LA EDAD COMO CONTROVERSIA - PREVENCIÓN SECUNDARIA

2. FACTORES DE RIESGO

3.3. PREVENCIÓN SECUNDARIA

3.3.1.7. LA EDAD COMO CONTROVERSIA

De la Vina v. Villareal Villareal

July 31, 1920, Johnson, J.

Facts:

Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of Geopano, wife, filed a complaint of divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC divorce (Sept. 17, 1917) in RTC IloiloIloilo against her husband de la Vina on the against her husband de la Vina on the ground of concubinage (which was ground of concubinage (which was allegedly occurring since 1913). When allegedly occurring since 1913). When she learned of the illicit relationship, she learned of the illicit relationship, she was ejected from the conjugal she was ejected from the conjugal home. She prayed for a decree of home. She prayed for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property, divorce, partition of conjugal property, and alimony pendente. After filing the and alimony pendente. After filing the complaint, she presented a motion for complaint, she presented a motion for preliminary injunction to restrain her preliminary injunction to restrain her husband from alienating or

husband from alienating or

encumbering the conjugal property.

Respondent Judge Villareal granted the Respondent Judge Villareal granted the motion. Husband filed present case of motion. Husband filed present case of petition for certiorari on the ground petition for certiorari on the ground that judge had no jurisdiction to take that judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action and

cognizance of the action and exceededexceeded his power and authority in

his power and authority in issuingissuing preliminary injunction.

preliminary injunction.

Issue/ Held/Ratio:

(1) WON a married woman may (1) WON a married woman may everever acquire a residence or domicile

acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband separate from that of her husband during the existence of a

during the existence of a subsistingsubsisting marriage.

marriage.

Yes. The general rule of law that the Yes. The general rule of law that the

domicile of the wife follows that of the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband is not an absolute rule. The husband is not an absolute rule. The husband unlawfully ejected the wife husband unlawfully ejected the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another woman.

relations with another woman.

Continued cohabitation would give the Continued cohabitation would give the impression of the wife’s condonation. A impression of the wife’s condonation. A wife may acquire a

wife may acquire a separate residenceseparate residence where the husband has given cause for where the husband has given cause for divorce.

divorce.

(2) WON in an action for

(2) WON in an action for divorce,divorce, where conjugal property is concerned, where conjugal property is concerned, a preliminary injunction may be issued a preliminary injunction may be issued to restrain a spouse from

to restrain a spouse from alienating/encumb

alienating/encumbering ering conjugalconjugal property during the pendency of the property during the pendency of the action.

action.

Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is

granted power to alienate and granted power to alienate and encumber the conjugal property encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the

without the consent of the wife. Thiswife. This only holds true as long as a

only holds true as long as a

harmonious relationship exists. When harmonious relationship exists. When such relation ceases, the

such relation ceases, the husband’shusband’s powers of administration should be powers of administration should be curtailed during the pendency of curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests of the action to protect the interests of the wife.

wife.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano Reyes v. Ines-Luciano

February 28, 1979, Fernandez, J.

Facts:

Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was with the intent to kill. A complaint was

filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt filed on June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father on March was prevented by her father and the second attempt, wherein she and the second attempt, wherein she was already living separately from her was already living separately from her husband, was stopped only because of husband, was stopped only because of her driver’s intervention. She filed for her driver’s intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and legal separation on that ground and prayed for support pendente lite for prayed for support pendente lite for herself and her three children. The herself and her three children. The husband opposed the application for husband opposed the application for support on the ground that the wife support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her

committed adultery with her physician.physician.

The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of

the lower court granted the wife the lower court granted the wife pendente lite. The husband filed a pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not

that his wife is not entitled to receiveentitled to receive such support during the pendency of such support during the pendency of the case, and that even if she is

the case, and that even if she is

entitled to it, the amount awarded was entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive.

excessive. The judgThe judge reduced e reduced thethe amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.

amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly.

Husband filed a petition for certiorari in Husband filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to annul the order granting the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made the husband appeal to the which made the husband appeal to the SC.

SC.

Issue Issue::

WON adultery of the wife was a WON adultery of the wife was a

defense in an action for support. WON defense in an action for support. WON support can be administered during support can be administered during the pendency of an action.

the pendency of an action.

Held/Ratio:

Yes – provided that adultery is Yes – provided that adultery is

established by competent

established by competent evidence.evidence.

Mere allegations will not bar her Mere allegations will not bar her rightright to receive support pendente lite.

to receive support pendente lite.

Support can be administered during Support can be administered during the pendency of such cases. In the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not determining the amount, it is not necessary to go into the merits of the necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978 the record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be

ordered the alimony to be

P1000/month from the period of June P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court accepted findings of the trial court thatthat the husband could afford it because of the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasn’t his affluence and because it wasn’t excessive.]

excessive.]

Banez v. Banez Banez v. Banez

January 23, 2003, Quisumbing, J.

Facts:

A decision granting legal separation to A decision granting legal separation to Aida and Gabriel Banez was

Aida and Gabriel Banez was

subsequently followed by a motion to subsequently followed by a motion to modify the decision (by Aida) and a modify the decision (by Aida) and a notice of appeal by (Gabriel). In the notice of appeal by (Gabriel). In the original decision, Aida was granted, original decision, Aida was granted, among other things, possession of a among other things, possession of a residential unit and a vehicle. The residential unit and a vehicle. The motion to modify the decision was motion to modify the decision was partly granted (commitment of fees, partly granted (commitment of fees, execution pending appeal granted but execution pending appeal granted but moral damages denied) but when it moral damages denied) but when it was questioned in the CA, the trial was questioned in the CA, the trial court’s orders were set aside. Aida court’s orders were set aside. Aida appealed to the SC.

appealed to the SC. Meanwhile theMeanwhile the notice of appeal given by Gabriel was notice of appeal given by Gabriel was granted by the CA.

granted by the CA. With this decision,With this decision, Aida also appealed to the SC. Both Aida also appealed to the SC. Both appeals were consolidated as one appeals were consolidated as one petition in the SC. Though she no petition in the SC. Though she no longer questions the CA’s decision of longer questions the CA’s decision of the vehicle after Gabriel

the vehicle after Gabriel repossessedrepossessed it: as to

it: as to the residential house, Aidathe residential house, Aida claims that it being conjugal in

claims that it being conjugal in nature,nature, justice requires that she and her

justice requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy it children be allowed to occupy it sincesince during the proceedings before the trial during the proceedings before the trial court, she was did not have a chance court, she was did not have a chance to stay there. She contends that an to stay there. She contends that an action for legal separation is one action for legal separation is one where multiple appeals are allowed where multiple appeals are allowed and thus Gabriel’s appeal should have and thus Gabriel’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file been dismissed for his failure to file the record on appeal with the

the record on appeal with the reglementary period.

reglementary period.

Issue

Issue / / Held/Ratio:Held/Ratio:

(1) WON execution of

(1) WON execution of judgmentjudgment pending appeal is

pending appeal is justified.justified.

As held in

As held in Echaus vs. Court of AppealsEchaus vs. Court of Appeals,, execution pending appeal is allowed execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances

when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and well become a tool of oppression and

inequity.

In this case, considering the reasons In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of

cited by petitioner, we are of the viewthe view that there is no superior or urgent that there is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did house. We note that petitioner did notnot refute respondent’s allegations that refute respondent’s allegations that she did not intend to use said house, she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is in the United States where she is aa permanent resident, while he had none permanent resident, while he had none at all.

at all. Merely putMerely putting up a bting up a bond is notond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution

execution pending apppending appeal. eal. To do To do soso would make execution routinary, the would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the

rule rather than the exception.exception.

(2) WON an action of legal separation (2) WON an action of legal separation is one where multiple appeals are is one where multiple appeals are allowed.

allowed.

In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of

Manila v. Court of Appeals,Appeals,258 SCRA258 SCRA 186, 194 (1996), this Court

186, 194 (1996), this Court held:held:

xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage.

mortgage. The The rationale rationale behindbehind allowing more than one appeal in the allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final.

by the court and held to be final.

The same holds true in an action for The same holds true in an action for

legal s

legal separation. eparation. The issThe issues involvues involveded in the case will necessarily relate to in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital

the same marital relationship betweenrelationship between the parties

the parties. . The effecThe effects of ts of legallegal

separation, such as entitlement to live separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and

separately, dissolution and liquidationliquidation of the absolute community or

of the absolute community or conjugalconjugal partnership, and custody of the

partnership, and custody of the minorminor children, follow from the decree of children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not

legal separation. They are not separateseparate or distinct matters that may be

or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and

resolved by the court and become finalbecome final prior to or apart

prior to or apart from the decree of from the decree of legal

legal separation. separation. Rather, thRather, they areey are

mere incidents of legal separation.

Thus, they may not be subject to Thus, they may not be subject to

multiple appeals.

Alvarez v. Ramirez Alvarez v. Ramirez

October 14,

October 14, 2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez,2005, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Facts:

Husband Maximo Alvarez went to Husband Maximo Alvarez went to sister-in-law’s house and set the place sister-in-law’s house and set the place on fire knowing that

on fire knowing that there were peoplethere were people inside (including his wife Esperanza).

inside (including his wife Esperanza).

Esperanza testified against her Esperanza testified against her husband but Alvarez petitioned to husband but Alvarez petitioned to disqualify such testimony on the disqualify such testimony on the ground of marital

ground of marital disqualificationdisqualification. The. The RTC issued an order to disqualify the RTC issued an order to disqualify the wife’s testimony. Sister-in-law (Susan wife’s testimony. Sister-in-law (Susan Ramirez) filed in the CA

Ramirez) filed in the CA an applicationan application for preliminary injunction and TRO. CA for preliminary injunction and TRO. CA nullified RTC’s orders thereby

nullified RTC’s orders thereby

anticipating husband’s current appeal.

Issue Issue::

WON the wife’s testimony can be WON the wife’s testimony can be usedused against her husband.

against her husband.

Held/Ratio:

Held/Ratio:Yes. The maritalYes. The marital disqualification rule has its own disqualification rule has its own exceptions for both civil and

exceptions for both civil and criminalcriminal actions. If marital relations are so actions. If marital relations are so strained that harmony and tranquility strained that harmony and tranquility are disturbed, “the identity of interests are disturbed, “the identity of interests of both parties disappears and the of both parties disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent”. “In

that identity is non-existent”. “In

Ordono v. Daquigan, “when an offense Ordono v. Daquigan, “when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the conjugal relation, it comes impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute…”

within the exception to the statute…”

Obviously the offense of arson impairs Obviously the offense of arson impairs the conjugal relation. It should be the conjugal relation. It should be stressed that prior to

stressed that prior to the commissionthe commission of the offense, the relationship

of the offense, the relationship between the petitioner and his was between the petitioner and his was already strained. In fact, they already strained. In fact, they werewere separated de facto almost six months separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Evidence thus before the incident. Evidence thus reveals that the preservation of such a reveals that the preservation of such a marriage is no longer an interest that marriage is no longer an interest that the State aims to protect.

the State aims to protect.

It was the latter himself who gave rise It was the latter himself who gave rise to the necessity.” – People v.

to the necessity.” – People v.

Francisco.

La Rue v. La Rue La Rue v. La Rue

May 25, 1983, Miller, J.

Facts:

Married in 1950, traditional marriage Married in 1950, traditional marriage between a husband who handled between a husband who handled financial affairs and a wife who was a financial affairs and a wife who was a homemaker. Divorce was granted in homemaker. Divorce was granted in 1980. Wife was only awarded

1980. Wife was only awarded alimonyalimony and allowance for health insurance and and allowance for health insurance and not one-half of the marital assets.

not one-half of the marital assets.

Issue Issue::

WON the wife was entitled to

WON the wife was entitled to equitableequitable distribution of properties.

distribution of properties.

Held/Ratio:

Yes. A housewife contributes to the Yes. A housewife contributes to the

economic well-being in the family. In economic well-being in the family. In

In document Impacto del cribado del Cáncer de mama en la provincia de Segovia (1992-2007) (página 59-65)