The term methodology is often used interchangeably with the word method. However, most methodologists make a clear distinction between the two. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.21) make the distinction as follows:
A research methodology is a broad approach to scientific inquiry specifying how research questions should be asked and answered. This includes world view considerations, general preferences for designs, sampling logic, data collection and analytical strategies, guidelines for making inferences, and the criteria for assessing improving quality…Research methods include specific strategies and procedures for implementing research design, including sampling, data collection, data analysis, and interpretation of the findings. Specific research methods are determined by the overall methodological orientation of researchers (emphases added).
Harding (1987, p.27) makes the same distinction, albeit more succinctly:
Methodology is a theoretical analysis defining a research problem and how research should proceed. It should be viewed as distinct frommethodwhich refers to the specific research strategies or techniques adopted.
The purpose of this section is to describe the methodology that was employed in this research. A discussion of method is reserved for Chapter 4.
3.4.1 Hypothetico-deductive and intepretivist methodologies
Guba and Lincoln (1994) distinguish between two main methodological approaches in modern scientific inquiry. The first is the experimental, manipulative or hypothetico-deductive approach. This approach derives from the realist/objectivist stance that an independent reality exists and that this reality can be apprehended in its “true” state. Hypothetico-deductive methodologies derive propositional hypotheses from a priori theory and subject them to empirical test for verification or falsification (Kuhn, 1970). Accordingly, there is a methodological imperative to eliminate confounding factors with experimental manipulations and controls because failure to do so would obscure ‘the way things really are’. Here, the goal of inquiry is explanation, the establishment of cause and effect relationships, and ultimately, the control and prediction of phenomena (Guba& Lincoln, 1994). This approach has dominated the natural sciences for centuries and until more recently, the social sciences also.
The second approach can be described as hermeneutical, naturalistic, or interpretivist (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). This approach originated in 19th century Germany when a group of neo-Kantian historians and sociologists, led by Wilhelm Dilthy, reacted against an uncritical adherence to the natural science model and its reductionist approach to human consciousness (Schwandt, 1994). They believed the natural sciences to be fundamentally different to the human sciences and argued for a clear distinction to be drawn between the two. It was argued that whilst the natural sciences could be studied through the external observation and explanation of regularities in physical events (Erklären), the human sciences should pursue a search for meaning or understanding (Verstehen) (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). This early perspective is clearly reflected in interpretivist methodologies of today, which show a commitment to a relativist/subjectivist stance, and an emphasis is placed on meaning, understanding, and description as opposed to explanation and prediction. Here, the goal of inquiry is theory generation as opposed to theory testing. The end result of this approach is a representation of reality through the eyes of the participants, with the meaning of experience and behaviour conveyed in context and its full complexity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
The interpretivist perspective is also reflected in the assumptions of symbolic interactionism. Blumer’s (1969) position implies that because people are actively and continuously constructing and transforming meanings and definitions in the course of interaction itself, meanings and definitions are subject to moment-to-moment change, and therefore, do not have the generality required of theoretical concepts from which predictive theories can be developed. As Blumer (1975, p.62) explains:
The isolation of relations, the development of prepositions, the formulation of typologies and the construction of theories are viewed as emerging out of what is found through constant observation of that world instead of being formed in an a priori
fashion through deductive reasoning from a set of theoretical premises.
Therefore, the symbolic interactionist perspective precludes a methodology that derives hypotheses about social behaviour from a priori theory (Stryker &Vryan, 2003). Rather, it is committed to an inductive
approach in which understanding or explanations of human behaviour are induced from data with which the researcher has become thoroughly familiar (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). In keeping with the assumptions of symbolic interactionism, this research employed the interpetivist methodology of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin,1998, 2008; Charmaz, 2006), the essential features of which will now be described.
3.4.2 Grounded theory methodology
Grounded theory methodology is an interpretivist-inductive methodology that emerged from Barney T. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss’s (Glaser & Strauss, 1965, 1967) sociological study of dying in hospitals. In this study, Glaser and Strauss (1967) were specifically interested in how terminal patients became aware that they were dying and how they dealt with the news. By observing this process in a variety of hospital settings, they worked to construct theoretical analyses depicting the social, organizational and temporal nature of dying (Charmaz, 2006). As they undertook their analyses, they outlined a set of systematic methodological strategies which were later published as ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ challenged many conventions of the hypothetico-deductive mode of inquiry that was dominating the social science landscape at the time. Consistent with the central tenets of the interpretivist tradition, Glaser and Strauss (1967) advocated an inductive approach that focussed on the development of theory from research grounded in data, rather than the testing of a priori hypotheses derived from existing theories (Charmaz, 2006).
Stated simply, grounded theory methodology consists of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing data to construct theories that are ‘grounded’ in data (Charmaz, 2006). It is important to emphasise that grounded theory is a general methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1998); that is, it’s a way of thinking about and conceptualizing data and offers a set of principles and heuristic devices rather than formulaic rules (Charmaz, 2006). As outlined by Glaser and Strauss (1967) the defining components of grounded theory methodology include:
i. Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis.
ii. Constructing analytic codes and categories from data, not from preconceived logically deduced hypotheses.
iii. Using the constant comparative method which involves making comparisons during each stage of the analysis.
iv. Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and analysis. v. Memo writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define relationships
between categories, and identify gaps.
vi. Sampling aimed toward theory construction, not for population representativeness. vii. Conducting the literature review after developing an independent analysis.
The original explication of grounded theory merged the contrasting philosophical and disciplinary traditions of its creators (Charmaz, 2006). Glaser had received rigorous training in quantitative methods and middle range theories at Colombia University under the guidance of methodologist Paul. F Lazarsfield and noted sociologist of science Robert K. Merton (Strauss & Corbin, 2004). Strauss, by contrast, had studied at Chicago University, which was renowned for its emphasis on pragmatist philosophy, Mead’s (1937) social psychology, Blumer’s symbolic interactionism (see 3.3.1), and ethnographic field research (Strauss & Corbin, 2004) .
In the decades that followed the publication of ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’, Glaser and Strauss parted ways and developed divergent versions of grounded theory that more closely reflected their respective philosophical and disciplinary backgrounds. Glaser (1978, 1992) formulated and advocated an objectivist version which came close to traditional positivism with its assumptions of an objective, external reality, and a neutral observer who discovers that reality and renders it in a value-free, unbiased way (Charmaz, 2006). By contrast, Strauss and his colleague Juliet Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, 2008) took grounded theory in a direction that was more closely aligned with the theory of symbolic interactionism: however, their epistemological assumptions remain more closely aligned with those of postpositivism which proposes that ‘one reasonably hold that concepts and ideas are invented (rather than discovered) yet maintain that these inventions correspond to something in the real world’ (Schwandt, 1998, p.237).
Charmaz (2006) has since taken Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) version one step further towards postmodernism. Her constructivist grounded theory denies an external reality and the ‘discovery’ of concepts. Concepts are not viewed as a direct reflection of reality but as mental constructions arising out of interaction with participants in a temporal, cultural, and structural context. The researcher and participants frame this interaction and confer meaning upon it, making the researcher a part of what is studied rather than separate from it. In this sense, constructivist grounded theory has a profoundly symbolic interactionist character. Constructivist grounded theory also privileges the perspectives of the participants over those of the researcher, which contrasts with the priority accorded to the researcher’s perspectives in the objectivist version. The foundational assumptions, objectives, and analytic implications of constructivist grounded theory are contrasted with those of the objectivist version in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Comparison of objectivist and constructivist grounded theory
Objectivist grounded theory Constructivist grounded theory
Foundational assumptions Assumes an external reality.
Assumes discovery of data.
Assumes conceptualizations emerge from data.
Views representation of data as unproblematic.
Assumes the neutrality, passivity, and authority of the observer.
Assumes multiple realities. Assumes mental construction of data through interaction.
Assumes researcher constructs categories.
Views representation of data as problematic, relativistic, situational, and partial.
Assumes the observer’s values, priorities, positions, and actions affect views.
Objectives Aims to achieve context-free
generalizations.
Aims for parsimonious, abstract conceptualizations that
transcend historical and situational locations. Specifies variables.
Aims to create theory that fits, works, has relevance and is modifiable.
Views generalisations as partial, conditional, and situated in time, space positions, action and interactions.
Aims for interpretive
understanding of historically situated data.
Specifies range of variation. Aims to create theory that has credibility, originality, resonance and usefulness.
Implications for analysis Views data analysis as an
objective process.
Sees emergent categories as forming the analysis.
Sees reflexivity as one possible data source.
Gives priority to researcher’s analytic categories and voice.
Acknowledges subjectivities throughout data analysis. Recognises co-construction of data shapes analysis.
Engages in reflexivity.
Gives priority to participants’ views and voices.
Source: Charmaz (2000)
This research adopts the constructivist version of grounded theory as developed and advocated by Charmaz (2006) because it is most consistent with the philosophical assumptions and theoretical perspectives upon which the research is based.
3.4.3 Grounded theory research with children
In recent years, grounded theory has been increasingly identified as an appropriate methodology for studying children’s perspectives and experiences (Woodgate, 2000; Greig & Taylor, 1999). Greig and Taylor (1999, p.43) have argued that the assumptions and techniques of grounded theory are consistent with contemporary theoretical perspectives on childhood and knowledge, making it an ideal methodology for researching children’s knowledge of particular phenomena:
The notion that [grounded] theory is created from or emerges from data is consistent with the view that that the child is subjective in nature and that his understanding, knowledge and meanings are subjective, and emerge in interactions with others in a given context.
Despite being identified as an appropriate methodology for research with children, the number of published grounded theory studies with children is limited. Of the studies that have been published, most have been conducted in the field of paediatric nursing, with a major focus on children’s experiences of illness and cancer, in particular (Bluebond-Langer, 1978; Clarke-Steffen, 1993, 1997; Coyne, 2006; Hinds & Martin, 1988; Sartain, Clarke, & Heyman, 2008; Stewart, 2003; Wenstrom, Hallberg & Bergh, 2008; Woodgate & Kristjansen, 1996). Whilst limited in number and scope, the insights deriving from these grounded studies have transformed the theory and practice paediatric nursing (Woodgate, 2000a, 2000b). The contributions of grounded theory findings to paediatric nursing suggest that it could be usefully employed to develop a more theoretically rigorous understanding of children’s knowledge of environmental hazards and disasters. However, an extensive search of the literature confirms that grounded theory has not yet been used in any published study of children’s knowledge of environmental hazards and disasters. Hence, this research represents the first application of grounded theory methodology in this field.