When we learn from testimony we usually assess the testimony for credibility. This includes an assessment of the over all credibility of the speaker with respect to the topic of their statement, as well as other factors such as the plausibility of the content of the statement, and circumstantial factors which may make the speaker less reliable in a particular context. Generally, when we assign the testimony a high degree of credibility we believe it (all else being equal), when we assign it a low degree of credibility we don't. Such assessments are usually spontaneous, and reliant on general heuristics that we apply (perhaps sub personally) in particular situations. For example, if someone appears drunk then we may instinctively assign them a low credibility. This is based on the stereotype that drunk people are poor informants, or an association between the concept of drunkenness and other concepts we associate with poor informants (for example dishonesty)64.
Such reliance on general stereotypes or associations seems essential to our ability to quickly and reliably make credibility judgements. However, this reliance on stereotypes or associations can also lead us astray. Historically there have been many stereotypes linking disadvantaged groups to factors which we associate with low credibility. For example, there was (and to some extent still is) a common stereotype of women as being emotional, irrational, overly intuitive, and naive. If such stereotypes are salient to a hearer then they may inform the hearer's credibility judgements (even if the hearer does not explicitly endorse the stereotype). The result is that the hearer will assign women low credibility as informants, at least with respect to certain topics.
Fricker points to several harms which result from epistemic injustice. Firstly, when we assign someone low credibility on the basis of factors such as race or gender we wrong them as a knower. Fricker argues that the capacity to know and to give knowledge is a fundamental human value. Thus, in limiting some individual or group's ability to give knowledge we thereby restrict their ability to engage in an activity fundamental to human value. As Fricker (2007) puts it, "the capacity
64 Fricker frames her discussion in terms of stereotypes, and I will mostly follow her in this. However, I think that the
notion that we appeal to stereotypes (most easily conceived of as a type of generalisation) in credibility judgements or interpretation over-intellectualises these processes. I think it is more likely that we associate certain concepts with others, and that the salience of one concept (for example intoxication) may thereby raise the salience of other concepts (for example dishonesty), and that these associations guide our interpretation and credibility judgements. Likewise, if someone harbours anti-Semitic biases the concept 'Jew' might raise the salience of 'greed', which could in turn influence their credibility judgement when it comes to testimony relating to money. Here the agent is not appealing to some sort of anti-Semitic generalisation like 'Jews are greedy' (they might not even consciously endorse such a generalisation), it is the mere association of Jewishness with greed which does the job, leading to epistemic injustice.
to give knowledge to others is one side of that many sided capacity so significant in human beings:‐ namely, the capacity for reason" p 44. By assigning someone a low credibility on the basis of prejudicial stereotypes we prevent them from giving knowledge, and thereby exclude them from the 'community of epistemic trust'. Fricker even contends (drawing on Bernard Williams) that the ability to share one's beliefs plays an important role in the psychological development of one's social identity through the steadying and securing of one's beliefs. When limited in our ability to convey knowledge we are, according to Fricker, limited in our ability to develop our own social identity.
Fricker also identifies a variety of secondary harms which arise from prejudicial credibility judgements. Our ability to share information is essential for our ability to partake in a large number of social activities which are central to the good life. For example, one's ability to progress in one's career, or to effectively defend oneself from false allegations65 will usually depend on one's ability
to effectively communicate one's knowledge. Indeed, usually when we try to impart knowledge we are doing so for some particular reason, in service of some more general task. When one is restricted in one's ability to share knowledge one is thereby restricted in one's ability to partake in any task in service of which one may wish to impart knowledge. Epistemic injustice also causes harm in the sense that it can lead people to lower their opinion of their own epistemic abilities. If you are treated as unintelligent for a long enough period you will eventually start to believe it yourself. If you are treated as unreliable on a particular topic you may lose confidence in your beliefs on that topic, and thereby lower your credence bellow the threshold required for knowledge. An ideal agent would instinctively appeal only to non-prejudicial stereotypes when assessing a speaker for credibility. However, most of us are not ideal in this respect. Something must be done to remedy this situation. Fricker's proposed solution is that we attempt to develop the virtue of testimonial justice. This is a corrective virtue whereby we actively reflect on the prejudices we may harbour and develop a sensitivity for the kinds of situation in which we may be led to unjust credibility judgements as a result of these biases. In such situations we should not rely on our quick intuitive judgements, but should try to make an accurate and unprejudiced judgement. Fricker puts the point as follows:
'When the hearer suspects prejudice in her credibility judgement—whether through sensing
65 One of Fricker's key examples is Harper Lee's (1960) novel 'To Kill a Mocking Bird', in which Tom Robinson, who has been falsely accused of rape, is unable to defend himself as a result of the racial prejudices of the time preventing his testimony from being trusted.
through self conscious reflection—she should shift intellectual gear out of spontaneous,‐ unreflective mode and into active critical reflection in order to identify how far the suspected prejudice has influenced her judgement. If she finds that the low credibility judgement she has made of a speaker is due in part to prejudice, then she can correct this by revising the credibility upwards to compensate. There can be no algorithm for her to use in determining how much it should be revised upwards, but there is a clear guiding ideal. The guiding ideal is to neutralize any negative impact of prejudice in one's credibility judgements by compensating upwards to reach the degree of credibility that would have been given were it not for the prejudice.' Fricker (2007), 91-92.
The hope is that eventually such reflective adjustment will condition us in such a way that our automatic intuitive credibility judgements become unprejudiced.