151Las acciones constitutivas «complejas» en los procesos laborales

Self-serving cognitive distortions have been studied in theoretical,

experimental, and applied literature. Gibbs, Potter, and Goldstein (1995) proposed a four-category typological model of self-serving cognitive distortions:

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1. Self-Centred: The individual places excessive importance on one’s own current views and expectations, needs, rights, feelings, and does not consider ,or completely disregards the views and feelings of others, or even their own long-term best interests.

2. Blaming Others: The individual externalises blame to other people, groups, or a temporary state (e.g., one was drunk, under the influence of drugs, in a bad mood).

3. Minimising/Mislabeling: The individual minimises the impact or harm of antisocial behaviour on others or sees it as acceptable or even admirable, or refers to others with belittling or dehumanising labels.

4. Assuming the Worst: The individual attributes hostile intentions to others, and assumes that the worst-case scenario is inevitable, with improvement in one’s own or others’ behaviour seen as impossible.

Gibbs et al. (1995) further classified these distortions into primary and secondary cognitive distortions. Primary distortions, which include the Self-Centred cognitive distortions, stem from egocentric bias and are characterised by a sense of entitlement. Individuals with strongly held Self-Centred cognitions who encounter resistance/obstacles in reaching their goals or desires are likely to react with

indignation. For example, in an extreme and internationally publicised case, a gang of youths who raped and almost murdered a jogger in Central Park New York recounted being outraged at the victims’ attempted resistance to the assault.

However, Gibbs (1987, 1993) also stipulated that even in anti-social individuals, such blatantly harmful actions to others can result in psychological stress, such as guilt and cognitive dissonance, arising from potential discrepancies between one’s

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behaviour and self-concept. However, any source of stress may be buffered by secondary distortions.

Secondary distortions (i.e., Blaming Others, Minimising/Mislabling, Assuming the Worst) serve to supplement primary distortions by diffusing feelings of guilt or remorse as generated by the primary distortions, and thereby act to protect one’s self-esteem and self-image when the individual is engaging in anti-social behaviour. In other words, Gibbs (1991) proposed that secondary distortions attenuate the stresses that emerge from the primary distortions. Indeed, early researchers argued that cognitive distortions mediate between certain types of social knowledge or emotions and social behaviour. For example, Sykes and Matza (1957) conceptualise self-serving distortions as misinterpretations that enable individuals to “neutralise” any guilt experienced as a result of their antisocial transgressions. Moral

developmental researchers Colby and Damon (1995) have hypothesised that self- serving cognitive distortions mediate the relationship between stage of moral judgement/moral self-relevance and moral behaviour, which presumes that self- serving cognitive distortions can justify anti-social behaviour that might conflict with one’s moral judgement, thereby reducing distress.

For example, using the previous example, the defensive anticipation or

minimisation of empathy or guilt that is enabled by Blaming Others was illustrated by the several youths who attacked the jogger, who blamed the assault on her being alone at night in Central Park. Blaming Others also extends to rationalising

victimisation on the basis of one’s own past victimisation. In addition, a participant in a study of incarcerated adolescents explained that he “really tried to prove that his stealing was all right because ‘somebody swiped my own wallet two weeks ago” (Redl & Wineman, 1957, p. 150)

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Cognitive distortions representative of Minimising/Mislabelling can also operate to minimise empathy or guilt. Yochelson and Samenow (1976) coined the term “minimising” (p. 499) to describe offenders’ tendency to play down the damages caused by their actions. For example, in the case of the jogger, the act was

minimised and mislabled as “wilding”, meaning spontaneous, uninhibited fun. Similarly, research has shown that highly aggressive adolescents are more likely to endorse statements such as “People who get beat up badly probably don’t suffer a lot” (Slaby & Guerra, 1988) and “People need to be roughed up once in a while” (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001; Liau, Barriga, & Gibbs, 1998).

Cognitive distortions of Assuming the Worst have been shown to be one of the strongest discriminators between aggressive-internalising incarcerated

adolescents and non-aggressive, non-internalising adolescents (Frey & Epkins, 2002). Assuming the Worst includes the gratuitous attribution of hostile intention to others. For example, Dodge (1980) found that highly aggressive boys attributed hostile intentions to another boy’s behaviours when their intentions were presented as ambiguous. Dodge, Price, Bachorowski, and Newman (1990) found a strong positive correlation between high levels of hostile attributions and high levels of aggression among juvenile offenders. In a longitudinal study, Dodge, Bates, and Pettit (1990) found that children’s hostile attributional bias and other distortions at age four were associated with previous physical abuse and were predictive of aggression in kindergarten.

Furthermore, highly aggressive adolescents are more likely to assume negative consequences to their reputation if they abstain from aggression. For example, they more frequently endorse statements such as “If you back down from a fight, everyone will think you are a coward” (Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Assuming the

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Worst also encompasses overgeneralisations such as “Everyone steals – you might as well get your share” (Barriga et al., 2001).

Overall, Gibbs et al.’s (1995) four-category formulation of self-serving cognitive distortion decompartmentalises self-serving cognitions into one primary and three secondary categories. It aims to provide a comprehensive and ecologically valid framework of self-serving cognitive distortions that are characteristic of

aggressive individuals.

Research utilising Gibbs et al.’s(1995) typology has found a strong

relationship between self-serving cognitive distortions and antisocial behaviour in both delinquent and non-delinquent adolescent samples (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Liau et al., 1998; Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2008), suggesting that cognitive distortions in non-delinquent adolescents are an important risk factor for delinquent behaviour that requires further investigation.

Studies have shown that the cognitive distortions that facilitate externalising behaviour are discernible from cognitive distortions that facilitate internalizing behaviours. For example, Barriga et al. (2008) found that in a sample of 239 males aged between 10 – 19 years of age, self-serving distortions (as conceptualised by Gibbs et al., 1995) were specifically predictive of externalising behaviours, whereas self-debasing distortions, which theoretically increase self-reproach through

processes such as misattributing blame to oneself or catastrophizing negative experiences, were specifically predictive of internalizing behaviours. These results are consistent with the findings of Leung and Poon (2001), who found that

aggressive cognitive distortions differentiated aggressive adolescent from their non- aggressive counterparts.

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Research has shown that self-serving distortions with overt behavioural referents (e.g., fighting, arguing, and temper tantrums) are uniquely related to physical aggression/anger, whereas self-serving distortions with covert behavioural referents (e.g., stealing, lighting fires, and lying) are uniquely related to verbal aggression/hostility (Barriga et al., 2008; Liau et al., 1998). These results are

consistent with findings that compared to non-aggressive incarcerated adolescents; aggressive adolescents reported more self-serving distortions representing overt behavioural content (Frey & Epkins, 2002). These results suggest that adolescents with overt aggression differ both cognitively and behaviourally from adolescents with covert aggression.