3-62. The following paragraphs contain basic tactical concepts listed in alphabetical order common to offensive and defensive actions and enabling operations. (See Fi g-ure 3-3.) Basic tactical concepts that relate primarily to only one type of military action or type of operation are addressed in the cor-responding chapters of this manual. In some cases the discussion of a concept in FM 100-5 has been expanded based upon difference between the operational and tact i-cal levels of war.
AREA OF INFLUENCE
3-63. The commander’s area of in-fluence is the entire physical volume
where his systems can influence the success of his operations. It may be irregular in shape and overlap another unit’s area of influence. It is not a control mea s-ure assigned by a higher headquarters. It is typically defined by the range of direct-fire weapon systems, the combat range of attack helicopters, and the observed range of ind i-rect fire systems and electronic warfare means. As a commander develops his plan in accordance with the military decision making process, he considers each of his subord i-nates’ area of influence when assigning areas of operation and missions. For a discussion of what a commander considers when deciding the size of a subordinate’s area of operation see page 3-23. The actual area of influence expands or contracts in size with changes in the factors of METT-TC, such as movement within the area of o p-erations, changes in task organization, or changes in the rules of e ngagement.
AREA OF INTEREST
3-64. The commander’s area of interest encompasses all friendly, enemy, and neutral actions, regardless of their geographical location, that can in-fluence the commander’s operations in the near term. It is not a control measure assigned by a higher headquarters. The commander’s area of interest usually extends beyond his area of influence. The commander’s area of interest usually includes Page
Figure 3-3. Basic Tactical Concepts
at least the geographic locations immediately adjacent to the loc a-tion of his own force. It usually exceeds the reach of his organic sensors. (See Figure 3-4.)
CLOSE COMBAT
3-65. Close combat encom-passes all actions that place friendly forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses
direct fire and movement in combination to defeat or destroy enemy forces and/or seize and retain ground. Forces conducting close combat are part of a combined arms team and may be supported by indirect fires. Close combat occurs throughout an AO whenever and wherever the commander needs to engage an enemy force with direct-fire weapon systems. Close combat is also necessary when the co m-mander is unable to keep enemy forces from closing with friendly forces or locations that must be protected. This occurs when an enemy ambushes a friendly force or attacks a sustainment base.
COMBAT POWER
3-66. Combat power is the total means of destructive or disruptive force that a military unit can apply against an opponent at a given time. It is a combination of the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, sustain-ment, and leadership in relation to a given opponent. The commander assesses his situational understanding; soldiers, to include their discipline, resolution, state of training, tactical skill, and inherent fighting ability; the capabilities of his weapon systems to include level of protection; leadership of subordinate commanders;
and the availability of supplies and supporting services in determining his force’s co m-bat power. The ability to synchronize the six m-battlefield operating systems allows the commander to maximize his combat power. The commander determines his relative combat power when he compares his combat power with that of an enemy.
COMBINED ARMS
3-67. Combined arms operations are the synchronized and simultaneous application of several arms, such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers,
Figure 3-4. Area of Interest Compared to Area of Influence
AREA OF
INFLUENCE
AREA OF INTEREST
air defense, and aviation to achieve greater effects on the enemy than that achieved if each arm were used against the enemy in sequence or against separate objectives. Weapons and units are more effective when they operate in concert. Each branch of the army provides unique capabilities that complement the other branches. A combined arms team consists of two or more arms supporting one another. The use of combined arms provides complementary and reinforcing effects and may have asymmetrical effects on an enemy force. The proper combination of actions and systems by the combined arms team is the essence of combined arms. No single a c-tion, weapon, branch, or arm of service generates sufficient power to achieve the effects required to dominate an opponent. (For more information on symmetrical and asy m-metrical effects, FM 100-5, Operations.)
3-68. Armor, attack helicopter, and infantry units are normally the nucleus of the combined arms team. However, emerging capabilities allow the commander to use any combat arms unit, such as artillery and aviation, to form that nucleus. The commander uses his combat arms forces in different combinations to provide flexibility in conduc t-ing different types of operations in varied terrain. For example, a commander may have his infantry lead in mountains and cities when moving dismounted, while his armor leads in open terrain. Attack helicopters can deliver large quantities of precision mun i-tions throughout the area of operai-tions. A commander can conduct decisive operai-tions using field artillery multiple rocket launchers and cannons augmented by the effects of fixed-wing aviation given the correct conditions. Air defense artillery destroys enemy aerial assets to assist the free movement of the friendly force. Engineers enhance the friendly force's mobility, degrade the enemy’s mobility, and assist in providing for su r-vivability of the friendly force. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) members of the combined arms team support the combined arms nucleus by combining capabilities in an appropriate manner to support and sustain the combined arms force.
CULMINATING POINT
3-69. A culminating point is that point in time and space when a force no longer has the combat power to accomplish its mission. It applies to both offensive and defensive actions. An attacker reaches his culminating point when his effective combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender, his momentum no longer paralyzes the enemy, or both. Beyond this point, the attacker risks counterattack and defeat and continues the offense only at great peril. A defender reaches his culm i-nating point when he can no longer effectively oppose the attacker. Beyond this point,
the defender risks the continued existence of his force and continues to defend only at great peril. FM 100-5, Operations, discusses the culminating point. Culminating points are closely tied to the conduct of transition operations. For a discussion of transition o p-erations in the offense, see Chapter 4. For a discussion of transition opp-erations in the defense, see Chapter 5.
DECISIVELY ENGAGED
3-70. A unit is decisively engaged when it is fully committed to combat and cannot extricate itself from the existing situation. In the absence of outside assistance, the engagement is fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at hand. A unit might become decisively engaged to hold key terrain, defeat a specific enemy force, secure a specific objective, or as a result of being placed in a position of disadva ntage by an attacker.
DEFEAT IN DETAIL
3-71. Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating the entire force at once. A smaller force can use this technique to achieve success against a larger enemy. Defeat in detail can occur sequentially (defeat of separate elements one at a time in succession), such as when a commander masses the overwhelming effects of its combat power against an enemy element outside the supporting distance of the rest of the enemy force. This allows the commander to destroy the targeted enemy element before it can be effectively reinforced.
DEFEAT MECHANISM
3-72. The defeat mechanism is the singular action or pattern of activities by which a commander defeats his opponent. It is not a specific force or unit. The specific defeat mechanism adopted by the commander depends on the factors of METT-TC. The presence of different defeat mechanisms, along with changes in task organization, signals the onset of different phases of an operation. For example, the defeat mechanism for an attack is to maneuver to isolate a portion of the enemy force, leading to its destruction or rendering it ineffective. In an area defense, the defeat mechanism's primary pattern is to absorb the enemy's momentum as he moves into an interlocked series of positions from where he will be destroyed largely by fires. A defeat mechanism may combine several types or forms of oper ations.
FLANKS
3-73. Flanks are the right or left limits of a unit. For a stationary unit they are designated in terms of an enemy's actual or e x-pected location. (See Figure 3-5.) For a moving unit they are defined by the d i-rection of movement. (See Figure 3-6.) A commander tries to deny the enemy the
op-portunity to engage his flanks because he can concentrate the least amount of direct fires on his flanks, while he seeks to engage his enemy’s flanks for the same reason.
Assailable Flanks
3-74. An assailable flank is exposed to attack or en-velopment. It usually results from the terrain, the weakness of forces, or a gap between ad-jacent units. If one flank rests on highly restrictive terrain and the other flank is on open te r-rain, then the latter is immediately recognized as the assailable flank for a heavy ground force. The flank on the
restrictive terrain may be assailable for a light force. Sufficient room must exist for the attacking force to maneuver for the flank to be assailable. A unit may not have an a s-sailable flank if both flanks are tied into impassible terrain or another force. When a commander has an assailable flank, he may attempt to refuse it by using a variety of techniques, such as supplementary pos itions.
Figure 3-5. Flanks of a Stationary Unit
Figure 3-6. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team Moving in an Echelon Right Formation
LEFT FLANK RIGHT FLANK
BP 74
TEAM TEAM
ENEMY LOCATION
TEAM RIGHT FLANK DIRECTION
OF MOVEMENT TEAM
LEFT FLANK
Flanking Position
3-75. A flanking position is a geographical location on the flank of a force from which effective fires can be placed on that flank. An attacking com-mander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions against a defending force to place destructive fires directly against enemy vulnerabilities. A defending commander m a-neuvers to occupy flanking positions on the flanks of a hostile route of advance for the same reason. A flanking position that an advancing enemy can readily avoid has little value to the defender unless the enemy does not realize it is occ upied.
INTERIOR LINES
3-76. A commander has interior lines if he can shift his forces’ loca-tions or reinforce faster than the enemy can shift location or reinforce. He can achieve interior lines through central position (its operations diverging from a central point), from superior lateral lines of communications,
or greater tactical mobility. The force having interior lines benefits in two ways:
first, its ability to shift effects more rapidly than the enemy ; secondly, its ability to rei n-force its subordinate elements faster than the enemy. (See Figure 3-7.)
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
3-77. Lines of communication (LOC) are land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with its bases. There are several different types of LOCs that support a unit. Supplies, personnel, equipment, and military forces move along these lines using any available transportation mode, such as highway, rai l-way, pipeline, and inland waterway. A line of communication includes the ports, airfields, railyards, and storage facilities that terminate the distribution system. Lines of communication also include those means through which information moves, such as satellites, wide-area network nodes, and computer centers. For any given operation the force needs a combination of LOCs that provide all the support the force requires.
Figure 3-7. Example of Geographical Interior Lines
ENYENY
Maintaining adequate LOCs is a key factor in delaying a unit's arrival at its culminating point. Field Manuals 100-5, Operations, and 100-10, Combat Service Support, address LOC in more d etail.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
3-78. Mutual support is support units render to each other against an en-emy because of their assigned tasks, relative positions with respect to each other and the enemy, and inherent capabilities. Mutual support ex-ists between two or more positions when they support each other by direct or indirect fire, thus preventing the enemy from attacking one posi-tion without being subjected to fire from one or more adjacent posiposi-tions.
That same relationship applies to units moving with relation to each other except they can maneuver to obtain positional advantage to achieve that support. It is normally associated with fire and movement (maneuver) although it can also relate to the provision of CS and CSS.
3-79. In the defense, the commander selects tactical positions to achieve the maximum degree of mutual support. Mutual support increases the strength of defensive positions, prevents the enemy from attempting to defeat the attacking friendly forces in detail, and helps prevent infiltration. In the offense, the commander maneuvers his forces to ensure a similar degree of support between attacking elements.
OPERATION
3-80. An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. It includes the process of planning, preparing, and executing offensive, defensive, stability, and support actions needed to gain the objectives of any engagement, battle, major a c-tion, or campaign. It also includes activities that enable the performance of any of the four types of military actions, such as security, reconnaissance, and troop movement.
PIECEMEAL COMMITMENT
3-81. Piecemeal commitment is the immediate employment of units in combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger aggrega-tions of units to ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively.
Piecemeal commitment subjects the smaller committed forces to defeat in detail and prevents the massing and synchronization of combat power with following combat and CS elements. However, piecemeal commitment may be advantageous to maintain m
o-mentum and to retain or exploit the initiative. A commander may require piecemeal commitment of a unit to reinforce a faltering operation, especially if the commitment of small units provide all of the combat power needed to avert disaster. The pile-on tec h-nique associated with search and attack operations employs the piecemeal commitment of troops. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of search and attack operations.)
SUPPORTING DISTANCE
3-82. Supporting distance is the distance two or more units may separate yet come to the aid of each other before they can be defeated separately.
Supporting distance is a factor of combat power, dispositions, communications capabi l-ity, and tactical mobility of friendly and e nemy forces.
SUPPORTING RANGE
3-83. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit, yet remain within the maximum effective range of the second unit's weapon systems. Major factors that affect support-ing range are the range of the supportsupport-ing unit's weapon systems and their locations in relation to the supported unit's positions.
TACTICAL MOBILITY
3-84. Tactical mobility is the ability to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another, relative to the enemy. Tactically mobility is a function of cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection. The terrain, soil conditions, and the weather affect cross-country mobility. Heavy ground maneuver units have good tactical mobility — except in restrictive terrain — combined with firepower and protection.
They can move on the battlefield against most enemy forces unless faced with an enemy who can defeat their protection and cannot be suppressed by friendly fires. Light ground maneuver units have a tactical mobility advantage against enemy heavy forces in r e-strictive terrain, but limited firepower and protection. Army aviation maneuver units have good tactical mobility in most types of terrain, good firepower, but limited prote c-tion. Extreme weather conditions can restrict the tactical mobility of Army aviation units.