LA OBSERVACIÓN

As noted in the previous cluster power deals with strategies, people and processes. Power is exercised strategically to enforce or influence processes towards preferred outcomes. The exercise of power frames the relationships of individuals, groups and organisations and the roles they play in the processes of decision making- the reality of who has power to make or manage change. However power can be internal, vested in the community or external vested in

171 government agencies or other external influences. These issues are explained in the following principles.

Landscape change decision making should be a bottom-up processes with locally defined outcomes. This is a reaction against regulations which do not originate in the community and are therefore seen as illegitimate. The thinking evident here is that the government has affected landscape change through growth imperatives which constrain processes on the local landscape. For example;

… [it is the] government which is putting huge pressure on farmers for intensification because they want greater production … C2.

… to a certain extent we are being over-governed … a person’s ability to think and to

innovate is being stifled to a degree by all the rules and regulations … we get too much

driven from the top … C14.

… those decisions [by councils] are being made on economic and political mind-set rather than practical … the decisions are being made by … council staff, not necessarily by

elected members that we elected to represent us, and then it is not a practical or

workable scenario that ends up coming out … C17.

… it is the community coming up with the blueprint of how they would like their place

their landscape to evolve … I 6.

This envisages a groundswell of locally initiated ideas or decisions, based on community values and visions, about the landscape and how they are to be achieved. It also signifies a reaction against top-down decision making, which it is argued is incited by external drivers of change.

Landscape decisions should reflect the local weighting of issues. This presupposes subsidiarity - landscape change decisions made at the lowest level possible closest to those affected by them. This strand of thought exposes internal-external tensions of who belongs in the landscape or who does not, and who has the power to make the decisions. Therefore those qualified as locals - by themselves and other locals - have legitimacy and a greater say in decisions.

… the people who it affects should be given more opportunity than people living outside

the area who might come through it once or twice a year … C16.

… I think that is a fundamental premise … in order to attain standing or weighting in the

eyes of a panel … it is quite wrong for someone from Auckland, Wellington …. can come

to Omakau and say … no you shouldn’t do this because I don’t like the colour

green…priority rights … decision making belongs to the locals … C12.

... you couldn’t really take what he says because he is an outsider, he just arrived here

and he might have a lot of preconceived ideas … be careful of … the extremists … live

somewhere else and think … ‘this is what’s gonna happen’ … C13.

… as long as it is fair and you have listened to the people … don’t listen to the outsiders

172 way I want to downgrade my land, this is the land I make my money from and if I abuse it, then am not going to make money from it. Am I? ... C16.

… there are a few vocal groups which feel land belongs to them not just farmers … C15.

This approach seems contradictory to impartiality above, but understood in context highlights the tensions in decision making at the local scale between local actors. This raises the issue of identity- not nominal identity but identity cultivated over a locally defined period, and therefore legitimacy and qualification to be consulted, and to make decisions.

Landscape change involving government should be done in moderation. This strand of thought seeks only moderate government intervention in regulating certain aspects of change. This is justified when there are time limitations, and decisions have to be made at some point anyway, on behalf of the community. However, it is the communities and their representatives who play the major roles in decision making.

… It’s got to be managed from the government isn’t it? People do what they are allowed

to do with no conscience. So the only way they can be managed is throughout the

regional council controlling the water supply and the rivers … [at the community level] … C7.

… you can’t force people to do it… there are times you say … let’s do it because we know

there’s going to be 50% that don’t like it and 50% who do … so you’ve got to make a

decision and 50% will tell you, ‘you are wrong’ … it would be good to be a benevolent

dictator … C8.

… I hope the council will be ahead in the ball game on those issues, so that when

intensification comes along there will be strict rules to go in, that they’ve got to pay for in

their initial set up … C8.

This raises question of the extents of government intervention, when and how it should happen. ...to a certain extent we are being over-governed … a person’s ability to think and to innovate is being stifled to a degree by all the rules and regulations … C14.

Presence of power implies conflicts between those who wield it and those who do not. The conflicts arising from power relationships should be mediated through deliberation and communication.

Compensation should be fundamental to landscape change management. Compensation is envisaged at two levels, in instances of loss, and as an incentive. Landowners should be compensated in event of loss of land or income to conservation, preservation and provision of wayleaves on the landscape. Secondly, individuals could be compensated for achieving desirable outcomes or maintaining the landscape. In both instances, compensation should be commensurate with the loss incurred or effort expended by the landowners. To illustrate this, the following examples are given;

173 … In the UK and Europe there is, if you fall within a, we call them outstanding…areas of outstanding natural beauty in the UK for example, and if you…perhaps it’s similar to here but we have people living in the national parks and villages and generally if you own land in a national park or an area of outstanding natural beauty or some high level landscape

[overlay],there is usually some financial contribution from the government or the local

authority to enable you keep that environment, your land looking, or keeping it in

context with its greater surrounding …and unfortunately in New Zealand there isn’t that

financial contribution which somehow upsets people … P1.

… if they go and put in a really good wetland, then they lose grazing and would have to

lose 10% of their stock and 10% of their income, how can they be recompensed to

remain viable…find ways of rewarding…good incentives … I 6

… Incentivise people to get good outcomes … paying management fees to manage

landscape and land the way society wants it managed … not sanctioning people and say

remove X number of stock from this country to allow tall tussock to grow…and then there is resentment … destroy social harmony … C12.

The discourse implies a political ideological position that, if society desires something, they should pay for it. This includes purchasing from private individuals. This process is already undertaken in the New Zealand high country through the tenure review system. Figure 7.7 below gives a summary of these principles.

Governance- ‘why?’ and ‘who?’- principles

Change purpose Institutions

Generic Sustainability

Innovative management

Bottom up

Benchmark Landscape values

Socio-economic and environmental hierarchy

Local weighting

Moderation of government interests

Operational Incremental

Conservation and preservation

Compensation/property rights

Figure 7.7: Governance landscape change principles

Governance principles discussed here point to an agreement generally about subsidiarity. What is not clear is what level this should be expressed. The key informants emphasises a bottom up approach, where a greater emphasis is placed on locals, and little or no involvement of government. Some measures include compensation to manage landscapes in ways acceptable to the community, and a greater emphasis on property rights. The general argument of this cluster is consistent with theoretical arguments of landscape democracy, democracy in general and communicative planning, where citizens at the grassroots have a greater influence than the centre- the government (see Arler, 2011; Dryzek, 1990, 2000; Healey, 1996).

174 The next section will delve into both deliberation and communication principles and their place in landscape change management.