resiliency with little social safety net supported by the military government. While local leaders could play a role in enhancing social capital by focusing more on collective actions, the national political framework did not give much space for networking among civil society groups. Participants at discussions in research Zone III stated that the local leaders sometimes assumed the role of civil society leaders as competitors to their authority and influence.
From a social capital point of view, leadership in the community must have a ‘shared sense of fairness, including mutual respect between all concerned’ for a collective action (Szreter and Woolcock 2004, p.656). The success of disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness largely rely on collective efforts. Many limitations were put on civil society by the governing structure before Cyclone Nargis. When the local governance did not always accommodate local initiatives, community resilience could
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not be present in significant ways. Limits on bridging and linking activities among the communities and outside institutions also hampered cross-fertilization of ideas regarding environmental change and risk knowledge. Restriction of movements turned out to be one of the limiting factors as revealed in the three research zones of this study. Later, larger villages in all three zones could organize DRR education activities such as public talks and smaller villages also obtained chances to participate in such occasions in nearby areas, especially after 2010. Due to the government’s restrictions, such activities were even limited before Cyclone Nargis. (Interview with local organizers in research zones and educators in Yangon.)
Restrictions by the authoritarian government on outside organizations also prevented them from reaching the local community. This impaired linking social capitals. In October 2007, 13 international non-governmental organizations based in Yangon sent an open letter to the government appealing for more space for humanitarian actions needed inside Myanmar (Reliefweb 2007). The letter stated that,
Current social and economic policies have led to conditions which have pushed many below subsistence levels, continuously weakening existing coping mechanisms of local communities.
This is compounded by the lack of investment at the scale needed to meet the needs of the people. Low public expenditure in the health and education sectors leave people with little to no access to basic affordable services in many parts of the country. In the absence of adequate public services, civil society groups have attempted to respond to local needs but are constrained in their ability to operate formally.
Despite efforts by the humanitarian community to provide international humanitarian assistance, the level of support is highly insufficient, programs are too narrowly defined and the humanitarian space for organizations to operate is frequently at risk. Although international humanitarian organizations have been able to develop and expand their actions, there are restrictions placed on the geographical and sectoral coverage of their operations.
We believe that the above factors have contributed to the existing humanitarian crisis. It is essential to consolidate and sustain existing programs as well as to reassess and seek new ways to expand and work together to better serve the people of Myanmar.
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This letter got a harsh response from the government in return and spaces for humanitarian work with NGOs and local groups were more scrutinized. Nevertheless, this letter validated the need for intervention in promoting human security in the communities. The vulnerable reality was also witnessed in the Cyclone Nargis tragedy few months after the above-mentioned letter.
After Cyclone Nargis, waves and waves of civil society from different areas of Myanmar came down to the Delta and helped their fellow countrymen. What they did was bridging and linking up with the local community for rebuilding their lives. In the process, the communities also benefited from bridging and linking social capital after the bonding capital had raised them from the devastation in the immediate days after Cyclone Nargis. As James (2012) stated,
The conjunction of domestic and international civil society and the resources and networks in their bridging level social capital has been critical in facilitating both relief and recovery phases in Myanmar. (p.20)
The changes in spaces of civil society before and after Cyclone Nargis were noticeable. Interactions and networking in humanitarian spaces and increased functioning of different social capitals were obvious to many observers (Kramer 2011; CPCS 2009). Before Cyclone Nargis, the old authoritarian structure did not give much space to a civic forum and civil society as their movement could be a ‘social obstacle’ challenging the legitimacy of the powers that be by revealing their shortcomings and the prevailing injustices. When the military came to power in 1988, one of their initial decrees was to prohibit assemblies of more than five people (Lall 2016). Although this limitation was not enforced strongly, later, many other formal and informal restrictions were put in place to control the community. Such a mood of inhibition hurt the local community and their resilience to disaster.
Discussion with former village leaders demonstrates that the authorities abandoned most of these restrictions after Cyclone Nargis, in varying degrees, accepting the urgent need for communities’ survival and tried to accommodate domestic and international assistance. Focus group discussions also revealed that if formal village leaders are not prioritizing villages’ welfare, informal leadership tends to step up in
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the form of civil society and mobilize resources to rebuild the community. Still, as was shown in the blockage of aid in the immediate days after Cyclone Nargis which prompted the international outcry, human security was not much of a focus for the military government. As Steinberg (2013) noted, Myanmar’s military regime was ruled by its rigid hierarchy characterized by disdain and distrust towards civilians (Steinberg 2013). This rigidity was on display against civic initiatives before Cyclone Nargis.