La Inseguridad Alimentaria

MIRIAM HOEXTER

Much of the discussion on whether Middle Eastern states have the necessary ingredients for the development of democracy has centered on the questions of civil society and the nature of relations between the state and society. The

“Oriental despotism” thesis, long in vogue in the literature, saw these two questions as inseparable: the despotism that characterized the Oriental state precluded the existence of any autonomous organization or civil society; or as Turner put it, “The concept [of civil society] has been used as the basis of the notion that the Orient is, so to speak, all state and no society.”¹The absence of a civil society thus constituted the principal theoretical postulate of the

“Oriental despotism” case, which, according to Turner, was “a reflection of basic political anxieties about the state of political freedom in the West.”²By now, the existence of a plethora of civic associations in the Middle East, though not structured on the Western model, seems to be widely recognized.³ However, emphasizing the despotic nature of rulers, their lack of legitimacy, and their lack of concern for the welfare of the public, the predominating pic-ture in the literapic-ture concerning the relations between state and society is that of a more or less total separation and estrangement of the two.⁴

I propose to challenge this rather unsatisfying picture by looking at the relations between rulers and society from the broader perspective suggested by the concept of the public sphere. The importance of this concept—defined as a zone of autonomous social activity between the family and the ruling authorities—lies largely in that it goes beyond appeals to the formal institu-tions of the Western civil society model, to address the entire realm of socie-tal and cultural life that has relevance to the social and political order.⁵ It thus broadens the scope of discussion to include aspects that have hitherto been largely neglected, such as informal ties, the moral-ethical values that form a society’s image of the good order, and the symbols that reflect the com-mon values and social ideals of the particular society.⁶I shall look at the rela-tions between society and its rulers through a particular prism—that of the Islamic endowment institution, the waqf.

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Hodgson, in his discussion of the shari`a as a civic force, lists the waqf foundations, along with the shari`a laws and the Sufi (mystic) orders, as the three religiously sanctioned integrative institutions holding together all Islamic groupings in the town.⁷Within this framework the waqf fulfilled a particular role: it became the vehicle for financing Islam as a society,⁸or, as I prefer to formulate it: the waqf served as a major means through which the Islamic idea of the social order proper for the umma (the community of believ-ers) was implemented. Throughout the premodern Islamic world, endowments (waqfs) were made by rulers as well as by all strata of the Muslim population.

They provided for the financing and maintenance of a host of public services and did so through an institution that, across the centuries, had retained its basic characteristic as an institution whose rules were an integral part of the shari`a—the sacred law.⁹The waqf is thus an ideal prism through which to examine both the moral values underlying the Islamic perception of the pub-lic sphere and the ways they were put into practice.

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first I shall discuss some doctrinal points that I believe are relevant to the perception of the public sphere characteristic of the Islamic cultural area and their reflection in the waqf. In the second part, I shall examine the impact of the waqf on the forma-tion of the public sphere and the nature of the discourse it generated.

THE WAQF AND THE PERCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE UMMA ANDSHARI`A

The central importance accorded in Islamic political discourse to the commu-nity of believers (the umma) is perhaps the most significant difference between the way Islamic culture and Western culture view the nature of the public sphere and the relationship between the rulers and society.

The interests of the community of believers and the norms that should guide the lives of individuals and the community were the main concerns of Muhammad. After his death, public life was, to a large extent, posited as the collective responsibility of the umma. The Qur’an and Muhammad’s sunna (practices established by the example of the Prophet’s life) provided the norms of public life and served as guidelines for the community as to how to dis-charge its responsibilities.¹⁰The umma inherited the task of spiritual guidance of the community after Muhammad, and its consensus (ijma`) on the legiti-macy of the ruler as well as on details concerning the development of social and cultural norms was considered infallible.¹¹

With the elaboration of the shari`a—the sacred law, or the rules and reg-ulations governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal from the Qur’an and hadith¹²—the role of interpreters and custodians of Muhammad’s legacy of the norms and ideals of good order proper to the community of believers passed,

in the main, to the shari`a specialists—the fuqaha', or, more generally, the

`ulama’. However, the umma—in its original meaning of the entire commu-nity of believers as well as in its more restricted meaning of the commucommu-nity of believers living under one of the legitimate Islamic rulers—never lost its cen-tral position as the moral community. Moreover, the umma retained its right and ability to influence the public sphere, although this did not necessarily imply participation in daily policymaking.

Umma and shari`a were thus the center of gravity around which all activ-ity in the public sphere revolved. Their central position in the premodern Islamic world created a situation radically different from the one prevalent in Western civilization: it placed the umma as the most significant group in the public sphere, and above the ruler. The shari`a embodied the norms of public order, and its preservation was the main moral obligation of both the commu-nity and the ruler.

Some implications of these basic tenets of the Islamic view of the public sphere and their reflection in the endowment institution will be discussed in the sections that follow.

THEINDIVIDUAL AND THEPUBLICSPHERE

Creation of a waqf has always been the act of an individual. The endowment itself as well as all the details embodied in the endowment deed were deter-mined by the individual endower, who alone was promised a reward for his good deed in the hereafter.¹³Endowments by rulers and their entourages are perhaps the best example, emphasizing the individual responsibility of the endower. When endowing an asset, a ruler never did so as a representative of the realm. His act of endowment, like that by anyone else, was the act of a private individual. An endowment by the realm, the political system as a body or institution, let alone an endowment by any other body or group, is simply unknown to Islam and unacceptable according to the terms of the law of waqf. Thus, an endowment of arable land, which in the Ottoman Empire belonged to the state, was preceded by a procedure of temlik—a procedure whereby ownership of the land to be endowed was passed to the person, usually a member of the ruler’s family or entourage, who intended to create a waqf.¹⁴

While the act of creating an endowment was that of a private individual, the beneficiaries of the endowment were always located in the public sphere, whether in the first stage (the endowment would then be described as a waqf khayri) or in the last stage of the devolution of beneficiaries, after the extinc-tion of the primary and intermediary private beneficiaries (the endowment would then be described as a waqf ahli). By endowing his property the individ-ual participated in the formation of the public sphere, thus expressing his sense of belonging to the community of believers and his identification with its values.

The waqf, then, reflects the basic Islamic notion concerning the relation between the individual and the community: in contrast to West European culture, where the distinction between private and public acts was very pro-nounced, what Hodgson termed “the unitary contractualism of Islamdom”

“denied any special status to public acts at all . . . to the point where it ruled out all corporate status and reduced all acts to the acts of personally responsi-ble individuals.”¹⁵The public sphere in Islam was thus conceived of not as an antithesis to the private individual but as an integral or synthetic component of his life as a Muslim.¹⁶

THECONCEPTION OFCHARITY

Endowing one’s asset has always been considered a sadaqa—an act of charity recommended by the shari`a that entitled the founder of the endowment to recompense in the world beyond. In fact, the term waqf, by which the Islamic endowment institution is known, is an abbreviation of the original sadaqa mawqufa.¹⁷The basic idea of the endowment as a continuous or eternal char-ity is reflected in the definition that appears in virtually every waqf manual:

al-waqf sadaqa jariya fi sabil Allah ta`ala—the waqf is a continuous charity for the sake of God and his religion.¹⁸

The institutionalization of the waqf called for a definition of a charity and thus a legitimate beneficiary of endowments. A valid purpose for the ben-efit of which one could endow the produce of one’s property was defined as qurba—that is, anything likely to bring the founder nearer to God.¹⁹ Obvi-ously this was a very broad definition, reminiscent of what Hodgson called

“occasionalism,” which he considered one of the hallmarks of the Islamicate social order (as against Occidental “legitimism”), symbolized by the arabesque and representing “an elaborate surface formalism, adaptable to any substance.”²⁰ This broad definition allowed for the inclusion, as beneficiaries of an endow-ment, of family members, freed slaves, the poor in general, or the poor belong-ing to a specific social group, even a group of animals, side by side with mosques, madrasas, Sufi orders, the water supply system, bridges, etc. This broad defini-tion ensued from the most basic concepdefini-tion of Islam, which, from its incep-tion, never conceived of itself as a religion regulating only the sphere of worship but as a political community guided by and devoted to Allah in all spheres of human activity.²¹ According to this conception a contribution toward the welfare of the community, just as care for one’s own family, was considered an act likely to bring a person closer to Allah.

The idea of charity, then, was defined in Islam in a much broader and more flexible manner than in other cultures.²²The definition of qurba does not differ-entiate between private and public well-being; each is assigned equal value and importance in furthering the interests of the community of believers.

THEUMMA,THERULINGAUTHORITIES,AND THE`ULAMA'

The way waqf foundations—conglomerations of large numbers of endow-ments serving a public purpose—were handled reflected the basic Islamic per-ception of rights, responsibilities, and competencies in the public sphere. An acquaintance with its major characteristics is therefore indispensable to an understanding of the subject.

Sunni doctrine distinguishes between two spheres of claims or rights:

those of men, known as huquq al-`ibad, and those of God, termed huquq Allah.

The first covers claims of private individuals in their dealings with one another and was always recognized as belonging in the sphere of jurisdiction of the `ulama'—the specialists in shari`a law. Huquq Allah, the claims of God, are traditionally identified with the general interests of the community of believers (the umma).²³

The point to be borne in mind concerning this distinction is that claims or rights accrued to only two categories: the individual and the umma.²⁴ Insis-tence on the rights of private individuals and on the primacy of the umma—

not the state or the ruler—in the public sphere was thus at the very root of Islamic political thought.

However, the umma—the entire community of believers as well as the local Muslim community in a specific region or town—was an uninstitution-alized reference group. A kind of latent competition ensued between the

`ulama' and the rulers as to who was entitled to represent the interests of the umma and stand up for the community’s rights. The modus vivendi in this competition may be summarized as follows: From quite an early stage in Islamic history,<sup>25</sup>the `ulama', not the rulers, were recognized as the bearers and inter-preters of the norms and basic values of the proper Islamic social order. The rulers, on their part, were made responsible for the implementation of these norms, the protection and promotion of the general interests of the commu-nity of the faithful. They were to attend to these responsibilities in fulfillment of their obligation to ensure the rule of the shari`a in the territories under their control—an obligation that alone legitimized their rule. They did so under the watchful eyes of the `ulama', and in cooperation with some of them. It is important to remember that the `ulama' very rarely acted as a con-certed group. They were hardly a group in the sociological meaning of the term. Usually it was the expertise in the shari`a of the individual `alim, not his membership in a specific group, that gave him the authority and the backing of the umma to speak up in defense of Islamic norms and social values against rulers who deviated from these norms.

As early as the classical period, rulers were granted extra-shar`i authority to take political and administrative considerations into account in their pur-suance of the interests of the Islamic community. However, one important

reservation was attached to the ruler’s discretion: his actions could in no way be in blatant contradiction of the substantive principles of the shari`a.<sup>26</sup>Rules and regulations promulgated by rulers in this capacity were considered ad hoc measures. They were binding in the territory under the particular ruler’s trol but usually did not assume normative character. Since they were not con-sidered an integral part of the shari`a, they are almost totally absent from the legal literature (fatwas, furu`).

How did this modus vivendi work in practice? Endowments serving gen-eral public and charitable purposes belonged in the realm of huquq Allah.²⁷ The modus vivendi therefore applied in their case. In pursuance of their extra-shar`i prerogatives, rulers asssumed direct or indirect responsibility for the administration of many of the largest and richest public foundations. Also, in a number of cases they allowed for the diversion of some of the income of these rich foundations to purposes other than those designated by the founders of the endowments. Sometimes this deviation from the strict letter of waqf law led to outright abuse of endowed property; but this was not the rule. Usually, the money diverted from its original purpose helped rationalize the manage-ment of foundations in general, by providing the means necessary for costly periodic restoration work in major mosques, expenses that could not have been met solely from the annual income of these mosques. In other cases, sums were spent on distributing charity to the needy or on furthering other general interests of the Islamic community.<sup>28</sup>Although a deviation from the strict letter of waqf laws, spending money to meet these needs was very much in line with waqf ideology and has never, as far as I know, met with objections or criticism from the `ulama'.

In all other matters the rich foundations controlled by the ruling author-ities remained within the jurisdiction of the `ulama'. The assets making up their patrimonies never lost their waqf status, which meant that all these properties were non-negotiable in principle and subject to the laws of waqf.

The interpretation of these laws and their implementation remained in the hands of the specialists—the `ulama'—not the ruler. Instances of rulers who blatantly violated waqf property or manipulated waqf rules in cooperation with some qadis are recorded in the literature.²⁹The fact is, however, that the supreme authority of waqf laws has never in premodern times been questioned outright or even tampered with. The above modus vivendi was thus main-tained for centuries in principle and to a very large extent also in practice.

The picture that emerges from the above discussion is that of rulers responsible for the organization and daily functioning of the public sphere but devoid of authority to determine the basic values governing many of its aspects. The norms, the ideals of good order, and the basic rules expressing them were laid down in the shari`a and left to the interpretation of the

`ulama'. The legitimization of the ruler depended on his observation of these rules, and the umma, usually through the intermediacy of the specialists, had

the right and the obligation to supervise the manner in which he fulfilled his obligation. In other words, the community of believers had built-in claims on its rulers concerning the nature of the public sphere. If the protection against arbitrary acts by rulers was the main purpose of the chartered rights granted in Western civilization to various corporative organizations, the commitment of the Islamic ruler to uphold the shari`a had a much broader significance. It implied an obligation on the part of the ruler to make sure that the public sphere in the territory under his control was construed in conformity with the basic moral norms and values of Islam, and that the law was administered according to the specific rules of the shari`a. The ruler’s adherence to these norms and rules was the touchstone of his relations with the community under his control.

THEDYNAMICS OFCHANGE

In terms of the above-mentioned modus vivendi the `ulama' were entrusted with the mission of preserving and protecting the Islamic norms embedded in the waqf institution and embodied in the detailed and intricate laws of the waqf.

This, however, did not mean that these laws remained unchanged throughout the centuries. Research in the past few years has largly dealt the coup de grâce to the notion that dominated the literature for a long time—to the effect that Islamic law was unchanging and immutable. This notion is certainly unac-ceptable concerning the Islamic endowment institution, with its obvious practical economic and social implications and with a record of survival over

This, however, did not mean that these laws remained unchanged throughout the centuries. Research in the past few years has largly dealt the coup de grâce to the notion that dominated the literature for a long time—to the effect that Islamic law was unchanging and immutable. This notion is certainly unac-ceptable concerning the Islamic endowment institution, with its obvious practical economic and social implications and with a record of survival over