LAS TASAS DE INTERES Y EL SECTOR FINANCIERO

Online social media were indeed a catalyst for protests in Morocco, but civil society also entered the movement at an early stage. Human rights

organizations in Rabat had been holding sit-ins in sympathy with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya during the winter of 2011, and there had been committees of support with Tunisia operating for years. Interviews with activists revealed that almost all of them had previous connections to the cluster of autonomous human rights organizations in Rabat: Amnesty International, the AMDH, and Transparency Maroc, to mention some. It was clear that several organizations, and the AMDH in particular, wanted to assume a leading role in the protest movement from the

100 start (Abdallah, Amin, et al., interviews 2011).

Amin, a member of the youth club of the AMDH, underlined that the Moroccan NGO sector had struggled to recruit youth to its organizations. He argued that the AMDH had been more successful at this precisely because it challenged the preconceptions many young people had of NGO activism as

“participation in endless meetings and noisy assemblies” (Interview 2011). In his view, most NGOs only managed to recruit those who were already

interested in volunteering, while the AMDH was better at reaching out to new constituencies and generations. Even though conditions for civil society organizations in Morocco were better than in Tunisia, the cultural and

generational differences that I discern between long-running NGO activists and youth remind us of the situation in the latter country.

Interestingly, older Moroccan NGO activists expressed surprise at the level of commitment their youth members showed to the emerging protest movement. Furthermore, generational cleavages manifested themselves in debates on strategy. The youth were more impatient and wanted to replicate the dramatic, yet successful examples of Tunis and Cairo, while “the old guard”

held back and opted for a moderate approach (Abdallah, interview 2011).

Undoubtedly, activists were anxious about how the regime would respond to such unprecedented mobilization.

While certain activists worked independently of formal NGOs and only expressed their views online, activist youth belonging either to the AMDH or the plethora of radical Leftist groups, trade unions, etc. in Morocco were also active users of new social media. This meant that the distinction between online

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organization and “non-cyber” organization of protests was even more blurred than in Tunisia.

Regardless of who shaped the agenda, the February 20 Movement benefited from being portrayed as a genuine youth initiative rather than a

“product” of the activities of mainstream NGOs. The AMDH itself was careful to underline the Movement’s autonomy and grass-roots character (Ibid). I interpret this narrative as an integral part of the Movement’s identity, but the responses of interviewees betray a consistent civil society involvement and influence.

Amin and Nadia described how civil society activists gathered to form the first coordination cell of the February 20 Movement (Interviews 2011).

Organizations such as the AMDH had chapters in more than 90 Moroccan cities, and encouraged these to set up February 20 coalitions around the country.

From the start, experienced activists from established associations formed the

“practical core” of the Movement, and ensured that its momentum was not lost.

The demonstrations on February 20 were therefore planned and announced weeks in advance, and Amin recalled how young members of the AMDH had worked day and night to mobilize people leading up to this crucial day

(Interview 2011). The long-established friendships and networks among these individuals greatly facilitated their joint efforts at pooling their resources together and preparing for the events.

Activists received substantial logistical support from their primary organizations, 99 of which established a National Council of Support to the February 20 Movement. Included were several trade unions, but these did not

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have an influence or capacity comparable to that of the UGTT in Tunisia.

Abdallah, himself leader of a local chapter of the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT), elaborated on how the Makhzen had successfully splintered and weakened the Moroccan trade union movement over decades, and that membership was very low compared to that of the UGTT. The Moroccan regime had implemented legislation that undermined the power of union delegates at the workplace, and several unions were too closely associated with political parties to be credible representatives of workers’ interests.

Civil society actors argued that their involvement in the Movement helped mobilization greatly. Traditional mobilization with flyers, posters, and outreach activities were relatively more important than in Tunisia, because of the limited reach of Facebook and Moroccan printed media. Television and radio, which remain under regime control, were not mentioning the Movement before the first mass rallies; while some minor newspapers were acknowledging its existence and potential. Still, the large numbers of illiterate people could only be reached if civil society and trade unions put their resources at the Movement’s disposal. Hence, the Movement’s online activity was

complemented by the efforts of multiple organizations, and their role increased over time in an effort to keep up the politicization of sympathetic groups. This effort arguably became more important as protests dragged on throughout the spring and summer months of 2011.

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