Leninist ideology and the degree to which
they can be changed by subtle reinterpretations of the ideology is a very interesting matter that is completely beyond the scope of this thesis.
and procedures forces subordinates themselves to take and adapt decisions to the specific conditions of their local circumstances. Frank writes:
The existence of conflict among standards prevents subordinates from following rules alone, forces them to handle and decide each issue individually, and thus turns all members of the system, subordinates as well as
superiors, into policy-makers.^
The party authorities recognise that in some circumstances the people working on the spot are in a better position to make decisions than they are. In the Soviet case overall objectives are rarely left undefined. However ambiguity is left in the specific tasks and procedures needed to achieve the objectives. As long as the PPO's at
all times work towards the objectives they are allowed to take advantage of the ambiguity over specific tasks and procedures to choose those that best suit local conditions. Jerry Hough describes this phenomenon in the Soviet context. He is primarily concerned with production enterprises and
speaks of the broad definition of responsibilities of an enterprise director and the impossibility of all these responsibilities being met. Hough writes:
Because the manager has no precise set of rules and regulations to follow, he has much
more room for maneuver than might be expected for an official low in a very centralized hierarchy ... The nature of the Soviet planning system has not only left the manager with freedom of action vis-a-vis his superiors, it has also had a major impact on the nature of the kontrol exercised by the primary party organization. Because there is no precise plan or set of regulations, the kontrol cannot be a routine
'verification of performance' in the usual sense of that phrase. If, as one Party
secretary expressed it, regulations are broken continuously 'for the sake of production', the Party secretary cannot be an official who
merely checks off regulations that have been violated. To be sure, he and his organization must be interested in machinations and law violations of a gross character, but their basic role must be much broader. In checking the overall performance of the enterprise, the organization inevitably becomes involved in policy-making, if for no other reason than that the mere choice of the indicator or regulation to emphasise constitutes a decision of significance.
Although the significance of movements towards decentralis ation of Soviet economic administration since 1965, and indeed since the death of Stalin, should not be over emphasised, it is nevertheless the case that lower-level line organisations now have important formal powers, not to speak of informal powers, to determine the specific tasks they will undertake and the procedures they will
follow. This gives their PPO's the opportunity to assume a considerable decision-making role in ensuring that the line organisations' choices are not outside the parameters of party objectives.
The third contribution conflicting standards and goal ambiguity make to organisational flexibility is in the greater initiative and willingness to criticise, innovate and improve that they allow subordinates. It is essential to the staff generalist role that PPO's take advantage of their decision-making powers to improve the performance of "host" organisations. Of course such criticisms and
improvements can only be within the limits set by party policies.
It is evident that the second situation in which PPO's are likely to have to exercise their control functions, when line organisations' tasks are undefined or ambiguous, gives the PPO's the opportunity to be involved in considerable decision-making.
The third situation which PPO's are likely to confront occurs when "host" organisations understand but are unwilling to accept party policies. Usually this situation involves specific cases of PPO-administration conflict over particular decisions or tasks. The PPO has specific powers it can use in such cases, the ultimate being an appeal to higher party authorities. However the
situation is particularly interesting when it involves more fundamental line opposition to basic party policies. The importance of PPO's will be greatly enhanced if it can be shown that they are involved in the implementation of basic party policies against line opposition. I will attempt to show this in one particular case - the case of the post- Khrushchev administrative and economic reforms. Chapter Four will be devoted to an examination of the role of
ministerial PPO's in implementing those reforms against the opposition of the state apparatus.
But before becoming involved in a detailed
discussion of such matters it is necessary to look at the powers PPO's have available for the exercise of their control function, remembering that direct intervention in decision-making and the giving of orders to administrators is forbidden.
The most important weapon at the disposal of the PPO is the right of control, as described in Paragraph 60
of the Party Rules.'*' Although the right of control is not essential to the PPO's exercise of control, it is most easily understood in terms of the right, the right giving formal expression to powers that are already available.
PPO's were certainly expected to exercise control before the formal right was introduced at the Eighteenth
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Party Congress in 1939. Although the introduction and extension of the right of control undoubtedly widened the powers exercised by many of the affected PPO's, this was more because once they had gained the formal right of control those powers which had already existed could no
longer be misunderstood or ignored by PPO officials or institutional leaders. An article in Bol'shevik in 1939 claimed that the right of control in effect already existed before the Eighteenth Party Congress:
In the Rules it is necessary to have clearly set out what party administrators are
already using: control of the administration of enterprises and collective and state farms.
1 Ustav KPSS, 1971, op. cit., pp. 53-55. 2 Pravda, 4/4/39, p. 2. The same applies
to non-production PPO's before they were given the right in 1971. The
situation with regard to the 1971 changes will be examined in more detail later in
The right in fact already exists.'*'
Remembering then that the right of control is the formal expression of the powers involved in party control we will now look at what is entailed. The two basic elements involved are the right to receive and examine information on the state of affairs in the
institution and then the right to take certain action once an understanding of the situation has been gained. A
Partiinaia zhizn' article of 1973 summarises the powers entailed in the right of control as follows:
(1) to hear reports (otchety) from leaders when necessary;
(2) to establish permanent and temporary commissions;
(3) to study affairs on the spot and acquaint oneself with relevant information;
(4) to express suggestions and recommendations in accordance with party decisions and Soviet
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laws and strive for their implementation. 1 Bol*shevik, 4/39, pp. 46-47 . An article in
Pavtiinoe stvottel 'stvo in the same year said that it was necessary to make clear through the right of control that PPO's now must concern themselves with economic matters. Partiinoe stroitel 'stvo, 4/39, p. 26. Cheplakov, a party official from Azerbaidzhan, said at the Eighteenth Party Congress that the right of control was a necessary weapon to be used against administrators who previously claimed that PPO's had no control over them because the Party Rules said nothing about it. Pravda, 21/3/39, p. 6.
Points (1), (2) and (3) are concerned with obtaining
information, while point (4) outlines the powers of action available to the PPO. I will now look at each of these points in some detail. Although authoritative statements are in substantial agreement with this list, in interpret ation and practice considerable differences appear.
A consideration of point (1) brings these differences out well. There appears to be a difference between categories of PPO regarding the hearing of reports
from the heads of "host" organisations. Authoritative statements stress that any leading official is obliged to give reports before the PPO.'*' It appears that the directors of schools and the rectors of tertiary educational
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institutions do so regularly. However lists of leading officials in administrative and research institutions that do so always exclude the head of the institution. For example, Pravda reported in 1971 that the party committee of the Ministry of Chemical and Oil Machine Construction heard reports (otchety and doklady) from communists working
in the ministerial apparatus right up to the deputy 3
ministers. Research institute party committees hear reports (otch'dty) from deputy directors, laboratory heads
1 P.zh., 14/65, p. 24; 10/68, pp. 41-42.
2 P.zh., 23/66, p. 61; 24/71, pp. 37-38;
Turkmenskaia iskra, 12/9/72, p. 2;
Kazakhs tanskaia pravda, 4/8/72, pp. 2-3.
and department heads.
The other feature of the coverage given to the hearing of reports in the Soviet press is that it usually refers to the hearing of reports from "communist leaders". Most leaders of Soviet institutions are party members and are therefore bound by party discipline to account for their behaviour before their PPO's. Presumably this is an indication of some controversy over the hearing of reports. Party officials prefer to avoid any possible difficulties by reference to the requirements of party discipline.
Another important matter to be noted is a diff erence in language that disappears in translation. There are three Russian words all translated into English as "report". Soobshchenie and doklad tend to have the sense
1 Kom. Estonii, 8/13, p. 2. At times the uncertainty has been in the opposite
direction. Thus in 1939, at the time of the public discussion of the coming introduction of the right of control, Pravda was asked whether the right involved hearing reports (otoh'dty) from directors only or from shop heads as well. Pravda, 19/2/39, p. 4. In 1972 the secretary of the party buro of the Ukrainian Institute of Mechanics reported that with the granting of the right of control the party buro hears reports {otoh'dty) from aspirant (post-graduate student) supervisors, not just from the communist deputy director as before. Pravda Ukrainy,
26/1/72, p. 2. What is interesting about these two cases is that the PPO's were interested in gaining access to lower-level workers.
Presumably it is these lower-level leaders who are directly involved in whatever it is the PPO's wish to examine.
of reports primarily for information purposes. The speaker simply reports on the state of affairs in his section of the institution or even on some very general matter. These words do not imply accountability. However the word otch'dt has the sense of accounting for one's behaviour. It would appear that an otchet is a more serious matter. A case
could be made that administrators that are not party members, or who are not appearing as party members, are more likely to give doklady. That is, administrators try to avoid giving otchety unless party discipline forces it on them. For example, in 1971 the secretary of the party committee of the State Committee for Science and Technology wrote that meetings of the party organisations, party buros and party committee of the State Committee, in order to influence the work of all its sub-divisions, hear doklady from sub
division leaders and otchety from communists.^
However this linguistic difference does not fully explain the confusion in Soviet commentaries and practice. The list of powers entailed in the right of control given above uses the word otchet and makes no mention of communist leaders. Also we can see that many of the examples I have given refer to hearing otchety without any mention that the
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