Comentarios finales
II. LAS ORDALÍAS INICIÁTICAS
1. C.P.D.j Vol. LV, 29 July 1910, pp. 862-863. 2. Toowoomba Chronicle, 19 March 1912.
He saw the policy, he told some of Fisher's constituents a few weeks later, as one which showed up the great distinctions between the Liberals and Labor. He asserted that while "the
former aimed at legislating for the people as a whole without distinction of creed or class", the latter sought the achieve ment of an entirely opposite objective.^ As one who had so often sided with union grievances in the past he could
hardly now attack unionism as such. But he did argue that though unionism and liberalism were compatible, compulsory unionism was an evil.^
The general strike in Brisbane in early 1912
crystallized his objections here. Brought to a head with the local state authorities' refusal to allow tramway
employees to wear their union badge, the dispute so developed that other unionists stopped work and commerce and industry
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were at a standstill in the city for some time. The
dislocation the strike caused made a deep impression on Groom, who was in Brisbane for most of its duration. Not long
afterwards he wrote to Deakin that the newspaper accounts gave no real idea of the situation's seriousness. The strike leaders, he said, were quite correct in their claim that
Brisbane was under their control.^
1. Maryborough Chronicle , 2 April 1912.
2. For a summary of his views see L. E. Groom, "The
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. How The Caucus has Defaced It", in Liberal, Vol. II, No. 2, September 1912. 3. A. A. Morrison, "The Brisbane General Strike of 1912",
in Historical Studies, Vol. 4, No. 14, May 1950.
4. Groom to Deakin, 17 February 1912, in Deakin Papers, Item 2191.
What particularly concerned him was the federal government's refusal to comply with the Queensland Liberal Premier's request that Commonwealth military forces be held
in readiness to restore order. Although, he asserted in parliament on 27 June, the states gave up their power to control military forces "on condition that in case their domestic power was not adequate to the occasion, the
Commonwealth would, in the hour of crisis, come in and assist them and protect them against domestic violence", in this case there was a complete abrogation of that responsibility. The federal government remained inactive, he speculated, because of its subservience to the unions involved. As a result, both life and property in Brisbane were seriously endangered.^ He interpreted the ministry's lack of action in the strike's settlement as connected with its preference for unionists in other spheres.
The act most often associated with Fisher's second government, the establishment of the Commonwealth Bank, also aroused Groom's reservations. Though recent writers have dispensed with the persistent belief that the eccentric Minister for Home Affairs, King O'Malley, largely created the bank, which was initially designed to substitute much of
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the work of private banks, Groom correctly objected that it
1. C.P.D., Vol. LX TV, 27 June 1912, p p . 221 -236.
2. See K. E. Beazley, "The Labor Party and the Origins of the Commonwealth Bank", in Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. IX, No. 1, May 1963, and Robin Gollan, The Commonwealth Bank of Australia3 Origins and Early History, Canberra, 1968, Ch. 7.
was going to undertake much of the work other banks performed. Nor did the measure’s relative moderation stop him questioning
its necessity in the first place. He was especially concerned over the government’s failure to divulge much detail on the bank's administration and functions. The Prime Minister’s
introductory speech on the Commonwealth Bank Bill, he argued in November 1911, was "completely devoid" of the necessary information to assist the House in coming to a decisison. Though the bank would apparently operate in the same way as any private bank it would have the added advantage of govern ment assistance. In every country which had a national bank,
he went on, such as Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland, the formative process was "a natural
evolution based on the actual experience through which people have lived." He saw everyone of the overseas national banks "moulded not by mere theorists, but by men who knew what they were doing, realized the financial needs of their country, and tried to devise an institution that would meet the occasion." No other country had ever "adopted the idea of a purely state bank", there being no precedent anywhere for such a bill as the government wanted passed."^
Because there already existed government savings banks in the states he could rationalize his opposition as con sistent with his long-held views about the preservation of federalism where states were effectively performing their functions. Like many other Liberals he was worried the government might be motivated to embark on irresponsible financial adventures with the bank's aid.
central feature of Labor's policy for the immediate future, the tax not only sought the break-up of large estates and the opening of land for agricultural settlement, but also
to encourage immigration and bolster defence.1 2 In the debate on the Land Tax Assessment Bill in September 1910 he claimed that under the measure it was possible "to do more than
impose taxation for the upkeep of government, and even go to the length of plundering the people.” Although he was forced to admit Labor had a popular mandate to introduce the tax, he accused Labor members of being "guided simply by passing waves of political thought and feeling when dealing with the constructing of an instrument of government." If his opponents were "guided by the opinions of those who ought to know", he went on, "and look at the scheme of government laid down in the Constitution, they will see that it is not fair and just or constitutional that we should mop up these sources of revenue without which the states cannot possibly exist.
As it turned out, his fears were not realized. Nor did the tax even fulfil its own aims. While right in his prediction that it would provide the Commonwealth with a
lucrative source of income, on the whole it proved ineffective as a means of promoting closer settlement. But what was
peculiar about his attitude was that he must have been aware that all the government was doing was to make nation-wide a
1. W. M. Hughes, "The Case for Labor", in Daily Telegraphy
16 February 1910.
tax which non-Labor ministries all attempted to introduce before federation.^ It was ignoring the real issue to see the matter as yet another Labor attempt to destroy the rights of the states. Nevertheless, in view of the socialist
theory found in some Labor arguments, it was not unexpected Groom should assume a hostile outlook.
He most vigorously denounced the government over its attempt in 1911 to increase Commonwealth powers in wages and
industrial conditions. One by one during the past few years the High Court had either struck down or limited federal acts
in this sphere. Other judgements disconcertingly restrained Commonwealth action regarding monopolistic practices. While the Deakin ministry enacted many of these measures, the
Labor Party viewed the court ’ s decisions with most dismay. Not only had legislation which it cherished been rendered null and void, but the Constitution stood as an impediment
to the fulfilment of the party's programme. Already Labor's 1908 Brisbane conference served notice of the intention to sponsor constitutional amendments for the implementation of the New Protection, the extension of federal arbitration
machinery and the Commonwealth's nationalization of monopolies. The bills that authorized the proposed referendö passed
through parliament with the required absolute majorities
1. For a full discussion of land taxation see J. M. Garland,
Economic Aspects of Australian Land Taxation, Melbourne,
1934. For details on the eighteen nineties see R. A. Gollan, "The Labour Movement and the Commonwealth, 1880-1900", in Greenwood (ed.), Australia, pp. 177-178. 2. Conrad Joyner, The Commonwealth and Monopolies,
during the 1910 session, with the government allowing Groom and other Liberals to protest to almost empty benches on the opposite side of the chamber. The referenda; were set for 26 April 1911, when two questions would be placed before the electors. The first combined wider Commonwealth powers in trade and commerce, corporations, labour and employment and the restraint of industrial corporations and monopolies. The second allowed the nationalization of monopolies, the judge of a monopoly being the federal government, not the High Court.^
Both in the parliamentary debates of 1910 and the referenda campaign of 1911, Groom argued he was still theoretically committed to the New Protection and any
constitutional amendment which would secure it but claimed that the proposed changes went much further. They not only threatened federalism, he contended, but also
insulted the electors in the lack of choice between the various proposals. He was prepared to support specific
amendments to correct particular difficulties, yet he stated that moves for unrestricted powers would destroy the
Constitution less than ten years after it was first functional.
Before the campaign got under way he put forward his views in his Notes on the Proposed Alterations to the
2
Constitution of the Commonwealth_, which many opposition
1. ibid.
2. L. E. Groom, Notes on the Proposed Alterations to the
spokesmen used as a handbook.’*" In it he methodically listed the proposed alterations, outlined their history and gave the case against them. A "Convention of Statesmen" who placed the peoples' interest above those of any party, he claimed, originally determined the distribution of powers
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between the Commonwealth and states. The proposals, he went on, undermined the federal compact, deprived states of
control over local matters and thus ff&nou»ly tendr-d to
impair the national government by unduly burdening it with them. He stressed that the Australian experience emphasized the need for a division between local and national affairs, especially in view of the desirability of the Commonwealth government bringing the country into closer connection with
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the other self-governing British dominions.'
Groom led the "no" campaign in Queensland and between his opening address on 16 February and the actual poll spoke
4
to about forty meetings throughout the state. It was
probably the most exhausting effort of his career up to that time. Most of his arguments were those already in
his Notes but were often expressed to appeal to the particular audience he faced. In Toowoomba, for instance, he maintained that if the referendB. were passed every industry would be subject to Commonwealth control. Consequently, state factory
1. See Deakin to Groom, 23 January 1911, W. Elliot Johnson to Groom, 24 January 1911, and Cook to Groom, 25 January 1911, in Groom Papers, Series 1, Folder 11, Items 916, 918 and 920.
2. Groom, Notes, p. 2. 3. ibid., p. 24.
and shop legislation, master and servants' laws, employees' liability laws, master and apprentices' laws, wages boards and labour legislation would all be suspended.^ He told an audience largely composed of farmers at Jondaryan that if the referendums were carried every farmer's dray entering the town would be interfered with. No one connected with trade or commerce would be outside the Commonwealth's
direction, but, he continued, primary producers had the most 2
to lose. Constantly expounding the argument that the
measures would mean a lessening of both state and individual rights, he spoke in large and small centres all over
Queensland of Australia's vastness, its differing conditions and the resulting need for a flexible form of administration such as that which already existed.
The cry of states rights of course involved much more for Groom than blind fear of the Commonwealth. Along with farmers who feared nationalization of land and manufacturers who expected interference with industry, he believed the referendum questions went far beyond what he or any other responsible Australian could ever logically justify. The primary task, he felt, was to consolidate on already attained reforms and implement future changes within the already
existing constitutional structure.
The referendgr results could hardly have been more satisfying for him. Although Deakin wrote to him three days before the poll that he doubted whether the proposals would
1. ibid. 3 17 February 1911. 2. ibid. 3 17 April 1911.
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succeed in the required minimum of four states, the actual extent of the "no" victory delighted them both. Only
Western Australia gave an affirmative majority while those who voted in other states overwhelmingly rejected the
proposals. Groom was especially pleased with the result in Queensland where the first question was defeated by 89,420 votes to 69,552 and the second by 88,472 to 70,529. The
figures in his own electorate were 14,694 to 5,040 and 14,555 to 5,159, and there were "no" majorities in two out of the six Labor held federal electorates in the state,
2
including that of the Prime Minister."
Groom, nevertheless, knew the campaign was not a clear-cut battle between the Liberals and Labor, nor even the government and opposition. A variety of interests united against the amendments, from radicals who were also federal ists, of whom the New South Wales Attorney-General, W. A.
Holman, was an example, to business groups which were willing to allow politicians to find arguments of principle as long as the sheltering structure of dispersed sovereignty
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remained. Groom himself wrote to Deakin that Queensland was not won on the Liberal vote and it "was Labour which
1. Deakin to Groom, 24 April 1911, in Groom Papers, Series 1, Folder 11, Item 940.
2. "Statistical Returns in relation to the Submission to the Electors (a) Of a Proposed Law for the Alteration of the Constitution Entitled Constitution Alteration
(Legislative Powers) 1910; and (b) Constitution Alteration (Monopolies) 1910", in C.P.P., Vol. II, Session 1911.
3. For Holman’s attitude see Conrad Joyner, Holman versus
HugheSy Extension of Commonwealth PowerSy Gainesville,
helped us to victory."^
The 1911 campaign was the last Groom fought under Deakin's leadership. On 8 January 1913 the latter sent him a telegram announcing his decision to retire because of ill
?
health." "It has", Groom replied, "naturally disturbed me very much". "Your leadership", he wrote, "meant so much to
3 the Party, so much to Australia at the present time."
Deakin's departure from politics, he publicly declared, was "both a National and Imperial loss." He had, Groom continued, been responsible for the development of inter - dominion
relations, laid the foundations of Australia's naval defence, fought to secure the federal Gonstitution, made the government more fully efficient and was largely responsible for much of
A
Australian liberalism's development/
though it was doubtful if Groom was fully aware of Deakin's gradual mental collapse which led to the
retirement,^ he was conscious of the pressures placed on his leader from within the Liberal Party. Already in May 1912 Deakin informed Groom of his concern that a meeting of the party's extra-parliamentary organization in Victoria watered down their more progressive policies, especially in the area
1. Groom to Deakin, 11 May 1911, in Deakin Papers, Item 2189.
2. Deakin to Groom, 8 January 1913, in Groom Papers, Series 1, Folder 13, Item 1020.
3. Groom to Deakin, 9 January 1913, in Deakin Papers, Item 2194.
4. Brisbane Courier, 9 January 1913. 5. La Nauze, Alfred Deakin, pp. 620-621.
of tariffs.^ Later in the year former Liberal Protectionists Hume Cook and Trenwith were denied Liberal nomination for the next election while Mauger nearly lost his place in the
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Senate team. Now with Deakin's going Groom was forced to wcrK more closely th*n cv<,< b w . ck opponents t . Much as he regretted the retirement, his own future would depend on how he adapted to the new situation it signified.
The most immediate problem was the selection of a party leader. Although Cook was deputy under Deakin, his succession to the vacant position was by no means automatic. He was faced with the formidable challenge of Forrest, whose own ambition to become leader deepened with the
knowledge that, at the age of sixty five, he would almost certainly have no other opportunity of doing so. The rivalry between the two was potentially very dangerous for the party's unity. Despite the virtual extinction of the Liberal
Protectionist element, among the Liberal parliamentary
members was a slight majority which favoured an increase in the tariff. Should the leadership contest exacerbate the division here a revolt from the losing group could face the
successful candidate. As a protectionist himself, Forrest had only to rely on the other protectionists to vote for him as a bloc to capture the coveted position. Cook, on the other hand, had to rely on the defection of at least two
1. Deakin to Groom, 27 May 1912, in Groom Papers, Series 1, Folder 13, Item 1008.
2. Hume Cook to Deakin, 20 June 1912, in Deakin Papers, I tern 13 2 7.
L i b e r a l p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s i n M e l b o u r n e , e a r l y 1 9 1 G r o o m t e n t h f r o m l e f t
protectionists to his s i d e . ^
The meeting which decided the leadership was held on 20 January. Aware of the dangers of a party split, those
present resolved for an exhaustive ballot without nominations. Each member was to mark one name on a list of Liberal
parliamentarians and the leader was only to be initially elected for the duration of the 1913 election campaign. It was also decided not to propose any alteration of the tariff,
so that neither group would have cause for dissatisfaction with the elected leader. With these preliminaries completed, the ballot itself got under way. In the first round Cook and Forrest each got eighteen votes, Irvine two and an un-named candidate one. In the second Cook polled twenty votes to Forrest's nineteen. The unauthorized publication of
the voting lists revealed the Liberals had, as predicted, divided almost completely along tariff lines. Yet had every member done so Cook would have lost. Instead, while only
two of the free trade element supported Forrest in the second ballot, four protectionists voted for Cook, two of whom were
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Deakin and Groom."'
On the superficial level Groom's choice seemed
extraordinary. Forrest and he had always been on friendly terms and apparently had many more beliefs in common than