Las investigaciones y los nuevos tratamientos

The two primary dynamics influencing the Battle of Algiers were the geographic terrain of the Casbah and the demographic makeup of the residing population. Prior to the 1957 battle, the FLN had already isolated itself from the French and the Arab communities had separated themselves from the rest of their colonial population in an attempt to demonstrate to the UN that they were, indeed, a free state, capable of maintaining their autonomy from the French. Additionally, the two opposing forces were not of the same culture, but separated by the heritages of French colonialists and Arab settlers. The segregation of groups provided a demographic safe haven within the Casbah from the French military and remaining colonial population, thus increasing the FLN’s ability to more readily recruit, train, and develop legitimacy with their supporters than could the French. This isolation allowed for effective insurgent training and recruiting, but also made the movement vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, the urban infrastructure

173 Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 27.

provided boundaries, restricted movement, and created ideal choke points to control access. These two factors, geography and demography, greatly enhanced the French military’s implementation of a tactical containment strategy.

Though the French did not deny the entire urban safe haven to the FLN, containing the Casbah effectively disrupted insurgent operations and slowed the movement’s spread to other areas. Additionally, this containment allowed for a more concentrated use of force within a confined area, rather than chasing the enemy throughout the Algerian Sahara or neighboring countries. Furthermore, France’s containment strategy put the French on the offensive and allowed their forces to determine the time and place of engagement. Tactical containment permitted the paratroopers to mitigate the risk to their troops based on collected intelligence, as well as minimize civilian casualties through a more targeted approach against FLN leadership, rather than through chance contact. With regard to the ‘tactical factors’ of containment, Galula supports General Massu’s initiative by stating that,

the counterinsurgent must pay particular attention to whether the area can be easily isolated and compartmented by taking advantage of natural obstacles, sea, rivers, plains…. If natural boundaries are lacking, consideration must be given to building artificial ones.¹⁷⁴

Though not specifically cited here by Galula, one can make the inference that the urban terrain can pose many advantages as well as disadvantages to the counterinsurgent. A confined environment allows for a more focused area to target for intelligence, as well as preventing both sides from rapid, open movement. The high concentration of a population also restricts the counterinsurgent from openly engaging the insurgent due to the risk of collateral damage, which would most likely become propaganda for insurgents to gain popular support.

Along with the challenges posed by geographic restrictions, demographics also play a critical role in insurgent and counterinsurgent operations. In many cases, there is a natural separation between the local population and counterinsurgent forces. This segregation from the counterinsurgent provides a natural level of security for the

174 Ibid., 99–100.

insurgent who is able to fall away and blend back in to his surroundings. Furthermore, this separation often prevents the counterinsurgent from freely moving throughout the area and going unnoticed. The level of support to the insurgents may not be strong; it some cases it may be derived from coercion. It is, therefore, vitally important for the counterinsurgent force to destroy the root of the problem and demonstrate to the local population that it is able to support and defend them.

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V. PSEUDO OPERATIONS IN RHODESIA

A pseudo operations, “indicates the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla groups for the long- or short-term penetration of insurgent controlled areas.”¹⁷⁵ The tactic of masking oneself as the enemy is as old as warfare, but effectively applying a pseudo strategy requires special skills, carefully selected individuals, command and control, and patience. As described in Chapter II, pseudo operators have been used to infiltrate terrorist safe havens and networks to garner actionable intelligence, conduct strikes, and sow distrust amongst terror groups. This strategy focuses on destroying a network from within and destroying the group’s operational capacity. Pseudo teams, comprised of “turned” insurgents who have been extensively vetted, provide a deep penetration strategy that is extremely useful for effectively targeting terrorist groups in safe havens.

This chapter analyzes the implementation of the pseudo operations strategy through the lens of the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. The Selous’ tactical success combating two communist insurgencies during the Rhodesian Civil War is unparalleled by any other special operations unit and provides a valuable analysis for understanding the conceptual framework and doctrine of pseudo operations. This chapter will also illuminate the advantages and disadvantages of conducting pseudo operations while illustrating the viability of the strategy to disrupt or defeat terrorist safe havens.

The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a history of pseudo ops, including their use in the Mau Mau rebellion, in the Malay Revolt, and in the Rhodesian Bush War. The second section offers a history of the Rhodesian Civil War pitting the white Rhodesian government against communist backed African insurgencies seeking majority rule. The insurgents sought control of the country after the Rhodesian government issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on November 11, 1965, formally severing colonial ties with the British. The third and fourth sections analyze the development of the Selous Scouts of Rhodesia and their operations

175 Cline, Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency, 1.

combating two insurgencies gripping the country. The final section analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of a pseudo operations strategy in combating terrorist safe havens and highlights the strategic utility of pseudo operators.