The 1180s were a politically turbulent decade for France. Henry the Young King, eldest son of Henry II of England, died in 1183 after prolonged conflict with his father, and his surviving brothers enlisted the assistance of the young and ambitious Philip II in their succession struggles and personal intrigues. Contests with Flanders and its powerful and influential count, Philip of
103 Cartulaire général des Hospitaliers, I, act 506, pp. 348–49: ‘Igitur ego Hugo, dux Burgundie, quorumdam sacris
ammonitionibus instructus, intuens sanctum domum Jerosolimitani Hospitalis tam in elemosinis quam in ceteris […] ut beneficiorum ejusdem loci particeps existerem, fratribus prescripti Hospitalis libere et absolute concessi ut, pro rebus propriis tam vendendis quam emendis, for a terre mee, que mea dominica sunt, absque ullius pedagii requisitione valeant exercere. Et quicquid de rebus suis sicco vestigio seu navigio per terram meam delatum fuerit, ab omni exactione, quantum ad me pertinent, liberum permanebit […] Hoc autem donum pro meis et parentum meorum excessibus institui in manu fratris Oldini, prioris S. Egidii, Rogero de Molinis, Jerosolimitani magistro, qui me in vita et post decessum in percipiendis beneficiis ejusdem domus constituit fratrem’.
104 Phillips also discussed this match, and concluded that the presence of Sibylla’s infant son, the future Baldwin V,
may have additionally discouraged Hugh from wanting to serve as regent for a child that was not his. Sibylla ultimately married Guy of Lusignan in 1180. See Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land, p. 240.
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Alsace, also came to the fore, especially after Philip II married his niece, Isabelle of Hainaut, in April 1180.105 In this context, Hugh III of Burgundy serves as an interesting example of Philip II’s relations with his vassals in the early part of his reign, and Hugh’s eventual participation on the Third Crusade under Philip’s command must be framed not as a natural act of solidarity with a long-standing ally, but as the result of a relationship that had undergone considerable change and challenge in a short time. Despite difficult relations with Louis VII, Hugh had usually supported him against the Plantagenets.106 Indeed Jim Bradbury, following Robert Fawtier, has claimed that royal authority over Burgundy was never challenged until the accession of Philip II.107 This is an overly simplistic assessment, but it does reflect Burgundy’s position as generally within the orbit of Capetian influence, which now encountered its first major upheaval since the eleventh century. Early in Philip’s reign, in 1180–81, the principalities which formed the core resistance to Plantagenet expansion in France – Flanders, Champagne, and Burgundy – were alarmed by his desire to improve relations with Henry II, which could have seen their own interests disadvantaged. Setting aside old rivalries, and urged on by Barbarossa, their leaders made an expedition against Ralph, count of Clermont, a friend and ally of Philip’s. This flare-up was quickly settled by Henry II himself, but it set the tone for an ongoing tension.108
Similarly to his cousin Hugh, Philip II had had difficulties with his mother, Adela of Champagne. Isabelle of Hainaut had previously been betrothed to the future Henry II of
Champagne, Adela’s nephew, and was promised to marry him as recently as 1179; her marriage to Philip II instead in 1180 represented both a rejection of Blois-Champenois influence at court
105 Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus: King of France 1180-1223 (London: Longman, 1998), p. 56. 106 Hallam and Everard, Capetian France 987-1328, p. 161.
107 Bradbury, Philip Augustus, p. 31. 108 Bradbury, Philip Augustus, p. 56.
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and Philip’s determination to separate himself from his mother’s authority.109 Accordingly, relations with Philip’s powerful uncles (and brothers-in-law) Henry I of Champagne and Theobald V of Blois quickly deteriorated after the marriage took place, culminating in Philip’s seizure of his mother’s lands.110 Hugh III of Burgundy (who was also a nephew of Henry I and Theobald V via his mother Marie, their sister) was part of the Champenois contingent during this struggle, allying with Philip of Flanders, William, archbishop of Reims, Theobald of Blois, Stephen of Sancerre, and Marie of Champagne, widow of Henry I, against the king.111 As noted, peace was made with the assistance of Henry II of England in 1182, but in 1183, Hugh was once more in coalition with these partners in opposition to Philip II.112 The crux of the matter was the claim of Philip of Alsace, count of Flanders, to Vermandois, the inheritance of his late wife Elisabeth, vis-à-vis the royal desire to reclaim the territory that had caused so many Capetian embarrassments in Louis VII’s day. The settlement allowed Philip of Alsace to retain it for life, but it would revert to the crown upon his death.113
It is difficult to determine precisely what altered Hugh’s policy from reluctant but general support of Louis VII to persistent struggle with Philip II. It could be that he was well aligned with his Champenois relatives by this point. In 1179, Henry the Liberal had departed on his own expedition to Jerusalem (for which Hugh assisted in the preparations),114 passed through
Burgundy, and made multiple charitable donations to Burgundian religious houses, including to
109 Kathleen Nolan, Capetian Women (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 79. See also Bradbury, Philip
Augustus, pp. 58–59.
110 Bradbury, Philip Augustus, p. 42.
111 HdB, II, p. 200. Henry I of Champagne died in 1181, and Hugh III’s involvement in Champenois marriage
politics in the early 1180s is also discussed in the Chronicle of Hainaut. See Gilbert of Mons, Chronicle of Hainaut, trans. by Laura Napran, pp. 104–05. Hugh was also apparently involved in Philip II’s efforts to annul his marriage to Isabelle of Hainaut in 1183, which as Napran points out, may have been an act of retaliation by their Champenois uncles for the Flemish match and dimunition of their influence at court. Chronicle of Hainaut, p. 85.
112 HdB, II, p. 202.
113 Bradbury, Philip Augustus, p. 57.
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Châtillon-sur-Seine, Bar-sur-Aube, Jully, Dijon,115 and Beaune.116 Thus, Hugh may have taken a dim view of any royal attempts to threaten this nexus of established family power, and Philip II had also been interfering in the affairs of the county of Nevers. Upon his death in 1176, Guy of Nevers left the wardship of his minor children, William and Agnes, to Louis VII, an avenue of potential political influence that Louis had not actively pursued, but in which Philip took a much more vigorous role.117 Guy’s widow, Matilda of Burgundy, was Hugh’s first cousin (her father was Raymond of Grignon, one of the many younger sons of Hugh II and Matilda of Mayenne, and brother to Hugh’s father Odo II), and this new arrangement, while leaving her as regent in formality, considerably reduced her actual influence. Petit described this time as one in which Nevers and Auxerre were ‘sous la domination directe de l’autorité royale’.118
It is impossible to judge how much Hugh III was personally invested in his cousin’s fortunes, but as Nevers had been recognised as a fief of Burgundy for quite some time, it is likely that he felt politically impinged upon by Philip’s determination to rule these territories directly. It is also the case that the previous hundred years of fairly uneventful relations for France and Burgundy owed more to a lack of aggressive motivation on the part of the dukes, than to a monarchy capable of forcefully resisting them if they had chosen otherwise. In other words, the Capetians had passively benefited from Hugh II and Odo II’s willingness to maintain the status
115 HdB, II, p. 197.
116 Cîteaux, act 234, p. 185: ‘Actum apud Bernam cum irem Iherosolimam’. Hugh had been the principal witness for
his uncle: ‘Hujus rei testes sunt: Hugo dux Burgundie [et al].’
117 HdB, II, p. 199. See also SMC, pp. 348-9.
118 HdB, II, p. 199. We can also see this royal jurisdiction in Philip ordering Peter de Courtenay, count of Nevers, to
assist him in a conflict against Henry II in the late 1180s. Peter was Philip’s cousin once removed, a grandson of Louis VI, and husband of Agnes of Nevers. Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste, roi de France: Lettres de formulaires, ed. by Jean Favier and Michel Nortier (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 2005), VI. See act 25, pp. 51-52: ‘Le roi [Philippe Auguste] demande au comte de Nevers [Pierre de Courtenay] (ou á tous ses barons) de venir en armes au colloque qu’il doit avoir avec le roi d’Angleterre [Henri II] le dimanche de la semaine après Pâques […] Rex Nivernensi comiti, ut armata manu veniat ad colloquium quod habiturus est cum rege Anglie’.
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quo, but when they began to expand their power under Philip II, they found that it was less easily negotiated or appreciated by the similarly bellicose and ambitious Hugh III.
It is thus debatable how Philip’s charter for the city of Dijon, issued sometime between 1 November 1183 and 31 March 1184, should be interpreted.119 Hugh III and his eldest son, the future Odo III, had granted the inhabitants rights and privileges after the model of the commune of Soissons.120 Philip accordingly guaranteed those rights, which could be viewed as either a political nicety to smooth troubled waters, or as a pointed reminder that from now on, the king had to explicitly confirm whatever acts the duke presumed to make. Indeed, Philip’s role appears more as that of enforcer, ensuring that Hugh kept his word if he should be tempted to renege on it,121 and Petit viewed this as a time in which there were several ‘embarras inextricables dans lesquels il [Hugh] était plongé’.122 The concessions to the inhabitants of Dijon may then have resulted from being at a political disadvantage and obliged to buy their goodwill, with Philip scenting an opportunity both to profit from Hugh’s weakness and position himself as the ultimate guarantor of legal rights and privileges in Burgundy. It certainly does not seem, with the ongoing friction since Philip’s coronation, that this represented a friendly rapprochement or personal favour, especially given what was still to come.
In the autumn of 1185, the fragile relations between crown and duchy broke down completely. The nominal cause for the conflict was Guy of Vergy, a vassal of the dukes of Burgundy and a long-standing thorn in their side. The root of Guy’s discontent lay in Hugh’s determination to annexe strategically important territory near Vergy, as well as the building of
119 HdB, II, p. 203.
120 CCB, I, p. 1. For the ‘Constitutions de la Commune de Soissons’, see CCB, I, pp. 15-16.
121 CCB, I, p. 1: ‘In nomine sancte et individue Trinatis, Philippus Dei gratia Francorum rex, noverint universi
presentes partier et future, quam fidelis et consanguineous noster Hugo, dux Burgundie, suis hominibus de Divione communiam dedit ad formam communie Suessionensis, salva libertate quam antea habebant. [. . .] Quod si Dux vel heredes ejus memoratam communiam vellent infringere, vel ab institutionibus communie resilire, nos ad eos posse nostrum eam teneri faciemus’.
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four castles to block him in, and other provocative military actions.123 Feeling affronted by Hugh, he appealed to Philip to redress the situation.124 Philip ordered the lord of Broyes to put the castles under siege, and while the attempt was unsuccessful, Broyes was attacked and burned in retaliation. A conference at Sens in December 1185 failed to put an end to things, and Philip himself took a hand at the beginning of 1186, invading Burgundy, destroying the disputed
fortifications, and making the point explicit: the young king, not yet twenty-one years old, was of a considerably different make than his father Louis. Hugh’s territorial ambitions and political aggressiveness, unlike his recent predecessors, had made him deeply unpopular in Burgundy, especially among the religious establishment. He was soon summoned back to the royal court, where he faced the accusations of the Burgundian abbots and bishops, was censured for failing to respect the rights of the church and for his own disobedience of the king, and ultimately
condemned and fined the enormous amount of 30,000 livres parisis.125
Upon his return to Burgundy, Hugh wrote angrily to Barbarossa, trying to enlist his assistance against Philip and reminding him that increasing Capetian power was likewise a threat to imperial interests. Barbarossa, however, could not afford to anger the Burgundian churches and religious houses on which his governing policy relied, and refused a new alliance.126 Philip, accurately sensing that hostilities had not been concluded, hastily made peace with the count of Flanders, raised an army of Frenchmen and Flemings, and invaded Burgundy again in March 1186. After a short campaign of two or three weeks, he achieved victory, including the capture of
123 Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 163.
124 HGMV, p. 146: ‘Intérim dum agebantur praedicta, Dux Burgundia Hugo collecto exercitu in extremis terra suae
finibus, castrum Vergiaco potenter obsederat , & quatuor munitiones in circuitu fìrmauerat. [. . .] Videns autem Guido dominus castri firmum propositum Ducis, & quòd castrum suum Dux omnino auferre moliebatur, misit nuncios suos ad Philippum Augustum serenissimum Francorum Regem’. . See also Hallam and Everard, Capetian France 987-1328, p. 216.
125 Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 164. 126 Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 164.
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Hugh’s eldest son, the future Odo III, at the siege of Châtillon-sur-Seine.127 It is noteworthy that Rigord’s Gesta Philippi Augusti described Philip in this relatively minor territorial squabble as ‘miles Christi’.128 Due to Hugh’s insults and exactions against the church, royal retribution could be classified as a sort of holy purpose, and calls to mind Suger’s description of French warfare against the invading Germans in 1124. There, the Germans could be killed ‘as if they were Saracens’ – here, the Burgundians were the ones placed into opposition to the soldier of Christ.
In any event, Philip’s triumph was substantial. Aside from Odo’s capture and Châtillon’s surrender, Hugh was forced to yield three more castles in punishment. Rigord, while failing to name these castles, indicates that Philip was also censuring Hugh for infractions committed against his father Louis, which seem to have been a general disregard of his promises to the king.129 At this, Barbarossa did intervene, writing to Philip to ask for Odo’s release, and Richard suggested that fear of more German involvement made the king decide to be conciliatory; he freed Odo and returned Hugh’s castles.130 Philip also ordered Hugh to make reparations to an unnamed monastery that he had insulted.131 In short, the defeat was comprehensive and
permanent. That summer, the changed terms of Burgundy’s relationship with king and emperor were ratified in the treaty of Orvieto, made on 3 June 1186 between Henry of Hohenstaufen, the future Holy Roman Emperor, on his father Barbarossa’s behalf, and Hugh.132 Hugh’s reduced status is at once evident, as Henry was addressed as ‘king of the Romans and always august’ and
127 Rigord, Gesta Philippi Augusti, trans. by Élisabeth Carpentier, Georges Pon, and Yves Chauvin (Paris: CNRS,
2006), p. 189. The editors suggest that Hugh had also infuriated Philip of Alsace by failing to stop bandit attacks on Flemish merchants carrying passports of safe-conduct. See GPA, p. 189, n. 139.
128 GPA, p. 188: ‘Philippus semper Augustus Francorum rex contra ipsum movit arma et, collecto exercitu,
Burgundiam miles Christi pugnaturus intravit et pro defensione ecclesiarum et cleri libertate. . .’ See also Jerzy Pysiak, ‘Philippe Auguste: Un roi de la fin des temps?’, Annales Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 57 (2002), 1165–90, discussing Rigord’s depiction of ‘sacred kingship’ for Philip.
129 GPA, p. 190: ‘Tria castria optima’. 130 Richard, Les ducs de Bourgogne, p. 165.
131 RPA: Lettres de formulaires, act 18, p. 42: ‘18. [1186 ?] Le roi [Philippe Auguste] mande au duc [de Bourgogne]
de restituer au moines d’un monastère [non désigné] ce qu’il leur a enlevé […] De eodem. Rex duci, ut prefatis monachis ablata restituate et in abbaciam de cetero non presumat’.
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Hugh (rather pointedly) as his ‘beloved and faithful vassal, the duke of Dijon’.133 The county of Albon, which Hugh claimed in his wife Beatrice’s name, was recognised as an imperial
possession, but this bound him into a complex and almost untenable network of rights and obligations, divided between Philip and Barbarossa. If Philip attacked Barbarossa, Hugh was legally allowed to assist the emperor in his capacity as a German vassal, but if Barbarossa attacked Philip, Hugh could not call on resources from his imperial lands, and could only muster troops from his French possessions to fight with the king. Lastly, he was explicitly forbidden to make war on Philip in any capacity, issued with a blunt reminder that the same obligations of fealty would be expected from his son, the future duke, and informed that three bishops would keep an eye on him, as well as an additional man or men of Henry’s choosing.134
In other words, any imagined autonomy or ‘prétention à l’indépendance’135 for Burgundy had been put to a resounding end, and Hugh’s future course of action would rest entirely on the volition of the French crown or the German emperor, rather than his own. The location for the treaty, in central Italy and deep in the Empire’s territory, reflected this arrangement: henceforth, Hugh would have to meet his overlords on their terms and on their ground. He was still liable to pay the full amount of damages to the church, and while Vergy itself, the original cause of the trouble, remained under ducal authority, it is doubtful that Hugh regarded that as much of an
133 Étienne Pérard, Recueil de plusieurs pièces curieuses servant à l’histoire de Bourgogne (Paris, 1644), p. 260:
‘Henricus Dei gratia Romanorum Rex, & Semper Augustus, dilecto & fideli suo Hugonis Duci Divionensi, gratiam suam & omne bonum [...] legiitatem de tota terra Comitatus Albonii, quae intra distractum Imperii continetur, quam modo possides, & in posterum possessurus es’.
134 Recueil de plusieurs pièces, p. 260: ‘In hoc etiam voluntati tuae consentimus, quod filius tuus, ille qui Dux
futurus est Divionensis, salva fidelitate Rex Francorum [...] & similiter de allodis quae habet, & quae habebet intra Imperium [...] Contra omnem hominem, praeter Regem Franciae, pacem & verram facies ad mandatum nostrum, de universo Comitatu Alboini, salvo iure Ecclesiarum Imperii [...] Compositionem quoque facies cum hominibus fidelibus nostris, Archiepiscopi Viennensi, & cum Episcopo Grationopolitano, & Episcopo Valentino, supra queriimonis. Sciens, si quas adversum te proponant, vel in praesentia nostra vel fidelis nostri Urrici de Godembert, vel alterius certi nunci nostri ad hoc destinati [...] vel secundam iustitiam, vel secundum amicabilem compositionem satisfactionem exhibebis. Ad hoc in gratiae nostrae plenitudinem te recipimus. Datum in Campo urbe veteri, anno dominicae Incarnationis millesimo centisimo octuagesimo sexto, indictione quarta, tertio Nonas Iunii’.
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enjoyable victory. He had put himself heavily in debt, been rendered dually subject to Philip and Barbarossa, lost any ability to pursue his own interests, made enemies with the church, and generally failed in his attempt to carve out a broader role for Burgundy. In this context, it is no wonder that Hugh participated in the Third Crusade, as both king and emperor took the cross soon after Jerusalem’s fall in October 1187, and his obligations had been forced into conjunction with their own. As contended at the beginning of the chapter, this was indeed the turning point for Burgundian ducal crusading policy, and the shift would be permanent.
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