La resistencia a los principios del audiovisual

structures: Towards taking over changed donors’ interests in the social action fund model?

TASAF and World Bank officials reported that there is an ongoing donor agenda to shift focus from the social action fund towards social protection programmes or safety nets. Although the government may wish to maintain TASAF in its current format, given its demonstrated achievements, it is left with limited options to do so since the major portion of its budget is donor funded. World Bank officials are fully aware that most sub-Saharan African countries ‘still want the social action fund model to be there because it also has an added value, it does a good job, it does a lot of good work’. However, the Bank official’s stance is that social funds should not be conceived as permanent institutions funded by donors, but as evolving ones (World Bank Official 23.03.2015). Pronouncing his verdict on the future of TASAF, a World Bank official asserted: ‘Social funds are dying; they must die” (World Bank Official 23.03.2014). However, from a national

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perspective, the question remains, if social funds like TASAF are performing well, why would governments seek to change them.

Ministry officials stated that having deconcentrated programmes like TASAF was not their optimal policy choice due to the fact that they were only sustained by donor money, however they had decided to let them operate the way they do for a period of time, hoping that they could soon be mainstreamed into the D-by-D framework (Ministry official-01 12.06.2014). Some ministry officials also believed that because of their

dependence on donor money, the parallel structures of TASAF are destined to failure once that funding ceases (Ministry official 12.06.2014). In that regard one ministry official observed that ‘Of course, in terms of structures, TASAF may not be efficient because anything established outside the existing government system will definitely fail (Ministry official-01 11.06.2014). Another added that ‘There will come a time when any

system operating outside the government administration will have no space in local government’ (Ministry official 12.06.2014). A World Bank official supported the idea of integrating TASAF into formal government structures, observing: ‘I will be happy if the structure TASAF holds for now will be integrated into the government structures; and especially the local government structures’ (World Bank Official, 23.03.2015). Accentuating the need for the formal incorporation of TASAF structures and system into existing state structures, the Bank official asserted:

Since TASAF is now considered a national institution with a Cabinet approval, then all its structures at all levels, and the local levels in particular, should be approved as well and should be recognised within the local government system to make it more sustainable. I don’t want these committees to be dispersed once TASAF is gone (World Bank Official 23.03.2015).

However, TASAF officials held a different view. Those interviewed in Dar es Salaam and in the case-study areas believed that the success of the TASAF initiative was a product of both its organisational structure and its location in the administrative hierarchy (TMU official 30.03.2015; TASAF Tanga 02.04.2015). A TASAF official, for instance, declared that ‘Experience shows that TASAF has survived mainly because of the approach adopted compared to other development projects’ (TMU officials 14.05.2014; 30.03.2015). As a consequence, the mainstreaming or integrating of the Fund (as an institution) into sector ministries at the central level was not something envisioned by TASAF officials. Many respondents believed that TASAF’s special status, and especially the fact that it operates under the President’s office, gave it the strength to ensure

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efficiency and accountability in utilising public and donor resources (TMU official 14.05.2014). Illustrative of this view, a TASAF official stated that: ‘For us, being under the President’s office is an advantage because from there we can work with other ministries and LGAs, otherwise, you cannot hold them accountable if you are at the same level’ (TMU official 30.03.2015). World Bank officials also acknowledged that TASAF’s accountability to the President’s office has an added advantage in the efficient use of resources as well as in the effective delivery of its services (World Bank 23.03.2015; 19.04.2015). Nonetheless, donors, and the World Bank in particular, are putting pressure on the government to reconfigure the structural orientation of TASAF as they are longer interested in the generality of such funds (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

The forces pushing TASAF towards a reconfiguration of its structures and operations are both internal and external. A TMU official observed: ‘We have pressure from development partners, but that pressure comes because the government did decide that we need to go this route, to have the fund decentralised and then think through these channels’ (TMU official 30.03.2015). However, even under this pressure the leadership of TASAF is thinking of changing its structure to an executive agency model in order to remain outside the normal ministry structures (TMU official 30.03.2015). However, TASAF officials understood that in order for TASAF to remain in its current form, the bulk of its funding would need to be sourced from the government budget in order to lessen its dependence on loans and grants (TMU official 30.03.2015). The extent to which the proposed agency model will be funded from the central fiscus and the extent to which it will continue to be effective remain uncertain. Bank officials believe that the government is facing a dilemma because of the pressure it is under from donors to change the format of TASAF:

I think there is a dilemma. They still want to see that they work with TASAF while TASAF is going to an end or it won’t be there. We need to mainstream it to different sectors and concentrate on safety nets. Let others assume their normal responsibilities, ministry of education take building schools; health take building clinics; roads authority take responsibility for roads construction (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

The dilemma faced by the government is illustrative of the challenges faced by LDCs in the face of powerful geo-political forces. Despite the fact that social funds such as TASAF have demonstrated their effectiveness in a number of developing states, and despite the reluctance of governments to reorientate their focus, the fact that they remain

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heavily dependent on foreign aid means that they are vulnerable to the changing agendas of multi-lateral an bi-lateral funding agencies.

6.7 Conclusion

From the responses in the three case-study municipalities, it is evident that, despite the introduction of the D-by-D programme, the administrative capacity of local governments continues to be highly constrained due to a lack of resources and the expertise necessary to deliver basic services and engage citizens in a meaningful way. In contrast, the influence of TASAF in strengthening the capacity of local government institutions was apparent in all three local councils. However, not all respondents acknowledged TASAF’s achievements in building the capacity of LGAs. Some (though not all) councillors and ward administrators felt side-lined by the parallel structures established to implement TASAF projects. Local political office bearers and some ministry officials also felt that TASAF served to weaken rather than to strengthen village government because it assigned more decision-space to the CMCs and council technocrats than it did to village councils. Ministry officials, however, had mixed opinions about the TASAF model. While a few believed that the TASAF system of funding would in the long run serve to reduce the commitment of government to devolve, the majority of officials from the central government ministry and regional administrations believed that the TASAF model had, in fact, advanced the process of decentralisation in the country.

It is also evident from the survey data, that ordinary citizens hold different views about the effectiveness of TASAF than do local politicians. The concerns raised about the fact that the hybrid model of decentralisation was undermining the legitimacy of LGAs, and hence impeding the development of local democracy, was not supported by empirical data, which revealed similar levels of trust in both administrative systems.

The chapter which follows looks at the perceptions of different stakeholders on the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation has influenced the delivery of public services in LGAs and, in particular, in poor communities.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

7

PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE

DECENTRALISATION ON PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter looked at the extent to which the hybrid model of decentralisation was perceived to have strengthened the capacity of local councils. Following in this vein, this chapter assesses the extent to which the model has served to improve local service delivery. It does so by analysing national trends in the delivery of basic services and by reviewing the perceptions of officials from central government ministries, regional administrations, local governments, the World Bank, local political office bearers, community leaders and ordinary citizens.