Suon Serey, a student at the Lycée Sisowath before 1975, had spent the DK period in a village in Kandal province. Within a month of the Viet-namese liberation of her village in 1979, Serey had established a
“school” and was teaching a “class” of young children. There were eighty students, she recalled, in a classroom that was an old disused building.
“I had no pedagogical training and I had no teaching materials. I just taught the students Khmer from my memory.” The children, Serey added, “used clay as a pen and wrote on boards.”26
Serey was not alone. In May 1979, a Vietnamese observer in Phnom Penh witnessed a primary school established in a former DK adminis-trative building. The children were “sitting seven to eight to a desk, with only one book and a stub of pencil, practicing reading out loud in cho-rus.” Kim Din, the secretary of the management committee of Kompong Cham province, also noted that “a number of schools run by the people have been opened with alphabet [literacy] classes and some elementary classes.” The classes, Din observed, “do not follow a systematic program.
The teaching staff . . . have some degree of instruction but no teaching experience.”27
The first schools to function in Cambodia after DK were neither or-ganized nor sanctioned by the PRK administration. Instead, they sprang from the initiatives of dedicated individuals like Serey. By April 1979, the PRK’s leaders had turned their attention toward the recommencement of an officially sanctioned school year. It was a task they approached with great haste and without due consideration of the obstacles they faced.
The structure and orientation of the education system implemented in Cambodia during the PRK (and SOC) period reflected this haste.
The task of reestablishing a national education system aligned with the promises and assurances made by the regime in the UFNS platform.
It was begun with significant Vietnamese support at both the provincial and national levels.28 Throughout April and May 1979, the few func-tional Khmer education officials, in tandem with their respective Viet-namese advisers, began a concerted campaign to set up a national body of officials and teachers.29The Vietnamese managed the effort, recalled one former official, “because we did not know where we should start. We were lost.” The officials originally focused on recruiting former teachers and officials who had survived the DK period. Later, they turned to the wider community in order to recruit enough teachers to fill the nation’s
classrooms. Teachers were “virtually picked up from city streets and vil-lage pathways.”30 An official proclamation circulated throughout the country on July 30, 1979, announced the new educational program of the PRK.31It had been developed in less than two months.
The system inaugurated by Heng Samrin in September 1979 was a function of the haste with which it was created: a combination of dia-metrically opposed revolutionary Vietnamese and French educational ideals and ill-conceived contingencies in the face of significant ob-stacles. The new educational structures put in place by the administra-tion were a hybrid, reflecting both Vietnamese educaadministra-tional practices and the French-oriented prewar background of many of those Cambo-dians entrusted with the system’s rehabilitation.
Vietnamese advisers imposed on a Cambodian ministry lacking both ideas and expertise a system of education that bore a striking resem-blance to that functioning in Vietnam. The primary school course, which had been divided into two three-year cycles prior to 1975, was condensed into four grades. Secondary school involved a further six years of study, broken into two three-year cycles. The ten-year structure, and the ascending numbering system adopted to denote school grades, were identical to those of Vietnam. A second feature of the system, which was the same as that of Vietnam’s, was its decentralized manage-ment. Provincial education committees, rather than the powerful cen-tral ministry of prerevolutionary times, were vested with a high degree of responsibility for decision-making.32
The changes were not “de-Khmerization.” Nor were they “ethno-cide.”33Rather, they were a removal of French influence from the struc-ture of the Cambodian education system. In respect of both strucstruc-ture and management, they were also changes that accorded with the pre-vailing post-DK conditions in Cambodia. The country was without the infrastructure, facilities, and personnel necessary to reintroduce a thir-teen-year system of education. Similarly, a decentralized management structure was entirely appropriate for a country in which there was not the staff to manage a powerful central ministry and in which the na-tional system of communications lay in ruins.
While the structure and management mechanisms of the system were almost entirely Vietnamese, the school curriculum was more complex.
On one side, it reflected Vietnamese socialist and revolutionary edu-cational ideals. On the other, it was a product of the memories of pre-revolutionary teachers. The socialist goals were expressly stated in the regime’s official decrees and in its English and French language
propa-ganda. The “Decree on the Establishment of the Cabinet of the Minis-ter of Education” stated, for example, that the Ministry of Education was an organization “to protect and build the People’s Republic of Cambo-dia [sic] into a socialist country.”34A later report, published after the transition to the SOC, noted that a “new and progressive” education sys-tem had been created that would serve “to defend and firmly build the country on the way to socialism.”35
The socialist influence in the development of the educational cur-ricula was most clearly manifested in the history syllabus, in the empha-sis on practicality, and in the introduction of “political morality” as a subject for study. The remaining curriculum areas, in both primary and secondary education, reflected the subject matter of the prerevolution-ary education system. The similarities, in terms of the structure of the primary education syllabi, are illustrated in Table 1. Moral education had replaced the ethics and civics education of the Sihanouk era, bring-ing with it a socialist conception of what constituted a “good citizen.”
Study of the French language had been eliminated, while a renewed emphasis had been placed on the practical and physical activities that reformers of the Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods had called for but had never been able to achieve. Despite the changes, the curriculum
Table 1. Primary Education Syllabus by Subject, Pre-1970 and Post-1979.
Pre-1970 Primary Education Post-1979 Primary Education
Ethics Moral Education
Civics
Khmer Language Khmer Language
French Language
Arithmetic Arithmetic
History History
Geography Geography
Science and Hygiene
Manual Work Manual Work
Practical Knowledge Drawing
Arts/Dancing/Singing Physical Education Source: C. Bilodeau 1954, p. 54; and H. Rieff 1980, Annex XI.
remained a classical academic one. In respect of both the time devoted to them and the traditional esteem with which they were held, humani-ties subjects continued to be emphasized by teachers, whose capacity to implement a detailed curriculum was, at best, negligible. Success, as had been the case in the past, was measured by passing academic examina-tions and paid scant regard to the students’ capacity to demonstrate proficiency in the practical skills they had allegedly acquired.
Dimensions of the Crisis
By the end of 1979, UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had successfully negotiated an agreement with the Phnom Penh regime for the provision of humanitarian assistance.36A UNICEF consultant was sent to the country in February 1980, providing the first illuminating insight into the educational crisis that had devel-oped in Cambodia in the DK period. The crisis assumed three critical dimensions. The first was a crisis of quality, where deficiencies in human resources and physical infrastructure continued to debilitate educa-tional provision. The second was a crisis of orientation, with an obvious conflict and contradiction between the goals and structure of the system on the one hand and its continued reflection of a French educational curriculum on the other. The final dimension was a crisis of timing. In its attempt to legitimize its authority and legitimize socialism, the new regime, with the support and encouragement of its Vietnamese advisers, had attempted to do too much too quickly.
The crisis of quality was staggering. In the first instance, there was a chronic shortage of qualified educational personnel. While the min-istry was without adequately trained or experienced cadres, the short-age of qualified staff was even more pronounced in the nation’s schools.
A former student’s recollection that there were “many students in every class” is certainly corroborated by statistical evidence.37 By November 1979, when 716,553 students had officially enrolled in primary schools throughout Cambodia, the nation had only 13,619 teachers, at a ratio of 1 teacher for every 53 students. Only 4,000 of the teachers had for-mal qualifications.38In addition to their lack of qualifications, teachers had other concerns. “I was not a good teacher at that time,” said Mon Pon. “Every day I would think about my parents who had died, and think about my wife, who I could not find.” Troubled by the effects of the previous four years, with concerns about the whereabouts of family members, poor physical health, psychological trauma, and poor mem-ory and concentration, the teaching corps was certainly ineffective.39
Problems with staff were heightened by problems of infrastructure and materials. Systematic national data relating to the state of Cambo-dia’s educational infrastructure in 1979 was never compiled. Anecdotal evidence, however, clearly demonstrates the extent of the dilapidation and decay. At a school in Phnom Penh, for example, UNICEF’s consul-tant observed that a “grade one class takes place under a tree but needs to be closed as soon as the rainy season starts.” A school in Svay Teap dis-trict of Svay Rieng province was “an ex-hospital and surrounded by mines and graveyards of soldiers [where] children sit on [the] floor [and there are] no windows!” At a school in Prey Veng province, there was a “lack of textbooks . . . and insufficient furniture.” In each class, there were only eight pens per fifty students. At a Teacher Training Cen-ter in Phnom Penh, the capacity of the school was affected by a lack of chairs and tables, while at the Teacher Training Center in Prey Veng there was “no furniture.” The lack of materials was coupled with a short-age of school texts.40 A Center for Program Writing and Textbooks, staffed by seventy-seven Cambodians and several Vietnamese advisers, was one of the first units to be functioning within the ministry. By Feb-ruary 1980, the center had produced thirty-nine texts for use in primary school, several for secondary school, and a single text for use in adult lit-eracy education courses. Owing to a lack of materials and problems with distribution, however, few of the texts had been printed or distributed to the provinces.41
A final dimension of the crisis of quality was the learning capacity of the nation’s students. Many were suffering from either malnutrition or diseases, especially malaria, that they had contracted during the previ-ous years. Others continued to move about the country looking for miss-ing relatives they had lost under the Khmer Rouge. Coupled with these concerns, many students lacked basic shelter and clothing. UNICEF’s consultant observed, for example, that some children at a school in Svay Rieng were attending school “completely naked.”42
The crisis of orientation stemmed from the conflict between the sys-tem’s goals and structure on the one hand and its European-oriented academic curriculum on the other. The regime’s primary goal for the education system was to create a socialist society in Cambodia. En-sconced within the broad goal of creating a socialist political economy through education were more acute considerations of “Khmerization,”
“ruralization,” and “cultural identity,” all of which were expressly stated by the Ministry of Education.43
The leaders of the PRK, in concert with their Vietnamese advisers,
firmly believed that the education system would serve to build or con-struct and also legitimize the post-DK socialist state in Cambodia. Quite simply, the educational curriculum did not reflect the goals underlying this belief. UNICEF’s consultant observed in 1980 that with the excep-tion of manual work and practical activities, the curriculum was “rather classical” in nature. He also noted the problem of reflecting educational policies such as Khmerization, ruralization, and cultural identity within
“appropriate educational structures, content and media.” This problem, commented the consultant, was “gradually being considered by educa-tional authorities.”44
If only he were correct. Questions of educational structures, content, and media had already been hastily considered and resolved by the ad-ministration. A former official, intimately connected with the early re-construction of the system, remembered that the process began with two tasks. “First, we needed to recruit people from everywhere and second, we needed a structure.” The Vietnamese experts provided the structure.
Cambodian officials “did the curriculum,” he remembered, “but only with the approval of the Vietnamese experts.”45
The only resource available to the Cambodians charged with cur-riculum development was their prerevolutionary educational experi-ences. The process was not as simple as the ministerial official described.
A former official at the program writing and textbook center remem-bered much turmoil in the center after its inception. “The center was the largest department in the ministry,” he recalled, with “many officers [who] worked for the Lon Nol government and were from the Sangkum period.” There were few revolutionaries at the center, he said. As such,
“many people did not agree with the new history. Others did not like Marxism or Lenin.” There was much disagreement, with several officers leaving and fleeing to Thailand.46
The conflict over ideals was eventually won by neither the revolu-tionary nor the prerevolurevolu-tionary faction of the center. Led by the Viet-namese, who one former textbook author remembered as the “big bosses” of the center, the revolutionary history syllabus, revolutionary morality syllabus, and the emphasis on practical activities, were all quickly ratified as policy.47In all other curriculum areas, and in the ped-agogical methods adopted, it was prerevolutionary educational ideas that prevailed.
While the ministry, with difficulty, could manage the goals of Khmer-ization and promoting Khmer cultural identity, both ruralKhmer-ization and the creation of the “new socialist man” represented a problem. A former
ministerial official vividly recalled: “when we saw the word ruralization in the policy, we just put one hand over our eyes and read the next word.” Officials were aware of the policy, he remembers, but “didn’t know how to implement it.” Creating the “new socialist man” was the same. “Many people did not understand it and many people did not trust it.”48
In addition to the problems of quality, the crisis was a product of the regime’s failure to consider a more relevant, rurally oriented school cur-riculum. To be fair, the country was without resources and was being ig-nored by the international community, which may have been able to provide alternative ideas. As such, the educational leaders of the PRK had few choices but to draw on their past experiences in reconstructing the education system. It was, however, their embrace of substantial ele-ments of the “classical” former French-oriented education system that was to prove the greatest impediment to improving the relevance and the quality of education. Two issues are particularly significant. First, the French model as it had existed under Prince Sihanouk and then Lon Nol carried with it in the eyes of the people considerable baggage. Pri-marily, it was encumbered by a perception that graduates of the educa-tion system would be able to assume posts in the civil service. Employ-ment in rural production, in the eyes of those who were educated, was inevitably devalued. Second, the French-imbued system would prove to be a difficult model through which the government could build social-ism by their stated aim of “linking study to practice, school to produc-tive labor, school to society.”49
The crisis of timing resulted from the new regime’s steadfast and speedy attempts to legitimize its authority. Cambodia in 1979 and 1980 was a tormented and traumatized country, without adequate food, with infrastructure in ruins, with the family unit significantly undermined, and with a government that was continuing its struggle to wrest control of outlying areas still under virtual Khmer Rouge control. Despite the torment and the trauma, the rehabilitation of the national education system was pursued by the new regime with unbridled vigor and un-bridled Vietnamese encouragement and support. The vexing question then becomes why was educational rehabilitation pursued with such vigor, given that other social policy sectors, including the national health system, were in a state equally as dire as education?
Essentially, education was seen as the primary tool for state-building and establishing legitimacy. The rehabilitation of education, while it had humanitarian motives, was a massive exercise in hegemony, an
attempt to rapidly diffuse among the masses the regime’s socialist world-view. With the damage done to the socialist cause by the DK period, it was a task of paramount importance if the regime was to be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the people.