LA METODOLOGÍA A APLICAR

In Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 I display the effect of an autocratization for the two risk sets.6

Once again, higher levels of bureaucratic quality are associated with less non-state conflicts. What makes these two figures differ are the predicted probability of conflicts during an autocratic transition. The predicted number of yearly counts for a high risk state with low bureaucratic levels going through an autocratization is 0.55. For a state that lack the internal characteristics associated with conflicts, the predicted yearly occurrences is 0.07 at the same level of bureaucratic quality. This means that over 100 occurrences of autocratization, the high risk state will have 55 non-state conflicts and the low risk state will have 7. However, these numbers should be interpreted with caution. Results from Model 3 suggest that the estimate is not bomber proof, only significant at the 10% level.

I will draw on an example from the Ivory Coast’s presidential election of 2001 to explain how autocratization directly can lead to fighting between non-state actors. The country inhabits characteristics that make it disposed for conflicts. The lead up to the election

Figure 5.18: Scenario 2: Autocratization for a state at high risk

1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 −2 −1 0 1 2 Bureaucratic Quality Predicted Counts Autocratization No Yes

Figure 5.19: Scenario 2: Autocratization for a state at low risk

1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00 −2 −1 0 1 2 Bureaucratic Quality Predicted Counts Autocratization No Yes

was marked by civil unrest. A newly approved constitutional change narrowed down the potential candidates allowed to run for office. Eligibility required that both parents of the candidate were born within the country. The consequence was a disqualification of 70% of

the candidates. Due to his alleged Burkinab´e nationality, the candidate representing RDR

(Rassemblement des R´epublicains de Cˆote d’Ivoire), Alassane Ouattar was disqualified. This

led supporters of RDR and Alassane Ouattar to call the election a fraud, hence claiming new elections. Reluctant to lose his position, President Laurent Gbagbo refused the opposition’s claims. In aftermaths, tension between supporters of Alassane Ouattar and Laurent Gbagbo lead to bloody street battles with more than 30 persons killed (Toungara 2001; UCDP 2014). According to predictions for countries resembling the Ivory Coast, more than half of the cases of autocratization would bring non-state conflicts. While the non-state conflicts in the Ivory Coast is directly traceable back to the shrinkage of the political sphere, the causal link between autocratization and non-state conflicts is in other cases dubious.

One example casting doubts about a causal path between autocratic transition and non- state conflicts is Cameroon. In my dataset, Cameroon is recorded with a total count of five non-state conflicts. One of these counts occurs within the context of an autocratization. In 1998 Cameroon is recorded with a conflict between the Bafanji and Balikumbat tribes. The

5.3. PROBING THE RESULTS: QUANTITIES OF INTEREST

origins of this conflict go back to the 1960s, based on division of land. In 1998 the tension was triggered by a quarrel between Balikumbat locals and a Bafanji traditional chief, in which the car of the chief was seized. While it seems rather arbitrary that a car seizure would lead to more than 50 persons killed, the hostility between the groups had existed for long (UCDP 2014). However, the origins of this particular conflict bring up a discussion of causal relations. It clearly does not speak in favor of a causal relationship between autocratization and non-state conflicts.

Whether autocratization leads to non-state conflicts remains unclear. Based on my analysis

I am reluctant to draw this conclusion. What I find is that autocratization is strongly

associated with non-state conflicts. The reason why I emphasis on associated is by closer examination of the particular states that have simultaneous observations of non-state conflicts and autocratization. These states tend to already be haunted by armed conflicts. Together, the coincidence of non-state conflicts and autocratization makes up a total of 36 counts,

distributed between 14 different states.7 _{Most of these observations are states that to already}

have a ponderous legacy of armed conflicts. The observations include states like Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan and Iraq. The dyads, or warring parties, that make up the counts for these observations are often conflicts that originated long before autocratic transition. Some of them might have inactive for a while, but the origin of tension goes beyond the autocratization argument.

From Hegre et al. (2001) we know that proximity to change often leads to a new change. The road towards consolidation is long and troubled. Within the two categories of imaginary states I have examined, the average number of years since last regime change (both democratic

and autocratic transition) is 62.77 for the low risk state and 7.87 for the high risk state.8

These two numbers gives a more nuanced picture between the probability of autocratization and the eruption of non-state conflicts. Since change more frequently occur within the state predisposed for conflicts, it adds more doubt to the causal argument between autocratization and non-state conflicts.

Based on the issues put forth, I fail to find any support for Hypothesis H3b. While au- tocratization is strongly associated with non-state conflicts, it fails as a causal argument. By more thoroughly probing the observations of non-state conflicts within the context of an autocratic transition, the causal argument is highly speculative. While non-state conflicts in

7_{These states are Russia, Niger, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon, DR Congo, Somalia, Ethiopia,}

South Africa, Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan

8_{These values are based on the more restrictive operationalization of regime change. For the regime change}

indicator incorporating state collapse, the numbers are slightly altered. For the low risk state the average number of years since change is 63.03. For the high risk state it is 6.92 years.

some case are the results of autocratization, as with the Ivory Coast, the majority of their origins go beyond an autocratic transition. States like Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sudan and Iraq are already so fiercely stricken by other aspects associated non-state conflicts and political instability. In these cases, adding an authorization to the context is not necessarily the cause needed for conflicts to turn violent. Hence, a causal path between autocratization and non-state conflicts is an argument without leverage in my analysis.