Las drogas: ¿Qué son? ¿Cómo se clasifican?

I shall now go on to present and assess Jonathan Quong’s two criticisms of Raz’s account – the contingency objection, and the objection from manipulation. In this section I will argue that the contingency objection – which argues that Raz’s harm principle is contingent on the wrong sort of factual considerations -‐‐ fails for two reasons. Firstly, I argue that either Raz would not or should not find the counter-examples problematic, as they are not counterexamples at all. Secondly, I argue that Quong fails to take sufficiently seriously the role that contingency plays in Raz’s political philosophy. In the subsequent section I will argue that Quong is wrong to claim that the harm principle must rule out perfectionist forms of political action.

268 _{Ibid. p. 419} 269 _{ibid. p. 418.}

As I highlighted in the previous section, Raz argues that the harm principle cannot justify using coercion in order to prevent the pursuit of bad options. However, this is not because autonomy requires their presence. Instead it is because coercion is indiscriminate; there is no practical way to restrict access to unacceptable options without also interfering with an individual’s pursuit of valuable ones. Jonathan Quong does not like this contingency.270 _{He seems} uncomfortable with basing the harm principle on such an empirical premise. He argues that there would still be something wrong with coercively interfering with an individual so to remove bad options, even if we could do this without thereby interfering with the pursuit of good options. He does so by introducing two counterexamples:

The brain chip: Suppose that technological advances have made it possible to control people’s preferences via a chip implanted in the brain. The chips are so precise that the only effect they have is to prevent us from choosing bad options. If we only select good choices, the chip remains inactive. If it senses that we are going to choose badly, it prevents us from doing so.271

Albert, Carl and Betty: Albert wishes to get back together with his ex-‐‐ girlfriend Betty. The relationship was objectively bad for Albert: Betty is mean and manipulative, and Albert is better off without her in his life. Lonely, Albert decides to head to Betty’s house in order to rekindle their romance. Carl, a neighbour of Albert’s, finds out that he is about to do this and, realising that it is not in Albert’s best interest to patch things up with Betty, locks him in his house so that he is unable to see Betty. Albert was not going to do anything else whilst he was locked in the room (apart from see Betty), and remains there until convinced that he should not rekindle their romance.272

270 _{Quong (2011: 53‐60).} 271 _{Ibid. p. 55.}

In both of the examples above, we are able to prevent the pursuit of the bad without infringing on the pursuit of the good. Thus, according to Quong, the Razian harm principle doesn’t apply here – as autonomy does not require the presence of bad options, and there is no value in pursuing them, preventing its pursuit causes no harm. Implanting the brain chips and locking up Albert is permitted on Raz’s account. Quong argues that this is counterintuitive; “The examples suggest that there is something wrong with preventing people from choosing badly, even when this can be done without limiting their ability to choose valuable options.”273 _{This is because, argues Quong, the harm principle} should instead be justified by an appeal to the moral status of individuals as free and equal persons.274 _{That is, even if we can prevent individuals from pursuing} the bad without affecting their ability to select good options, we should not do so as this demeans them and treats them as morally inferior.

How might Raz respond to this criticism? Firstly, he might argue thus: to harm someone is to fail to secure them the conditions of autonomy. One such condition is independence. Independence is contravened through coercion and manipulation, which subjects the will of one person to that of another,275 _and expresses a relation of domination and an attitude of disrespect 276 _{. The} counterexamples above demonstrate a clear case of the condition of independence failing to be fulfilled. In both the brain chip case and the Albert case, the individual is being subject to the will of another, and hence he is not independent. As such, assuming that no long term good would be realised by treating them in such a way (as permitted by the paternalistic aspect of Raz’s harm principle), restricting the access to repugnant options in the manners suggested by the counterexamples would not be permitted by the Razian harm principle. By acting in such a way, the condition of independence would not be secured. Thus, the counterexamples are not actually counter examples at all. The Razian harm principle would not permit such situations to occur. In both cases,

273 _ibid. 274 _{ibid p 56.} 275 _{Raz (1986: 378)} 276 _{ibid. p. 418.}

attempting to prevent the pursuit of bad options means that the duty to secure independence is not discharged.

Unfortunately, this response is not available to Raz. As Quong notes when discussing such a reply, “if autonomous choice has no value when directed at bad options, why is it disrespectful or domineering to prevent people from making such choices?”277 _{In fact, Raz says elsewhere that it would be disrespectful to} ignore moral considerations in such a way.278 _{We do not respect an individual by} turning a blind eye when she pursues something worthless. Autonomy is a conditional good. It is valuable insofar as it promotes human flourishing. Thus, there is no reason to protect it when it does not so contribute. As such, Raz can’t appeal to the condition of independence in order to protect the autonomous pursuit of the non-valuable found in the brain chip and Carl and Albert cases.

A second response Raz might give is to simply say that the counterexamples are not troubling. Quong’s argument seeks to show that Raz’s position gives counterintuitive results. He does this by relying on the attractiveness of the moral status view. As we have seen, Raz does not justify his harm principle by an appeal to the status of moral agents. He justifies it by an appeal to the principle of autonomy, and his principle of autonomy argues that it is only of value in pursuit of the good. As such, there is no reason to protect autonomous error, and Raz might not be bothered by the counter examples at all. He extends the harm principle to cover paternalistic action, and if the brain chip or Carl’s padlock are necessary to improve Albert’s autonomy in the long run, then those actions are justified by an appeal to the harm principle. However, if the actions are not required by autonomy – i.e. if they do not improve autonomy in the long run – the principle is silent on the matter. It might not require the absence of bad options, but neither does it require their presence. Quong might find this discomforting, but this is due to the fact that, as he himself admits, he justifies the harm principle by an appeal to different moral concerns. Raz, with his autonomy-based reading of the harm principle, might be untroubled by these

277 _{Quong (2011: 58). Regan (1989: 1084) and Lecce (2008: 130) both make a similar point.} 278 _{MF p. 157.}

counterexamples.279 _{In order to secure his point, Quong would need to vindicate} the moral status view. But he does not do this.280 _{Instead, he starts from the} conclusion that Raz is wrong.281

Furthermore, as Quong himself highlights, Raz does not think that such contingency is a problem.282 _{He argues:}

It is an advantage of my argument that it does depend on contingent features of our world. The temptation to make abstract a priori principles yield concrete practical policies is responsible for many bad arguments.283

Raz would argue that counterexamples such as the brain chip case (but not, as Quong points out284_{, the Albert case) “diverge from anything we have experience} of sufficiently to make it impossible for us to say how the change would affect the merits of the issue.”285 _{This is enough for Raz to remain agnostic about whether} it would be justified to coercively prevent the pursuit of the bad if you could do so without interfering with one’s ability to pursue the good.

It seems that Quong sees this as a bit of a cop-out on Raz’s part. He argues that it is too strong to claim that it is impossible to have sensible normative intuitions about such cases.

We often ask ourselves questions about how we would react if the world were different, sometimes in different ways that are not feasible or ever likely to happen….But asking such questions, and considering our

279 _{Quong mentions this possibility. ibid p. 56.}

280 _{Nor does he do this in chapter three, where he appeals to moral status to argue for the}

wrongness of paternalism.

281 _{In fairness to Quong, he does concede that this objection relies on intuitive reactions, and that}

it is not meant to provide decisive proof that Raz’s harm principle is flawed. ibid. p. 56.

282 _{Quong (2011: 56-7).} 283 _{Raz (1986: 419)} 284 _{Quong (2011: 57).} 285 _{Raz (1986: 419)}

intuitive reactions to these cases, can help clarify our thoughts, and is a standard part of everyday moral reasoning.286

What would Raz say about this? I don’t think he would deny Quong’s basic point, that thinking about how we would react if the world were different might help clarify our thoughts. His point is different. As he says in a later piece of work287 his approach to political philosophy is essentially historical or time‐bound. Political principles should be constructed to apply to the here and now. This is why he remains agnostic about situations where we can remove repugnant options without affecting the pursuit of the good. We can think about these situations, and how we might react in them. But, we cannot draw any political principles from such thought experiments. This is because even if we can think about how we act in these imagined circumstances, they only apply to these circumstances, and not the ones we actually find ourselves in. There is a vast distance between us and the circumstances in which brain chips of the requisite sort are features of life. The “we” who hold the intuitions is not the “we” who will ever end up in the brain chip scenario. As Gregory Kavka says with regard to future people affected by a decision about a nuclear programme, we know neither who these people are, nor what they are like.288 _{It will not be us who find} ourselves in such a position. As such, why should conclusions made in such hypothetical circumstances apply to us? Thus, I think Quong is wrong to reject this Razian response. Why should Raz’s theory be judged now on what it would say in some currently impossible brain chip scenario?289

Hence, I do not think that Quong’s contingency objection is successful. Firstly, I argue that the Razian would not be troubled by the counterexamples. Secondly, I argue that Raz can maintain that rather than a hindrance, the contingency may

286 _{Quong (2011:57)} 287 _{Raz (1994: 170-171)} 288 _{Kavka (1982: 103).}

289 _{Kamm (1996) appears to think that the more unlike the real world our cases are, the more}

plausible the principles derived will be. “Real‐life cases often do not contain the relevant – or solely the relevant – characteristics to help in our search for principles” (p. 10). I disagree with Kamm for the reasons that I spell out above. The fact that we cannot coercively prevent folk from pursuing bad options without a general invasion of autonomy is hugely relevant in selecting our principles of justice.

actually be a benefit of his account; he can remain agnostic about the counterexamples.