I address this aspect of religious experience in this chapter using the concepts of intentionality and intention. ‘Intentionality’ was developed by phenomenological philosophers, but goes further than Mead’s (1934/1955) concept of the ‘generalised other’. Intentionality is about ‘aboutness’ — it concerns ideas about ideas, not of physical things (Bruce and Yearley 2006). Bruce and Yearley’s
summary (below) sparked my ‘sociological imagination’ and inspired an attempt to develop the concept in the context of this thesis — it seemed to have merit.
This is a term from the discipline of philosophy that is often used loosely by social scientists. Philosophers use the word intentionality to refer to what is sometimes called ‘aboutness’. Novels can be about London but London is not about anything. More generally, mental states are about things while physical phenomena lack the property of ‘aboutness’. Some philosophers have used this point to argue that mental phenomena are thus radically distinct from physical ones and that the mind must therefore be different from the brain. Given that the social world is partly made up of people’s ideas, beliefs and perceptions, intentionality is a property of part of the world investigated by sociology. People’s awareness that they have beliefs and ideas about the world means that there is a widespread awareness of the phenomenon of intentionality even if people are not generally interested in its philosophical ramifications. When symbolic interactionists or ethnomethodologistsstudy how actors make sense of the social world, they are therefore studying intentionality empirically. It should be noted however that intentionality does not mean simply that people have intentions (in the sense of purposes or objectives); intentionality refers to a much wider range of mental phenomena (Bruce and Yearley 2006: 155-156).
Although relevant to social science research, the need for caution about the application of the concept of intentionality becomes apparent. In this research, the ‘aboutness’ is ideas and perceptions about individuals’ conceptions and perceptions of God, the ideas of believing in and living according to what are perceived to be God-directed and God-inspired teachings; about perceptions that bring about such acts in daily life; and about whose ideas and perceptions of God and God’s teachings are ultimately correct. As such, individuals have ideas about ideas that are interpreted to be God’s expectations, as described in religious doctrines, which lead to God-inspired attainment aspirations, or intentions, about how one should live. Intentions, then, regard right living — the ‘doing’, but intentionality offers the ‘according to what’ — the reference ideal or reference point against which acts are evaluated and defined as either right or wrong.
Doctrines and teachings prescribe the way to live and act. Intentions, then, involve how closely one follows what is written and taught, which teachings one
emphasises in one’s life and actions, and how doctrines and teachings are interpreted in order to implement them in one’s life. Intentions influence both aspirations and then social actions. Intention is also directly linked to purpose and meaning in individuals’ lives. Religious conviction is related to both intention and intentionality: people intend (intention) to ‘do what is right’ and ‘live the right way’ according to their interpretation and understanding of God (intentionality) and God’s expectations.
Intentionality becomes a necessary focus in this thesis, given the emphasis on cognitive processes as connected with symbolic communication and physical acts; the focus is about people’s perceptions, of personal religious self-identity and beliefs, and of perceptions of religious ‘Others’ who have different beliefs. Scientific proof of the existence of God is unavailable; the important point is that believers believe and act in the social world accordingly: it is a different way of knowing. W. I. Thomas (1921) noted that if people define something as real, that it is real in its consequences. As such, any belief that God exists is ‘bracketed’ in the phenomenological way, because the acts of believers reflect that belief, making the consequences real and often explicit in the social world. Additionally, to recognise that people believe in and act towards God, locates and grounds the concept of intentionality in participants’ lived religious lives, so justifying its application in religious symbolic interaction research.
Whereas intentionality is the way one thinks ‘about’ God and about one’s belief in God, intentions, instead, refer to and operate as direct symbolic acts that convey intended messages to those around oneself in one’s given social world. In Mind, Self, and Society, Mead (1934/1955) emphasised that mental processes are integral in interpersonal communication. In any interaction, there is a ‘mind’ component — the internal act of processing information from the environment in the form of interpretations and definitions — from which acts follow. This mental or cognitive process involves intention — regarding one’s own intentions about one’s
life, and intentions toward ‘Others’. This includes interpreting and defining the potential or inferred intentions of ‘Others’. Tagiuri explains it thus:
...when we speak of person perception or of knowledge of persons, we refer mostly to the observations we make about intentions, attitudes, emotions, ideas, abilities, purposes, traits — events that are, so to speak, inside the person(Tagiuri 1958a: Introduction x, emphasis original).
Surveillance of self and others is part of the act of perceiving intentions, ideas, purposes, and so on, and also of the interactive process. Tagiuri explains that each person mentally holds a representation of the environment and that each person knows, or assumes, that another “is capable of watching, perceiving, remembering, and waiting for opportune circumstances. On this basis we can experience the other person as directing himself to us, with intentions, attitudes, and feelings” (1958a: Introduction xi). Tagiuri also explains that people act towards and about others, according to the perceptions they hold about those others.
... the opinion of others may, in fact, be the all-important consideration in someone’s evaluation of a person. For what people think of a person unquestionably influences their behavior toward him as well as, in the long run, the behavior of the very person himself (1958b: 329).
If we love another, we will act in a loving way that indicates our feelings and intentions; if we dislike another, we let that person know of our dislike in our acts towards and about that person. The perceptions one has about another, influences one’s intentions towards that other. Tagiuri’s description suggests that another not only responds to immediate conditions, but also that some actions may be premeditated. Goffman describes it as impression management, whereby people attempt to influence others’ inferences and perceptions by managing their visual presentation and social acts (1969). Some religious affiliates also attempt to manage the (good) reputation of their affiliation, where possible, by being an example to outsiders of the right way of living according to the teachings of their affiliation.