La problemática actual de la movilidad en la

Dependencies in patron-client relations shape the nature and translation of diffusion influences into the state building developments of de facto states. While relations between de facto states and their patrons rarely imply a complete transfer of authority, Lake (2016: 1-2) warns that external actors, that are willing to fund state building, “are likely to have interests in the future of that country, and will therefore seek to promote leaders who share or are at least sympathetic to their interests and willing to implement their preferred policies.” This, in turn, can reduce the internal legitimacy of the leadership, which Lake (2016: 70-77) refers to as the ‘statebuilder’s dilemma’. Furthermore, the acceptance of a dominant state’s involvement reduces the subordinate state’s possibilities and privileges of setting their own policies (Lake 2011: 9).

Yet, most entities voluntarily accept subordination if they receive something for this in return. Also dominant entities are willing to accept financial and possible political costs associated with the relationship if they benefit from the engagement

65 (Lake 2011: 7). Within this context, Comai (2018b: 189, 193) identifies a pragmatic approach of post-Soviet de facto states toward sustained dependence on their patron by striving for “sustainability rather than self-sustainability.” Building on these dependency dynamics that capture a degree of agency of the dependent state, the theoretical framework of this thesis offers explanatory power as to why domestic actors may be more susceptible to mimic, challenge or justify specific diffusion practices of external actors. Thus, dependencies should not only be regarded as a way for external actors to coerce certain institutional or policy choices on the recipient state, but also as a mechanism that shapes the room for manoeuvre and courses of action of domestic elites. Understanding de facto state agency in the context of dependency and layers of diffusion may offer insights into varying state building outcomes. This is why (bounded) agency represents a second transition variable, symbolised by the second orange bar in figure 2, that shapes the ways in which diffusion sources influence the state building processes of de facto states.

Diffusion frameworks have the analytical advantage of considering not only the reflective nature of the adopting agent, but also the contextual environment that may shape the decisions of domestic actors (Strang & Soule 1998: 266-267). Gel’man and Lankina (2013) highlight, for instance, how regions may act in contexts of limited choice and that entities can resist coercive diffusion in certain settings. They explain the varying institution outcomes in Russian regions not only with the aspirations of actors involved, but also with fluctuating “propagation structures” (hierarchical versus loosely networked (Savage 1985: 14)) as well as the spatial proximity and connections of individual regions. In practical terms, this means that depending on a region’s penetration of national actors, so called change agents, and the regions involvement in the federal network, institutional choices can be influenced by the national government. At the same time, the involvement of national governments, even in authoritarian systems with strict hierarchies, might not be all-encompassing due to challenges from domestic actors or competing external influences (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 46).

The ability of elites and societies to challenge external coercive diffusion influences is also conditioned by the capacity of de facto states, the reliance of patron states on the de facto state, the domestic relevance of the patron interference, the

66 availability of alternative support sources and pressures from the parent state. Given the limited international recognition of de facto states, these entities have reduced financial, political and military capabilities and therefore restricted room for manoeuvre in challenging external patron engagement. Also external pressures from the parent state reduce the agency of the de facto authorities to challenge patron involvement, because of higher demand for military, financial and political support from the patron. At the same time, the importance of a given legislation and institution for the legitimacy of a de facto regime (private property and language legislations in Abkhazia for instance), the availability of viable alternative support sources from countries or international institutions as well as the relevance of the de facto state for the patron state’s domestic politics loosens the bind on agency and increases a regime’s ability to challenge patron involvement.

The presence of alternative diffusion influences in form of resource streams and normative pressures increases the likelihood for resistance in dependent entities. However, depending on the propagation structures and organisational penetration of diffusion sources, alternative resource support and normative factors may be insufficient to counter mimicry or coercive diffusion (Gel’man & Lankina 2013: 56-58). Hence, due to the limited availability of viable alternative choices, de facto regimes are less likely to resist coercive influences and more susceptible to indirect diffusion influences in form of mimetic, normative and competitive diffusion. The agency of dependent de facto states is likely to be bound by the perceived interests and activities of the patron. This bounded agency increases the likelihood for legislative and institutional isomorphism between the de facto state and its patron. Still, in this arena of limited manoeuvre and course of action, the de facto authorities can exemplify agency and signal autonomy.

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Chapter 3

Conceptualisation of Patron States in the Context of

Patron-De Facto State Relations

Notwithstanding a growing emphasis in the de facto state literature on the agency and internal developments of de facto states (see e.g. King 2001; Caspersen 2012, Berg & Mölder 2012; Richards 2014; Bakke et al. 2013; Broers et al. 2015; Kopeček 2020), numerous studies recurrently stress the significance of patron states for these unrecognised entities in one form or the other. Florea’s (2014) data set presents relations between de facto states and patron states as relatively common phenomena in international politics with 21 out of 34 de facto states falling into this category. What is more, the term patron state is repeatedly used in de facto state scholarship covering diverse regions such as South East Asia, West Africa and the South Caucasus, which assumes commonalities across patron state characteristics and practices that transcend geographical boundaries. Yet, a wide range of case studies have uncovered the varying shapes, motivations and dynamics of patron-de facto state relations. Russia’s influence on Transnistria, for instance, is difficult to comprehend without contextualising the relative power dynamics of their patron-

68 client relationship and its ensuing dependencies (Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2017; Devyatkov 2017). Meanwhile, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh’s relationship follows arguably different interests and is a prime example of fluctuating dependencies in patron-de facto state relations (Broers 2005; Kopeček 2020).

Judging by the prevalence of patron states in the de facto literature, it is somewhat surprising that scholars have not engaged more closely with the concept of patron states. The arguably most prominent works on de facto states (Pegg 1998; King 2001; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2008; Caspersen 2012), for instance, do not define patron states despite using the term repeatedly in their work. Even most accounts that directly engage with the role of patron states, patronage or patron-client relations (e.g. Blakkisrud & Kolstø 2012; O’Loughlin et al. 2015; Gerrits & Bader 2016; Bakke et al. 2018; Comai 2018a; 2018b) neither offer a definition of patron states nor do they refer back to definitions of patron states or patron-client relations in preceding literature. This apparent limitation to present a working definition of patron states ultimately avoids considerations of the presuppositions as well as the theoretical and practical implications of using the term.

Recent scholarship has begun to address this omission. Veenendaal’s (2017) study on the position of microstates in international relations through the lens of an international patron-client model popularised patron states in the international politics literature once more and also presented a common basis and reference point for subsequent de facto state studies. Some articles started engaging increasingly with patron-client relations to analyse de facto states (Devyatkov 2017; Berg & Pegg 2018; Kolstø & Blakkisrud 2017; Berg & Vits 2018) by either relying on the patron- client models of the Cold War period (most prominently Shoemaker & Spanier (1984) and Carney (1989)) or on Veenendaal’s (2017) understanding of patron-client relations in the context of micro states. While this shift towards greater clarity in terms of patron-client model definitions presents an important development in the de facto state literature, this chapter argues that (1) the assumptions of the Cold War patron-client relations literature do not neatly fit the context of the post-Cold War patron-de facto state relations (e.g. patron competition, international perception of patron-client relations) and that (2) de facto states represent a different form of client class to micro states, especially in terms of their limited international

69 recognition and the associated limitations of engaging with these entities. Moreover, (3) the proposed definitions (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984; Carney 1989; Veenendaal 2017) do not offer a satisfactory basis for identifying patron-client relations.

Henceforth, the aim of this chapter is two propose a conceptualisation of patron states in the context of patron-de facto state relations, by building on critiques of existing literature on patron-client relations from the Cold War period. Subsequently, the chapter ascertains whether patron interests, foreign policy instruments, domestic capabilities, the relative power dynamics of patrons and de facto states or dependencies represent unique identifiers of patron states in patron- client relations. The final part of this section outlines the ways in which the ensuing patron state conceptualisation challenges Florea’s (2014) coding of patron states and suggests an alternative classification of patron states in his data set. The novel conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relation will form the key independent variable in the statistical analysis of patron influences on state and institution building in de facto states (chapter 5).

This chapter argues that as commonalities across domestic characteristics of patron states cannot account for common factors of patron state identification, patrons have to be examined from a relational perspective, which shifts the focus on patron-de facto state relations rather than patron states in themselves. This chapter essentially proposes a conceptualisation of patron-de facto state relations that considers dependencies and foreign policy instruments as the defining components of these relations. More specifically, de facto states need to receive the dominant share of support from one patron state in order to develop dependencies that make up the inherent power dynamics of patron-client relations. Thus, it is necessary to go beyond mere asymmetry in patron-client relations to refer to these forms of dyadic relations. The proposed conceptualisation of patron states contributes to the clarity of debates surrounding patron state influences on de facto states by offering insights into behavioural patterns of patron states, motivations behind patron engagement and dependency dynamics in patron-de facto state relations. Understanding the dependency dynamics of patron-de facto state relations, for instance, uncovers the ways in which these relations shape the domestic realities and agency of de facto states.

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