As future work, relating the ideas presented in Section 3.2, where we inves- tigated the connection between the abilities of an agent to perform certain actions and the agents importance for a group to achieve some state of affairs, to the preferences is particularly interesting. This will provide us with deeper insights into how the distribution of the action abilities among the agents in a group effects the power of the agent to influence the group action such that the resulting state will be one that is ‘good’ for him according to some solution concept.
Furthermore, the preference language that we used can be extended and the preferences of the agents over states can be lifted to preferences over formulas [van Benthem et al., 2005; van Benthem et al., 2007]. The resulting language then has a global existential modality and contains binary preference mobilities in a addition to the unary ones. Then we can express that an agent e.g. prefers all states satisfying ϕ over all states satisfying ψ. In such a framework, we could then reason about why a coalition would e.g. forceϕrather thanψ. The approach we presented in this thesis starts with an environment in which actions and their effects are modelled. This environment is then populated by agents and cooperative ability is obtained from the actions they can perform individually and as groups. It would be very interesting (and promising with regard to an investigation of cooperative games) to develop a logic for coopera- tion action and preferences by starting from another point; namely base it on a logic for cooperative ability that can indeed be directly interpreted in coalitional games like it is the case for coalitional game logic (CGL) [˚Agotnes et al., 2006] and then try to make the coalitional power more explicit.
One way of doing so would be to add some representation of actions and their effects. Another way which seems easier to realize is to make the coali- tional power of groups more explicit by showing how the ability of a group to achieve some outcome depends on the abilities of its members to achieve ‘sub- outcomes’, similar as in the case of the logic of cooperation and propositional control [van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2005].
7.3. FUTURE WORK 87
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors Eric and Ulle. I am very grateful to Eric especially for introducing me to the topic and for his advice in developing the central ideas of this thesis. Thanks to Ulle especially for always providing useful feedback about the current state of my work and for his help in presenting my ideas in a clear way.
I am also grateful to Can for reading this thesis and for his comments that helped me to increase the readability.
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