Approving is necessary for attributional-responsibility on the valuing view as well, although a mistaken picture of the contrast between valuing and desiring (in terms of interpretation of valuing deep self views) may make this idea seem somewhat obscure. There is a picture of human agen- cy that pits what an agent wants to do against what she thinks would be best to do, conceiving of the two things as wholly separate. On this view it
53 Frankfurt (1988): 16. 54 Frankfurt (1988): 19. 55 Frankfurt (1988): 89.
is nice when an agent is motivated to do what she thinks is best, but this is either accidental or caused by the agent bringing her motivations in line with what is best; it is not that there is any motivational force to her judg- ment that a certain course of action is best. Given this sort of picture, it would be hard to see how approving of one’s course of action would be a necessary condition on attributional-responsibility on the valuing view. Valuing, however, is often held to have some more intimate connection with motivation. And once this is granted, it is easier to see the connection with approval.
This picture can be further specified in a number of different ways. For example, on one view put forth by David Lewis, valuing X consists in de- siring to desire X. Value, for Lewis, just is what a person would be dis- posed to desire to desire in certain ideal circumstances.56 If an agent acts in accordance with her values, and valuing is given Lewis’s analysis, the connection to the agent’s approving of her course of action is clear: the agent who values ϕ-ing has a stake in wanting to be moved to ϕ. It’s inter- esting to note that Lewis seems to take the intuitive connection between valuing and approving to be strong enough to support an account where valuing essentially just is a certain kind of approving.
While adherents of the valuing view need not be Lewisians about valu- ing,57 in order to make the view that valuing is connected up in the right sort of way with agency in the sense that could reasonably ground attribu- tional-responsibility, they do posit some sort of strong connection between valuing and motivation via the fact that an agent approves of doing what she takes to be the best thing to do.
56 Lewis (1989).
57 Given that coupling the Lewisian account of valuing with the valuing Deep Self view would make the account of agency hierarchical, proponents of the view, like Gary Wat- son, who criticize the hierarchical nature of the endorsing view might even have special reason not to adopt it.
To act on one’s valuing state in the sense that defenders of the valuing view conceive of it is never to merely act in accordance with what one co- incidentally believes to be good. Rather, valuing is thought to have some- thing to do with agency, and thus to have an essential connection to moti- vation. Gary Watson’s characterization of valuing makes this connection clear:
Now, to be sure, since to value is also to want, one’s valuational and motivational systems must to a large extent overlap. If, in appropriate circumstances, one were never inclined to action by some alleged eval- uation, the claim that that was indeed one’s evaluation would be dis- confirmed. Thus one’s valuational system must have some (considera- ble) grip upon one’s motivational system.
So the notion of evaluation here is in an important way personal; an agent’s values issue from a faculty that has a “grip” on her motivations. If the thought “it’s the right thing to do” is meant to have a grip on motiva- tion, it must be because the second thought, “and I approve of doing the right thing,” is also present in some form. Whether the second thought is a matter of the meaning of rightness, a truth about human nature, or a standing disposition that happens to be present in agents like us (or some- thing else), the fact that the agent approves of acting as she does because it is right seems baked into the story.
Watson explains that the sort of motivational power exerted by valu- ing is special because we are concerned to bring about the satisfaction of desired ends for some reason that goes beyond the fact that acting allevi- ates the suffering of having the unsatisfied desire. For an agent to value ϕ- ing is for her not just to desire to ϕ but to set ϕ-ing as an end for herself. And so an agent must not only be motivated to ϕ, but also actually ap- prove of ϕ-ing for some reason. As Watson puts it,
Now, it must be admitted, any desire may provide the basis for reason insofar as non-satisfaction of the desire causes suffering and hinders the pursuit of ends of the agent. But it is important to notice that the reason generated in this way by a desire is a reason for getting rid of the desire, and one may get rid of a desire either by satisfying it or by eliminating it in some other manner (by tranquilizers, or cold show- ers). Hence this kind of reason differs importantly from the reasons based upon the evaluation of the activities or states of affairs in ques- tion. For, in the former case, attaining the object of desire is simply a means of eliminating discomfort or agitation, whereas in the latter case that attainment is the end itself. Normally, in the pursuit of the objects of our wants we are not attempting chiefly to relieve ourselves. We aim to satisfy, not just eliminate, desire. 58
And so, on the valuing view, valuing is necessary for attributional- responsibility precisely because it guarantees that the agent’s effective de- sire becomes effective because she approves of her course of action. And so, proponents of the valuing view, too, should hold that approving is a necessary condition on attributional-responsibility.