The Russian Federation has two main strategy documents on the Arctic that we analyze: the 2013 Strategy for the Devel- opment of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Na- tional Security Efforts for the Period up to 2020 [Стратегия развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной безопасности на период до 2020 года] (Russia TRG 2013). It is a follow-up to the 2008 Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond [Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу] (Russia TRG 2008). In 2001 Russia presented for the first time Foundations of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике], a draft of the Arctic policy for the 2008 document. For this analysis, the unofficial English translations are used and compared to the original Russian language documents; it is thus important to understand that the quotes used here may not be the same in the original Russian version.
There are also other policy documents/resolutions released by the Russian government. However, because they are not strategies, they are not considered in this analysis. Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation On approval of the state program of the Russian Federation Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 [Правительствo Российской Федера- ции Постановление Об утверждении государствен- ной программы Российской Федерации Социально- экономическое развитие Арктической зоны Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года] issued in April 2014 (Russia TRG 2014); Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation On approval of the Provisions of the State Commission for the Development of the Arctic [Правительствo Российской Федерации Постановление Об утверждении Положения о Государственной комиссии по вопросам развития Арктики] from March 2015 (Russia TRG 2015); and Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation On Amendments to the Resolution of the Government of the Rus- sian Federation of April 21, 2014 [Правительствo Российской Федерации Постановление О внесении изменений в постановление Правительства Российской Федерации от 21 апреля 2014] from August 2017 (Russia TRG 2017). Addi- tionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order on 26 February 2019 N78 On the improvement of state governance in the sphere of development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation [О совершенствовании госуправления в сфере развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации] (Russia TRG 2019), according to which the Min- istry for the Development of the Russian Far East is renamed to the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and the Arctic. This Ministry has the authority, inter alia, to develop and enforce government policy and legal regulations concerning the Arctic’s socio-economic development. Final- ly, the Russian Fedration is currently working on a new draft
policy, Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation up to 2035 (Korchunov 2019, 4-11). The 2013 Strategy identifies the following five main priorities: “a) integrated socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;
b) the development of science and technology;
c) the establishment of a modern information and telecommu- nications infrastructure;
d) environmental security;
e) international cooperation in the Arctic;
f) provision of military security, protection, and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (2013, 3).
The priorities of the 2008 Strategy can be summarized as mar- itime delimitation, regional safety (SAR) standards, regional cooperation, improved infrastructure, socio-economic devel- opment, and improving regional wellbeing (2008, 3, 4). While there may be some overlap in priorities, the new 2013 document provides a more comprehensive description of Russia’s objec- tives, priorities, and means of implementation.
Comparison by Indicator
The (Re)mapping and (Re)defining the Arctic indicator pro- vides insights into how the Russian Federation (Russia) under- stands the Arctic. Both documents recognize that the regional climate is extreme and that there is poor ecological stability. Ad- ditionally, Russia considers the region to be industrial despite its remoteness (2013, 2; 2008, 2,10). The strategies also refer to the region as the “Arctic” and do not use terms like circumpolar or North.
Figure 11 provides a comparison of how many quotes are as- signed to the different indicators, as a percentage of the total number of coded quotes (rounded to the nearest whole num- ber) in the document.
Figure 11. Comparing the Russian Federation’s 2008 and 2013 Strategies
Note: The percentages in each indicator are rounded to the closest whole number and represent the percent of the total number of quotes coded for each document.
The Human Dimension indicator accounts for 12 % of the total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 3 % of the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). The 2008 Strategy addresses little to do with this indicator; there is one sentence stating that increased access to social and economic activities would improve the wellbeing of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the Russian Arctic. The strategy seeks the “improvement of quali- ty of life of the Indigenous population and social conditions of economic activities in the Arctic” (2008, 4).
In contrast, the 2013 Strategy addresses a wider range of top- ics. First, Indigenous peoples are discussed in relation to overall health and wellbeing corresponding to education, culture, and economic success. For instance, the Strategy links education to future success. This means the improvement of “educational programs for Indigenous Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, especially as it relates to preparing children for life in a modern society with a full mastery of skills policies for extreme envi- ronments, including equipping of educational institutions and remote areas means of distance learning” (2013, 4). The Strategy also explains that there is a connection between Indigenous cul- ture(s), way of life, and environmental protection (2013, 4). As for Indigenous economic success, this is understood as new op- portunities rooted in “the traditional economy that strengthen employment and self-employment” (2013, 5) rather than larger companies hiring Indigenous peoples as employees. To achieve this, the Strategy explains that many actors will be involved through the “mobilization of domestic resources of households and communities, and their active support from the govern- ment, business and non-profit organizations” (2013, 5). The Strategy also addresses culture outside the Indigenous con- text. In particular, it provides a broad understanding of things and places that provide culture. Indeed, the strategy seeks “ac- tive formation in cities, small villages and towns new affordable for all segments of the population, and mobile multi cultural institutions (socio-cultural centers, cultural and sports facilities, information intelligence centers, mobile library)” (2013, 4). Health and wellbeing are also addressed outside the Indigenous context. For example, there is much emphasis on the need for improved access to health care for those living in the Russian Arctic. For example, the Strategy calls for “ensuring the avail- ability and quality of medical care to the population, including through improved primary care and primary health care in plac- es of traditional residence and traditional economic activities of the population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, the use of country vehicles and aircraft for sanitary -Air evacuation of patients, the development of technologies for remote panel of doctors” (2013, 4). The Strategy also links better telecommuni- cations, water, housing, and energy infrastructure to improved wellbeing (2013, 4). Improved health and wellbeing, in turn, are connected to increased “self-employment and entrepreneur- ship” opportunities, “particularly in single-industry towns and villages” (2013, 4), as well as improved education, and access to sports and cultural activities (2013, 4).
As for demographics and migration, the 2013 Strategy also ac- knowledges that skilled workers are problematically leaving the Russian Arctic. For example, the Strategy identifies the “negative demographic trends in most of the Arctic regions of the Russian Federation, the outflow of labor (especially skilled) in the south- ern regions of Russia and abroad” (2013, 2). More skilled people will thus be needed to migrate back into the region (2013, 4). The Governance indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85) is briefly captured only in the newest 2013 Strategy, while the 2008 Strate- gy does not reflect on governance at all. The 2013 Strategy states that for the “effective use and development of the resource base” it is necessary to “ensure the preparation of materials submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for the validation of the outer limits of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic” (2013, 5).
To “modernize the fishing industry” the Russian government promises “the effective use of key species of marine biological resources and the involvement of non-traditional fishing sites.” At the same time, there is also a need for “preventing and com- bating illicit production and trafficking of water biological re- sources.” Furthermore, the Strategy aims at “the preservation and development of the resource potential of fisheries and implementation of technical upgrading and commissioning of new capacities for deep processing of aquatic biological resourc- es and the development of marine biotechnology” (2013, 6). In terms of science and technology, the Russian government aims to use “use of the opportunities for international scientif- ic and technological cooperation, ensuring the participation of Russian scientific and educational organizations in the global and regional technology and research projects in the Arctic” (2013, 6).
The International Treaties and International Cooperation in- dicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % of the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85), highlights the importance of joint cooperative efforts by all Arctic states. The 2013 Strategy states that “in order to promote international cooperation and preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace” it is necessary “providing a mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Fed- eration and the Arctic states on the basis of international trea- ties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is increas- ing the efficiency of foreign economic activity” (2013, 7; 2008, 3). Russia should also “ensure a mutually beneficial Russian presence, economic, and scientific activities on the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard keep” (2013, 8).
One of the strategic priorities of Russia is to “strengthening, on a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional or- ganizations, including the Arctic Council and the Barents-Eu- ro Arctic region Council, good-neighborhood of Russia with the sub-Arctic states, atomization of economic, scientific and technical, cultural interaction, and also frontier cooperation,
including in the field of effective natural resources management and environment preservation in the Arctic” (2013, 8; 2008, 4). The 2013 Strategy also refers to the importance of “combining the efforts of the Arctic states to create a single regional sys- tem for search and rescue, and to prevent man-made disasters and elimination of their consequences” (2013, 7). There is also a need for “the implementation of the regular exchange of infor- mation on the environment, as well as data on the Arctic climate and its dynamics, the development of international cooperation in improving systems for meteorological observations in the Arctic climate, including from space” (2013, 8).
The 2008 document also emphasizes the need for “carrying out of an active interaction of the Russian Federation with the Arc- tic states with a view of delimitation of maritime areas on the basis of norms of international law, mutual arrangements taking into account national interests of the Russian Federation, [and also] for tackling issues of an international legal substantiation of the external border of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa- tion” (2008, 3). The 2013 Strategy further highlights the organi- zation and “efficient use of transit and cross-polar air routes in the Arctic, the use of the Northern Sea Route for international shipping under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Feder- ation” (2013, 8).
The 2008 Strategy also emphasizes enhancing “the participation of Russian official agencies and public organizations in the work of international forums devoted to the Arctic problematic, in- cluding the inter-parliamentary interaction within the frame- work of the Russia - European Union partnership” (2008, 3, 4). Furthermore, the 2013 Strategy refers to the necessity of “devel- oping a dialogue between the regions and municipalities of the Nordic countries to exchange experience in the development of climate and energy policies” (2013, 8).
The Environmental Protection indicator accounts for 5 % of the total coded quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 8 % of the total cod- ed quotes for the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). The two documents take different approaches to discussing environmen- tal concerns. For instance, the 2013 Strategy acknowledges that the environment in the Russian Arctic has been damaged (2013, 3), and expresses adesire to find a way to use technologies, es- pecially those in the resource industry, to limit further harm. The Strategy calls for the “development and implementation of new techniques and technologies in the field of environmental management, the development of offshore mineral resources and water resources, as well as the prevention and elimination of oil spills in ice conditions” (2013, 6). In contrast, the 2008 Strategy does not recognize that environmental damage has oc- curred, but expresses the wish to ensure that economic activities do not harm the environment. The Strategy thus states a “basic objective…in the sphere of environmental security – preserva- tion and maintenance of environment protection of the Arctic, liquidation of ecological consequences of economic activities in the conditions of increasing economic activity and global
changes of climate” (2008, 3). Despite the small difference be- tween the two documents with regard to recognition of existing environmental damage, both strategies do recognize the need to protect the environment.
Expanding protected areas and protection of the region’s bio- diversity are addressed in both documents in a similar man- ner. For example, the 2013 Strategy makes clear that it is im- portant “to ensure the conservation of biological diversity of Arctic Flora and Fauna in the expansion of economic activities and global climate change, including:” i) “development and ex- pansion of the Arctic protected areas and federal waters”; ii) “development and expansion of the Arctic protected areas of regional significance;” iii) “monitoring of ecosystems and flora” (2013, 7; see also: 2008, 7). Additionally, the 2013 Strategy ex- plains that there will be “the development and expansion of the network of protected areas and water areas of the federal and regional level” (2013, 7), suggesting that this is a priority for the Russian government.
The Pollution indicator accounts for 3 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 3 % in the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). Neither strategy clearly defines regional pol- lutants, other than one statement about oil spills in the 2013 Strategy (2013, 6). There is one quote from the 2013 Strategy that identifies different sources of pollution, explaining “envi- ronmental damage caused by past economic, military and other activities in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 7) is problematic. One can thus can glean that military waste is a pollutant, while the economic pollution mentioned is likely oil. The document does not state whether the mining industry has also caused pollution. Similarly, the 2008 Strategy is also vague, naming “anthropogenous pollution” (2008, 7), but not saying exactly what this is or where it comes from.
Despite the limited discussion around the types and sources of pollution, both strategies identify different pollution prob- lem-solving measures. For instance, both documents suggest that technology can be of benefit for pollution management. The 2008 Strategy provides a little more information than the 2013 Strategy, explaining that Russia will “introduce new tech- nologies, including for clearing of the territories of islands, coastal zones and water areas of the Arctic seas of anthropog- enous pollution” (2008, 7). The 2013 Strategy identifies other problem-solving methods that range from environmental as- sessments, “environmental monitoring,” corporate responsibili- ty, and improved state oversight (2013, 7).
The Climate Change indicator accounts for 3 % of the total cod- ed quotes for the 2013 Strategy and 5 % of the total coded quotes for 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85). Both documents state that climate change requires further study. Indeed, in both doc- uments there are similar statements explain the need for bet- ter understand of climate change. This means working towards “the prediction and assessment of the impact of global climate changes in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation under the influence of natural and anthropogenic factors in the medium
and long term” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Additionally, similar statements were used with regards to using technology to pre- dict change. For instance, Russia will “promote comprehensive research on the study of natural hazards, the development and introduction of new technologies and methods to predict in a changing climate” (2013, 6; see also: 2008, 8). Russia also recog- nizes that climate change research requires international coop- eration. To this end, the 2013 Strategy states that there will be “organization of complex international research expeditions to study the environment (ice, pollution of marine waters, marine) and the influence of observed and projected climate change” (2013, 8).
The Security indicator, which accounts for 5 % of the total cod- ed quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 15 % of the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85), describes the need to protect the national interests and national borders in the Arctic. According to the 2008 Strategy, the basic objective “in the sphere of military se- curity, defense and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation [is] lying in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federa- tion, [and] maintenance of a favorable operative regime in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, including maintenance of a necessary fighting potential of groupings of general purpose armies (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military formations and organs in this region” (2008, 3). The 2013 document highlights that the Russian gov- ernment aims at the “development of integrated security system for the protection of territory, population and critical facilities [in] Arctic zone of the Russian Federation from the threats of natural and man-made disasters” (2013, 4).
Further the 2013 Strategy states that “in order to ensure military security” it is necessary “to ensure comprehensive combat and mobilization readiness level required and sufficient for solving non-military pressure and aggression against the Russian Fed- eration and its allies, to ensure the sovereign rights of Russia’s Arctic and features the smooth implementation of all of its ac- tivities, including the exclusive economic zone and the conti- nental shelf of the Russian Federation in the Arctic [and also] to neutralize internal and external military dangers and mili- tary threats in peacetime, providing strategic deterrence, and in the event of armed conflict – repel aggression and cessation of hostilities on terms that meet the interests of the Russian Fed- eration” (2013, 8). Further, “there is a need for improvement of airspace and surface control and use of dual-use technologies for the benefit of a comprehensive approach to defense, security and sustainable socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (2013, 8).
The 2008 Strategy states that one of Russia’s strategic priorities in the Arctic is the “delimitation of maritime spaces in the Arctic Ocean and maintenance of a mutually advantageous presence of Russia on the Spitsbergen archipelago” (2008, 4). Furthermore, according to the 2008 Strategy, it is necessary “to optimize the system of a complex control over the situation in the Arctic, in- cluding the boundary control at the check points across the state border of the Russian Federation, [and] introduction of a bor- der zones regime in the administrative-territorial formations of
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation and the organization of a device technical control over the strait zones, rivers estu- aries, firths on the itinerary of the Northern Sea Route” (2008, 6). The 2008 Strategy also highlights that it is necessary to cre- ate “groupings of general purpose armies (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other armies, military forma- tions and organs in this region” (2013, 8; 2008, 6).
The Safety and SAR indicator, which accounts for 6 % of the total coded quotes in the 2013 Strategy and 10 % in the 2008 Strategy (see Figure 11, p. 85), identifies similar safety concerns in the two documents. For instance, safe transit through the Northern Sea Route is important, as are search and rescue capabilities and the ability to address “natural and man-made disasters” (2013,