La Modificabilidad Estructural Cognitiva de Reuven Feuerstein

“In order to grasp what follows, it is essential to realize that both he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (a tautological proposition), i.e. that the author and the reader of these lines both live ‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology in the sense in which I have said that ‘man is an ideological animal by nature’” (Althusser 2001, p. 116).

The above passage must be read carefully as it includes both the potential for

developments in the theory of ideology as well as the potential for serious limitations. First, the positive aspects: it has been argued that Marx inherited a humanist

conception of authenticity from Feuerbach, a notion exemplified in the idea of ‘collective social labour’. For Althusser, there is no longer a need to explain the way in which an individual identifies/communicates with this collective subject, in the sense that there is no dichotomy here between ‘authentic subject’ on the one hand and ‘ideological identification’ on the other: there is no ‘subject’ prior to ‘ideological identification’, the two instances emerge simultaneously and cannot be differentiated. This reduction of the status of the subject to the ideological appears to do away with the problematic presupposition of ‘objective knowledge’ as a test and measure for instances of ‘ideological mystification’ – presuming that knowledge must be preceded by a subject, it would seem to follow that the influence of ideology must be in a certain sense ubiquitous.20 This leads to what can only appear on a first reading to be

20 _{This is not the conclusion arrived at by Althusser himself who, like Marx, maintains a conception of} scientific knowledge as distinct from ideology in general: “Marx founds a new science, i.e. he

elaborates a system of new scientific concepts where previously there prevailed only the manipulation of ideological notions. Marx founds the science of history where there were previously only

philosophies of history…before Marx, two continents only had been opened up to scientific knowledge by sustained epistemological breaks: the continent of Mathematics with the Greeks (by Thales or those designated by that mythical name) and the continent of Physics (by Galileo and his successors)” (Althusser 2001, pp. 21-22).

a serious limitation in the Althusserian theory of ideology, as Sharpe has pointed out, this line of reasoning is indeed vulnerable to accusations of being too ‘all-inclusive as a social-theoretical notion’ to be of any use. The propositions that ‘man is an

ideological animal by nature’, that one is ‘always-already’ a subject, appear to be simply non-falsifiable and so unhelpful in breaking away from the limitations encountered in the theory of ideology thus far. Nonetheless, I wish to argue that Althusser’s strict anti-humanism can and should be tempered with an aesthetic conception of a decentred, yet active, subject; that with slight revisions Althusser’s theories of interpellation and ideological State apparatuses do represent an important advance in the theory of ideology.

Althusser begins his treatment on ideology with an important modification to the Marxist theory of the State. He notes that the standard formulation has been first to claim that the State can be defined as the repressive State apparatus; ‘State power’ must be distinguished from the State apparatus (the mechanism through which the former is exercised), as State power can change hands and represent different interests without modifying the State apparatus; ‘class struggle’ is primarily concerned with the seizure of State power, by a class or alliance of classes, in order to implement their class objectives through the consequent control of the State apparatus; finally, it is the imperative of the proletariat to seize State power, in order to first replace the existing State apparatus with a proletarian State apparatus, with the eventual goal of the radical dissolution of the State, i.e. every State apparatus and State power as such. Althusser accepts the distinction between State power and State apparatus but argues that a further distinction is needed within the State apparatus itself. He maintains that

the repressive State apparatus (RSA) can, preliminarily,21 be identified as the unity of institutions including the Government, Administration, Army, Police, Courts and Prisons – institutions which function primarily by ‘violence’, “…at least ultimately (since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take nonphysical forms)” (Althusser 2001, p. 96). However, Althusser argues that the exercise of State power would not be possible in a purely repressive form of State apparatus, that any effective RSA must be supplemented with what he terms ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs).

Unlike the composition of the RSA, the institutions representing the ISAs appear relatively autonomous and distinct from one another. Althusser presents the following as a preliminary empirical list:

• the religious ISA (the system of the different Churches),

• the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘Schools’), • the family ISA,

• the legal ISA,

• the political ISA (the political system, including the different Parties), • the trade union ISA,

• the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),

• the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.) (Althusser 2001, p. 96). Althusser of course accepts the obvious rebuke that the RSA and ISAs cannot be neatly demarcated, noting that some, such as the family ISA, serve other functions and others, such as the legal ISA and arguably the political ISA, also belong to the RSA. Despite this he maintains that there are important differences between the RSA

21 _{It is important to note that Althusser did not present his theses on ideology in completed form: “I} should like to venture a first and very schematic outline of such a theory [of ideology]. The theses I am about to put forward are certainly not off the cuff, but they cannot be sustained and tested, i.e.

and the ISAs, over and above the fact that there is one RSA and a plurality of ISAs. Firstly, there is a distinction between public and private domains; the RSA belongs to the public domain whereas most of what comprises the ISAs can be considered to belong to the private domain. Anticipating the objection that what belongs to the private domain cannot also belong to the ‘State’ apparatus, Althusser argues that “…[i]t is unimportant whether the institutions in which they are realized are ‘public’ or ‘private’. What matters is how they function. Private institutions can perfectly well ‘function’ as Ideological State Apparatuses. A reasonably thorough analysis of any one of the ISAs proves it” (Althusser 2001, p. 97). The general argument here is that insofar as the ISAs all work to produce, or rather reproduce, subjects with attitudes, habits and customs commensurable to the interests of the State, they can be said to belong to the State apparatus. The primary difference, then, between the RSA and the ISAs is that the former functions predominantly by violence and the latter functions predominantly by ideology. It is important to note that Althusser maintains that there is no such thing as a ‘purely’ repressive apparatus or a ‘purely’ ideological apparatus, each utilises the predominant aspect of the other as a secondary or supportive

function:

For example, the Army and the Police also function by ideology both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and in the ‘values’ they propound externally…[the ISAs] also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic… Thus Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to ‘discipline’ not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family… The same is true of the cultural IS Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc. (Althusser 2001, p. 98).

Given the necessary interplay between the RSA and ISAs, as well as Althusser’s dictum that no class can maintain or reproduce the use of State power without effective control of the ISAs, we can make the observation that the more subtle, the less obvious, are the instances of repression functioning in the ISAs, the more hegemonic and secure are the interests of the class or classes in control of State power. Thus the importance of the ideological field is clear:

…the Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. [Because]…[t]he class (or class alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the (repressive) State apparatus (Althusser 2001, p. 99).

For while the appropriation of State power through the seizure of the RSA may be quick and decisive, it can only be short-lived without the subsequent reproduction of the relations of production which underlie it; and such reproductions cannot be achieved without what Althusser terms the ideological interpellation of individuals as subjects.

The primary function of ideology, manifest in the ideological State apparatuses, is thus the reproduction of the relations of production. The question remains as to the means by which this is accomplished; precisely what is the nature of the relation between individuals and ideology? Althusser proposes two theses by way of

explanation: “Thesis I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 2001, p. 109) and “Thesis II:

Ideology has a material existence” (Althusser 2001, p. 112). Thesis I represents a slight divergence from the approach that Marx adopted from Feuerbach. The German Ideology proposed that ideology represented a mystified, or alienated, conception of authentic conditions of existence; the cause of this conception lies in the fact that the

actual conditions of existence are themselves alienating, thus in order for this to be sustained ‘authentic’ conditions of existence must be projected in ideology – either as a potentiality inherent in the actual conditions of existence, or more commonly, as with religious ideologies, as a state to be attained in a transcendent existence. The obvious flaw in this conception is the space left open regarding how one comes to formulate and identify with a mystified representation of authentic conditions that are necessarily absent from one’s actual conditions. Who or what is causally responsible for such a projection? Althusser’s thesis is beneficial in that it disposes of this

problem of causation:

[I]t is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there…it is necessary to advance the thesis that it is the imaginary nature of this relation which underlies all the distortion that we can observe (if we do not live in its truth) in all ideology …What is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live (Althusser 2001, p. 111).

Although this thesis has advantages over those propounded in The German Ideology, it could arguably be accused of relying on circular reasoning: ideology represents an imaginary relation to one’s real conditions of existence. Why? Because one’s real conditions of existence are regulated through an identification with the ideological State apparatuses. Althusser’s approach becomes more meaningful against the backdrop of thesis II, so this criticism can be put aside for the moment. For now it is important to note the radical transformation of the status of alienation entailed here. For Marx, the ideological subject is necessarily an alienated subject – ideological conceptions are born of the estrangement entailed in alienated labour and class

stratification, essentially as an explanation or justification for this alienation. Here the opposite holds true: the ideological subject does not feel alienated from his or her actual conditions of existence – on the contrary the more one ‘feels at home’, the more one identifies oneself as belonging to the ISAs, i.e. the less alienated, the more successful ideological interpellation is. The two approaches agree on the same general tendency of ideology to create a sense of self-identification with the external, though while Marx holds this to be an illusory effect, Althusser argues it to be very real, for he insists that ideology has a material existence.

The materiality of ideology follows from Althusser’s insistence that ideology is always realised in and through an apparatus. It seems non-controversial to claim that one’s ideas, particularly one’s ‘ideological’ ideas, if this distinction can be made, always imply a corresponding action – indeed Althusser claims that it is an essential aspect of ‘the ideological representation of ideology’ that one

…must ‘act according to his ideas’…Indeed, if he does not do what he ought to do as a function of what he believes, it is because he does something else, which, still as a function of the same idealist scheme, implies that he has other ideas in his head as well as those he proclaims, and that he acts according to these other ideas, as a man who is either ‘inconsistent’…or cynical, or perverse…the ‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his actions… (Althusser 2001, pp. 113-114). This ‘ideological’ expectation that one ought to act according to one’s ideas is sustained by the fact that these ideas have correlative rituals and practices embodied in the ISAs. These rituals and practices are of course exceedingly numerous and diverse, ranging from obvious examples such as the material practices of worship and ethical commitments implied by a belief in God, to more subtle instances such as the proper rituals and practices associated with notions of civility and good manners.

Althusser follows Pascal here, these ideas, certainly supportive of and indispensible to the ISAs, are themselves, in the last determination, a product of the ISAs; they have no autonomous or ‘ideal’ existence of their own: “ideology…[exists] in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material practices governed by a material ritual, which practices exist in the material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to his belief” (Althusser 2001, p. 115). The problem of circularity reappears here: the ISAs cannot function without subjects willingly adopting and identifying with the ideas that underlie them; but the possibility of adopting and identifying with ideas is itself dependent on their corresponding existence within a material ISA. Thus a person is simultaneously a free subject and a subjected being. To make sense of this counter-intuitive notion Althusser introduces the concept of ‘ideological

interpellation’.

The mechanism of ideological interpellation is equated with instances of being ‘hailed’. Althusser gives the example of an individual being hailed on the street – ‘hey, you there!’ – the consequent recognition from the hailed individual that this call was addressed to him or her, the spontaneity or obviousness of this recognition is, Althusser maintains, an ideological effect, ‘the elementary ideological effect’:

[W]hat thus seems to take place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology. What really takes place in ideology seems therefore to take place outside it. That is why those who are in ideology believe themselves by definition outside ideology: one of the effects of ideology is the practical denegation

of the ideological character of ideology by ideology: ideology never says, ‘I am ideological.’… (Althusser 2001, p. 118).

The way in which ideology functioning in the ISAs hails or interpellates individuals is reliant upon the recognition of themselves as ‘subjects’, ideology always addresses

itself to subjects and, because we ‘always-already’ are subjects, this hailing is almost always successful. To demonstrate that this is not so much a temporal process, but rather in a sense an omnipresent reality, Althusser refers to the Freudian analysis of the expectation of a birth:

Everyone knows how much and in what way an unborn child is expected. Which amounts to saying, very prosaically, if we agree to drop the ‘sentiments’, i.e. the forms of family ideology (paternal/maternal/ conjugal/fraternal) in which the unborn child is expected: it is certain in advance that it will bear its Father’s Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is ‘expected’ once it has been conceived (Althusser 2001, p. 119).

Althusser’s claim is that, to varying degrees, all the ISAs contain this feature through which certain expectations are in a sense imposed upon individuals as subjects, that this imposition succeeds because individuals recognise themselves as the intended ‘subject’ of these expectations; thus in a retroactive movement one recognises oneself as being ‘always-already’ a subject.

However, if ideological interpellation is conceived as a blanket process encompassing all aspects of human nature, it then appears to be not only non-verifiable but also intuitively implausible. Althusser’s reference to humanity being an ‘ideological animal by nature’ does seem to point in this direction and invites the following criticism from E.P. Thompson:

…behind Althusser’s grotesque notion of ideological ‘interpellation’ or ‘hailing’ we find even more chic notions of men and women (except, of course, select

exalted thinkers, ‘bourgeois’ or ‘Marxist’, proceed from the same ‘latent

anthropology’, the same ulterior assumption about ‘Man’ – that all men and women (except themselves) are bloody silly (Thompson 1995, pp. 199-200).

The attempt to disassociate ambiguous notions such as ‘human nature’, ‘authenticity’ and ‘essence’ from the theory of ideology is an understandable and, I would argue, a necessary endeavour; Marx’s failure to account for such notions when implying that ideology can be equated with ‘false consciousness’ is a fundamental deadlock in the theory. Thompson is correct to argue, though, that sweeping these notions under the umbrella of ideology does nothing to remove the ambiguity – we simply move from ideology in juxtaposition to an unspecified authentic ‘other’ to a concept of ideology itself that exhibits aspects of this unspecified ‘otherness’ (i.e. ‘class struggle’ as the determining factor in the last instance). I would argue, however, that Althusser’s theory has the potential of dissociating itself from these ambiguous notions without having to negate or subsume them – that human nature, authenticity and essence may or may not exist, and that this problem has nothing to do with the existence of

ideology. I think that Althusser’s reference to ‘bad subjects’ could point towards this: …the subjects ‘work’, they ‘work by themselves’ in the vast majority of cases, with the exception of the ‘bad subjects’ who on occasion provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus. But the vast majority of (good) subjects work alright ‘all by themselves’, i.e. by ideology (whose concrete forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses) (Althusser 2001, p. 123).

The need for this occasional intervention from the RSA can only mean that