La evaluación ambiental estratégica aplica múltiples herramientas

Between 1932 and until 1992, military intervention in politics was the norm rather than the exception. In fact, the military dominated the political scene except for very brief periods following Second World War and when it failed to repress the democracy protest in 1973. Nevertheless, the fight against communism allowed for a military come back in 1976-7. Part of the military’s strategy of fighting and winning this war was to allow for a more liberal polity,

which began to materialize over the course of the 1980s and until the military’s willful

withdrawal from politics to the barracks in 1988 (Bamrungsuk, 2002: 78-9). The military was also, with the king’s blessing and constitutional ordinance, involved in the efforts to develop especially the Northern parts of the country, where most of the communist influence was

concentrated, a role that it continued to play even after abandoning political power in the 1990s. The logic for this developmental role for the military was that the more developed the society gets, the more secure it becomes (Ibid: 81-2).

Following the transition to democracy in 1992, the government changed all laws that were used to justify military interventions in political life and transferred control over the riot control force to the police (Ibid: 80). The minister of defense was also drawn from among civilians as the 1997 constitution banned active duty officers from serving on the cabinet. Yet, it remained that retired officers qualified as civilians and through a political class of retired

officers, the military was able to remain autonomous and shield itself from effective civilian control, especially considering the fact that the bureaucracy in the ministry of defense stayed largely staffed by active duty officers (Pathmanand, 2001: 6; McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 132). The problem of civilian control was compounded by the fact that the armed forces committees in the parliament remained underdeveloped (Ibid: 89). This caused civilian

governments to remain vulnerable vis-à-vis the monarch and the military (Chachavalpongpun, 2014: 3). Against the military’s resistance to civilian subordination efforts, the domination of the Privy Council22 on defense-related issues, and civilians’ lack of expertise on defense issues, civilian politicians opted instead for cutting on the privileges of the military rather than

subordinating it to their civilian control (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 133; Croissant et al,

22 _{The Council has been led since 1989 by retired Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda, former Prime Minister and army chief. Gen. Prem, as} a prime minister, oversaw the opening up for democracy and the return of the military to the barracks in 1988 (Croissant et al, 2013: 158; Chambers, 2011: 294).

2013b: 162-3). Even with the government’s control over the defense budget, especially procurements, the electoral process politicized the process and turned some of the political parties into clients either to the military or to the arms suppliers, further undermining civilian control over the military (Bamrungsuk, 2002: 83).

The rise of Thaksin came in the wake of the financial crisis in 1998, adopting a critical position on the government’s management of the crisis. Making use of his control over a re- branded political party and the minimal influence the crisis had on his investments, Thaksin had sufficient resources in the 2001 election to push for a populist platform that aimed at both rescuing affected businesses while shielding the poor. This election was also the first to be held under the 1997 constitution, which strengthened the role of the executive branch in the

government (Kongkirti, 2016: 4-7). The constitution also sponsored a move towards more “nationalized politics,” as opposed to a factional, power dispersion model that tended to give more weight to local centers of traditional authority.

Nevertheless, Thaksin changed the rules of the political game from a power sharing, or sum-sum game, to a winner-take-all by dominating the political field. This became clear also as he tried to build an elite-masses alliance to consolidate his power and to back his policy positions against the royalist-military-bureaucratic traditional authority network. According to Croissant et al (2013b), Thaksin’s accumulation of power was meant to endorse his own personal power and authority rather than to lay the foundation for democratic practices. In addition to trying to subordinate the bureaucracy and the military to centralize power in his hands, Thaksin brought to power the business sector, expanding its influence over the political process (Hewison, 2010: 123-5; Connors, 2008: 481; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 243).

Additionally, the looming monarchical succession has also had some influence on the rise of Thaksin in the sense that the low levels of popularity of the heir-to-the throne presented an opportunity for the prime minister to be on the offensive and to compete with the monarch within even one of his traditionally claimed-exclusive constituencies, i.e. the poor rural communities in the Northern parts of Thailand. Thaksin’s wider victory margin in the 2005 election, on the eve of the king’s 60th _{anniversary on the throne, made his threat even more}

imminent. In addition, Thaksin’s political and business influence could have also negatively affected the work of the CPB (Hewison, 2010: 120-121, 128-129). This made Thaksin’s combination of political and economic power and his populist appeal all threatening to the institution of the palace (Hewison and Kitirianglarp, 2010: 194-5). According to

Chachavalpongpun (2011: 45, 50), Thaksin was seen as taking over the Thai state through a rising “network Thaksin,” building upon his legacy as the first civilian Prime Minister to complete his full term in office and by making use of his career background in police work and business operations.

As far as the military is concerned, the rise of Thaskin and his efforts to take over the entrenched ‘monarchy network’ came to challenge both the power position of the military as well as the king’s control over it (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005: 135-6, 151). As Thaksin’s approach was to centralize power in his office through informal powers rather than institutional means (Croissant et al, 2013b: 165-6), problems arose as he tried to secure his own leverage over the military through politicizing promotions and appointing a large number of retired- and

active-duty generals as advisers to his office. Thaksin also directed the proceeds of MOBs’ privatizations or the profits of some of the standing ones to officers loyal to him and to his party, yet while occasionally approving some long-delayed increases the national defense budget (Ibid:

167). The military, and the Privy Council, was antagonized by Thaksin’s meddling with its own finances and promotions. The challenge reached its peak when Thaksin nominated his cousin to the position of the head of the army in 2005. Seen as meritless for the position, and upon Gen. Prem’s recommendation, the king intervened and appointed one of his loyalists to the post instead (Chambers, 2013: 72; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2009: 270).