I. Introducción
2. El Acuerdo de Asociación Económica, Concertación Política y Cooperación
2.5 Las reglas de origen
2.5.1 Las reglas de origen: marco general
first-tier suppliers remains
difficult. And from a supplier
perspective, compliance
efforts can be costly.
Generally, the audit process involves an inspection of the factory site, interviews with management and workers (individually and in groups) and an analysis of company files and records, such as time sheets, wage records and employment contracts. The time required to complete an audit can vary between half a day and six days, depending on the size of the supplier.
These CSR programmes can have a beneficial impact at the level of tier-one suppliers, improving some aspects of their social and environmental practices. They do not, of course, solve all problems at the tier-one level, where TNCs still face many challenges implementing their codes. Such programmes, however, can also place a burden on suppliers who are often the subject of frequent (sometimes weekly) inspections from multiple customers. And there is little investment in capacity building and training for suppliers, especially SME suppliers, to improve their social and environmental practices.
Beyond first-tier suppliers, the challenge of influencing the CSR practices of value chain members becomes increasingly difficult. Companies are beginning to apply their CSR codes to members of the value chain beyond first-tier suppliers (figure IV.26). However, the influence of TNCs at these lower levels of the value chain is typically very weak.
One of the key factors in determining the potential usefulness of company CSR codes is the power of the TNC relative to other members of the value chain, and the proximity of the TNC to those members in terms of direct and indirect dealings. Power differentials between members of a GVC can differ vastly across industries, and sometimes even across specific product categories within an industry. Within apparel, for example, lead firms in some product categories (such as athletic shoes) maintain significant power in relation to their first- tier suppliers, while in other product categories (such as t-shirts) TNCs have much less power over their suppliers.40 A significant factor influencing power differentials is the level of concentration at different levels in a GVC, as indicated by the market share that any one buyer or supplier maintains for a given product. TNCs will typically, but not always, have the most influence in value chains where they are a part of a highly concentrated set of buyers dealing with a large number of suppliers at the tier- one level (e.g. the branded athletic shoe market). Their power is much reduced when they are part of a large group of potential buyers (e.g. the t-shirt market). Influence is also significantly reduced as TNCs attempt to reach deeper into their GVCs. To influence the social and environmental practices of suppliers at the second or third tier, TNCs will typically need to form industry associations, join multi-stakeholder initiatives and/or rely on public policy solutions (figure IV.27).
Watchdog organizations, such as non- governmental organizations and trade unions, and strong national laws help to develop an institutional framework in which corporate behaviour can be adequately monitored and violations can be tracked and corrected. An immediate impact of the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh, for example, was a public policy shift allowing the formation of labour unions without prior consent by the employer. The strengthening of watchdog organizations, including trade unions, can have a positive impact on CSR issues by shedding light on violations and empowering workers to self-regulate the industries in which they work. These impacts can be further strengthened through a vibrant civil society network, including open dialogue and opportunities for press publications on all issues surrounding corporate environmental, social and governance practices. Figure IV.26. Application of CSR codes beyond tier-one
suppliers
Source: UNCTAD (2012), “Corporate Social Responsibility in
Global Value Chains”.
Note: Based on study of 100 TNC CSR codes. Indicates what value chain member the company says its code applies to.
Share of TNCs applying CSR codes to their suppliers, by type of supplier
Licensees Joint Ventures 2nd tier or beyond 1st tier 82% 5% 13% 23%
Orange indicates areas that have come under scrutiny for CSR issues. Size of box indicates relative power in the GVC.
Figure IV.27. TNC influence on CSR practices in the athletic shoes GVC
Source: UNCTAD.
Note: Tier 1: Use of company codes and inspections; Tier 2 and 3: Use of industry associations and multi- stakeholder initiatives (e.g. Better Leather Initiative, Better Cotton Initiative).
Branded Goods Retailer Institutional Customer Apparel Brands Agents Athletic Shoe Manufacturer
Textile Mill Leather Tannery
Cotton Farmer Cattle Farmer
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
b. Offshoring emissions: GVCs
as a transfer mechanism of
environmental impact
Trade and GVCs are the mechanism through which the emission impact of final demand is shifted around the globe. Manufacturing for exports was responsible for 8.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide in 2010, or 27 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions (roughly in line with the share of gross exports in GDP of 30 per cent in 2010). As developing countries continue to engage in export- oriented industrialization, they tend to have a higher share of emissions caused by final demand in other
countries (i.e. trade- or GVC-related emissions) as compared with developed countries (figure IV.28). Only 8 per cent of total carbon dioxide emissions produced in developed countries were used to satisfy final demand in developing countries, whereas more than double that proportion (17 per cent) of emissions produced in developing countries served final demand in the developed economies. Africa and the least developed countries account for small fractions of global emissions (4 per cent and 1 per cent respectively), but relatively large shares of those emissions are transferred through GVCs to satisfy demand elsewhere.
This offshoring of emissions facilitated by GVCs can have a significant impact on a country’s ability to achieve its national environmental goals, as well as its ability to meet internationally negotiated emissions reductions targets. Deliberations on global emissions reduction must take into account this offshoring effect when considering national emissions targets.
Engaging in GVCs, even when firms employ environmental best practices, will typically lead to a shifting of the burden of emissions reduction to developing countries, which often have the least capacity to address it. The situation can be further exacerbated by the energy sources used in different countries: shifting energy-intensive manufacturing from a country with low-carbon energy sources (e.g. nuclear, hydro, solar) to a country with high- carbon energy sources (e.g. coal) can lead to higher overall emissions even when all manufacturing processes remain the same. Addressing the issue of emissions offshoring can involve greater coordination between investment promotion and export promotion authorities, on the one hand, and environmental protection authorities, on the other, as well as coordination with the energy production strategy for the country.