The study of ancient Pythagoreanism is full of contentious issues. For example, it is still a matter of debate to what extent Pythagoras was a typical Presocratic philosopher of nature. Recent treatments of the issue by Kahn1and Riedweg2 have tried to make Pythagoras at least a cosmologist of sorts, but they still use assumptions which Burkert’s care- ful critique of the early Pythagorean tradition make untenable.3In an- other area, however, there is almost complete unanimity among scholars concerning Pythagoras. Kahn asserts that “what is not controversial is … his importance as the founder of a religious community and the evan- gelist of immortality based on transmigration”4 and Riedweg similarly says “the reports leave no doubt that Pythagoras … paid special attention to the soul (psychÞ) and its survival after death”5. It is also agreed that Py- thagoras’ attention to the soul produced the most dramatic of results. As Burkert puts it in Greek Religion:
… a new general concept of a living being is created, empsychon: ‘a psychÞ is within’. This psyche is obviously not the powerless … image … in a gloomy Hades, as in Homer’s Nekyia; it is not affected by death: the soul is immor- tal, athanatos. That the epithet which since Homer had characterized the gods in distinction from men now becomes the essential mark of the human person is indeed a revolution.6
Kahn agrees that Pythagoras’ view of the soul “represents a radical break with the Homeric view of the psychÞ”7.
Beyond the revolutionary assertion that the soul is deathless and that it migrates from body to body, however, scholars have had a great deal
1 Kahn 2001, 34–38. 2 Riedweg 2005, 73–90.
3 See Huffman 2008a, 2008b and Huffman 2005. 4 Kahn 2001, 18.
5 Riedweg 2005, 62. 6 Burkert 1985, 300. 7 Kahn 2001, 18.
of difficulty in determining with what conception of the soul Pythago- ras and the early Pythagoreans were working. What sort of a thing did they think underwent transmigration?8 Because of the scarcity of relia- ble sources for early Pythagoreanism, scholars have typically had little to say in answer to this question and some, such as Burkert, have, in fact, raised more questions than answers.9He raises questions both about ter- minology and about the substance of the Pythagorean theory. Did the Pythagoreans use the word psychÞ to designate the transmigrating soul or was Empedocles following Pythagoras’ lead in referring to it as a dai- mün? Whatever term was used, what were the details of the Pythagor- ean theory of transmigration? Do all living things have an immortal soul? Was the soul reborn in plants as well as animals as it is in Empe- docles? Are souls reborn in all animals or only certain ones? Most fun- damentally did the Pythagoreans have a coherent view of the soul which could provide answers to these questions? There are also problems con- cerning the continuity of the Pythagorean conception of the soul. The standard interpretation of Philolaus, who wrote 50–75 years after Py- thagoras’ death, argues that for him the term psychÞ was not used to des- ignate a comprehensive soul containing all psychological faculties. In- stead it simply meant ‘life’ and was conceived of as a harmony of phys- ical elements, which passed away when the specific arrangement of these elements did. As a result, scholars have concluded that he either had abandoned Pythagoras’ belief in the immortality and transmigration of this psychÞ or perhaps thought that what transmigrated was a separate occult soul, i.e. a soul that has no role in the functioning of the organ- ism while alive.10 The discontinuity between Pythagoras and later Py- thagoreans such as Philolaus might even be seen to be reflected in the testimony of Aristotle. In De anima, he makes two basic assertions about the Pythagorean conception of soul. In one case (407b22) he re- fers to what he regards as absurd Pythagorean stories (to»r Puhacoqijo»r l}hour) according to which any soul can find its way into just any body. Elsewhere, however, he ascribes to the Pythagoreans what are clearly more sophisticated physiological accounts of psychÞ as either the motes
8 Furley (1956, 11) raises the problem when he says, concerning the Pythagorean transmigrating soul, “the problem now was to see what sort of thing psychÞ must be …”, but he does not answer it.
9 Burkert 1972, 133–134.
10 Dodds (1951, 153) and Guthrie (1962, 318–319) assign such an occult soul to Empedocles. For the status quo on Philolaus see Huffman 1993, 328–332.
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visible in a sunbeam or what moves these particles (404a17), a view which he compares to that of Democritus.11
In this paper, I will reexamine the evidence and argue that a simple and coherent Pythagorean conception of the soul can be constructed from it. Moreover, this conception remained fundamentally the same from the time of Pythagoras in the late sixth century until the beginning of the fourth century, although in some important details it did develop in sophistication, particularly in the case of Philolaus. My case will be based on three sources of information: 1) the early testimonia for Pytha- goras’s views on soul (i.e. those derived from Xenophanes, Herodotus and Ion of Chios), 2) the oral maxims known as akousmata, which may go back to Pythagoras and formed the basis for the Pythagorean way of life and 3) the fragments of Philolaus. These sources, so I will argue, in- dicate that psychÞ was indeed the word used by Pythagoras and early Py- thagoreans, including Philolaus, to refer to the transmigrating soul, which is also the soul that is the center of the personality during life. This soul was conceived of primarily as the seat of emotions, which was closely connected to the faculty of sensation; it was, however, dis- tinct from the intellect. Such a conception of soul fits well with the doc- trine of transmigration, since it is plausible that humans share such a soul with animals. Indeed, the identification of the human self with a capaci- ty to feel and respond to such sensations as pleasure and pain, a capacity which is shared with animals, is the foundation of the Pythagorean claim of a kinship between animals and men, which leads to the conclusion that human beings should take into account the pain or harm caused to animals by human actions. What passes from body to body is thus not the human intellect but a personality characterized by emotions and desires, which is fashioned by human intellect, when born in a human body.
The earliest sources of evidence, the early testimonia for Pythagoras, are the most problematic, because we cannot be sure that we are dealing with Pythagoras’ own terminology and see his views on the soul only as described by others. Rather than beginning with this evidence, there- fore, I will start with the fragments of Philolaus. Although there are considerable problems of interpretation even here, at least we are deal-
11 Philoponus (in de An. 69.24–70.32) says that it is ridiculous to think that the Pythagoreans literally thought the motes were soul and argues that they were speaking symbolically, but Aristotle treats it as a serious theory alongside that of Democritus.
ing with Philolaus’ ipsissima verba. In the genuine fragments, psycholog- ical faculties are discussed only in fragment 13, which therefore must be considered in some detail. The fragment reads as follows:
The head [is the seat] of intellect, the heart of psychÞ and sensation, the navel of rooting and first growth, the genitals of the sowing and generation of seed. The brain [contains] the origin of man, the heart the origin of an- imals, the navel the origin of plants, the genitals the origin of all (living things). For all things both flourish and grow from seed.
The first thing to notice is that the term psychÞ is not used here to refer to a comprehensive soul which contains all psychic abilities. Instead it is just one among a number of psychic faculties (intellect, sensation, root- ing, growth and generation). It is particularly noteworthy that it does not include intellect. As I have argued elsewhere, this peculiarity in the use of psychÞ is the strongest reason for regarding the fragment as au- thentic.12Andre Laks has pointed out that, in fragment 13, two oppos- ing tendencies in the development of a conception of the soul can be observed: first there is an attempt to distinguish a number of separate psychic faculties, second there is an attempt to unify them in one scheme, although the unification has not reached the point where psychÞ or any other single term is used to describe the combination of all the separate faculties.13But if the psychÞ is not a comprehensive soul in frag- ment 13, but rather one among a number of faculties, what sort of a fac- ulty is it?
In the hierarchy of living beings given in fragment 13, all living things share the lowest faculty, the faculty of generation and sowing of seed, which is associated with the genitals. Each of the faculties and the organ with which it is associated serves as an archÞ, which can be thought of here as the origin of a particular sort of organism in the sense of a starting point or necessary condition for the organism to de- velop.14Generation and the sowing of seed is an archÞ shared by all living things. Without seed no living thing can develop. If the faculties of
12 Huffman 1993, 307–314. The later pseudo-Pythagorean texts typically take Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions and try to assign them back to figures like Philolaus in order to glorify the early Pythagoreans and show that they had anticipated Plato and Aristotle. Both Plato and Aristotle use psychÞ to refer to the comprehensive soul, and it is exceedingly implausible that a forger writing after Plato and Aristotle would use psychÞ as anything other than such a soul.
13 Laks 1999, 252.
14 For Philolaus’ use of archÞ see Huffman 1993, 78–92.
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rooting and growth are added to mere generation, then a specific sort of living thing, a plant, emerges. All of the lower faculties are included in the higher sorts of organism, so that animals too will have a principle of rooting, which is connected to the umbilical cord which serves as a root for the embryo. It follows, however, that plants not only do not have intellect but also lack sensation and psychÞ, which are associated with the heart, and are the archÞ of animals. Animals in turn do not have in- tellect, which is the distinctive archÞ of human beings, but do share sen- sation and psychÞ with humans. What is this psychÞ which humans share with animals but which plants lack?
In my book, I followed Burkert in arguing that it simply meant ‘life’, which is indeed a common meaning for psychÞ in the late fifth- century.15 Thus, when the singer Arion is about to be killed by the crew of the Corinthian ship on which he has taken passage, Herodotus says that he begged for his psychÞ, i.e. he begged for his life (1. 24). Over half of the uses in Herodotus have this simple meaning ‘life’. It is clear, however, that both Burkert and I were wrong. Certainly it is a mistake to translate psychÞ as ‘life’ in fragment 13, since psychÞ is there denied to plants and in English usage plants are obviously considered to be alive. Fragment 13 itself, moreover, is clearly trying to give a hierarchical scheme of faculties and those faculties must be related in some way; the obvious conclusion is that they are the faculties of living things, so that plants are as much alive as animals and men.16 On the other hand, it will not do simply to identify psychÞ with sensation (aisthÞsis) as Laks does when he says “soul, localized in the heart, is recognized as being the sensory organ”17. It is possible to read Philolaus’ statement that “the heart is the seat of psychÞ and sensation” as saying that “the heart is the seat of psychÞ, i.e. sensation”, and this is probably what Laks intends. This interpretation is not necessary, however, and there are two problems with it. First, the other pairs of faculties used in the fragment, while connected, are not simple synonyms. Thus, ‘rooting’ and ‘first growth’ (literally ‘growing up’) are connected, but a root is not the same as the shoots that grow up from it. Similarly, the initial generation of a seed and the sowing of a seed are distinct faculties. In
15 Burkert 1972, 270; Huffman 1993, 312.
16 In my book, I clearly felt the problem, since in several cases I translated psychÞ not as ‘life’ but ‘animal vitality’. But one must ask what sort of principle of an- imal life psychÞ is intended to be. See Huffman 1993, 312.
the case of humans, if the male generates the seed but does not sow it in the female no offspring result. The parallelism in the structure of frag- ment 13 thus suggests that psychÞ is not just another name for sensation but instead designates a related but distinct faculty. Second, if we look at the other psychic faculties in fragment 13, there is a clear gap which it is a reasonable hypothesis to suppose that psychÞ was intended to fill: none of the other faculties account for the emotions. Moreover, it is com- monly supposed that animals share with human beings the ability to feel emotions such as fear and anger as well as feeling pleasure and pain. So I suggest that, in fragment 13, it is the seat of emotion that is located together with sensation in the heart. Philolaus nowhere else talks of individual organs of perception so that aisthÞsis appears to refer to the general ability to sense and respond to external stimuli.18 Such a capacity is clearly closely connected to feelings of pleasure and pain and emotions such as anger, fear and grief, so that it makes sense that the two might be paired.
Is there any further evidence for this hypothesis? The usage of Phi- lolaus’ contemporary, Herodotus, provides just what is needed. There are twenty-one uses of psychÞ in Herodotus, in about half of which (12) psychÞ has the meaning ‘life’, which I have illustrated above. In an- other 8 cases, however, the psychÞ is precisely the center of emotions in human beings. In three cases it is that in human beings with which they feel pain or grief at the loss of something or someone. Thus, the Egyp- tian king, Amasis, advises the Greek tyrant Polycrates to throw away that object which would pain his psychÞ most to lose (3.40); he later breaks off his friendship with him for fear that Polycrates will suffer some misfortune which will pain Amasis’ own psychÞ (3.43). In four cases, it is that which makes us show courage or endurance in the face of misfortune. Thus, Cambyses is said to make trial of the psychÞ of the Egyptian king Psammenitus by having him watch his daughter and son abused (3.14). Similarly, Herodotus says that, in order to restore exiles to their proper home, one requires both manly strength and a good/ brave (agathÞ) psychÞ (7.153). It is striking that Herodotus explic- itly extends the possession of this sort of psychÞ to animals as well as men. He comments on the forethought of the divine in making sure that those animals that are timid with respect to psychÞ and good to eat, are prolific. His example is the hare (3.108). Finally, the psychÞ is that part of us that feels desires. Thus Artabanus is upset with Xerxes be-
18 Burkert 1972, 270.
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cause, when presented with two councils, he chose the one that fostered his pride rather than the one advising that it was evil to train the psychÞ to seek always to have more than it has (7.16). Thus, in Herodotus, apart from its meaning life, psychÞ refers to that in humans and animals with which they feel pain and grief, that which gives them courage or endur- ance to follow a given course and that which desires to have more. It is thus the center of emotions and desires for animals and men. It is never assigned any intellectual functions, nor is it simply the ability to receive sensations. Herodotus’ usage thus assigns precisely the role to psychÞ which would make sense in fragment 13 of Philolaus. In light of Her- odotus’ usage, Philolaus might well have expected his reader to think of psychÞ as the seat of emotions and desires.
Twenty of the twenty-one appearances of psychÞ in Herodotus have now been considered, but the twenty-first is perhaps the most important for the Pythagorean conception of the soul, since it is an explicit refer- ence to the doctrine of transmigration (2.123). Herodotus says that the Egyptians were the first to say that the psychÞ of man was immortal and that, when the body perishes, it always enters into another animal that is being born. The psychÞ is then said to enter into all creatures of land, sea and air before returning again to the body of a man that is being born. Powell, in his great lexicon, classifies this usage under the meaning ‘life’, but it must be something more.19The Egyptians do not just say that first a man was alive and then various animals were alive but clearly mean that the same immortal psychÞ enters into various animals. In accordance with Herodotus’ usage elsewhere, this psychÞ must then be the center of emotions. For Herodotus, this emotional center seems to be very close to defining our individuality; it approaches the meaning ‘character’. This is clearest in the passage where Cambyses tests the psychÞ of Psam- menitus by showing him his daughter and son being abused. Cambyses is testing something that will vary from person to person and that very much defines who they are. So Herodotean usage suggests that the doc- trine of transmigration, which he ascribes to the Egyptians, involves the transmigration of a soul that is defined by its pattern of emotions. He ascribes this doctrine not just to the Egyptians of course but also to “some Greeks” who “both earlier and later adopted it as if it were their own”. Herodotus maddeningly says that he knows the names of
these Greeks but will not record them.20 Given the early and persistent association of Pythagoras with the doctrine, however, it is overwhelm- ingly likely that he is one of the people meant. Herodotus may be think- ing of him as the earlier figure and Empedocles as the later or perhaps he means Pythagoreans and Orphics.
Before turning to Pythagoras though, there is still a lingering ques- tion regarding fragment 13 of Philolaus. The parallel with Herodotean usage suggests that Philolaus thought of the psychÞ as a center of emo- tions. Did he also think that it was the transmigrating soul? Scholars have been divided on whether he believed in transmigration at all,